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THE PAST DECADES have witnessed revolutionary change in the banking industry. New
competitors to banks have entered financial markets; new technologies have been
developed, leading to the introduction of many new products (for example in the field of
derivatives); and the regulatory environment has altered dramatically. In the European
Union a single market for bank services was established in 1993, preceded by a full
liberalization of cross-border capital flows in 1990.1 In the US, regulatory authorities
have in the past decade allowed increases in interstate banking and various regulatory
reductions, providing for the most significant regulatory changes since the adoption of the
Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.2 Whereas the financial sector was a symbol of stability in the
1950s and 1960s, many countries in recent years have seen the greatest frequency of bank
failures since the Great Depression.
The impact of technological progress on information processing has been a key
factor in bringing about many of these changes. Increased technological ability to process
and transfer information has enabled truly global markets for many financial services to
1 See Van Wensveen (1989) for an overview of issues associated with the creation of a single market for
bank services in Europe.
2 Diamond and Dybvig (1986) give implications for bank regulation of changes in the US banking industry.
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be established, has increased competition, and has led to the development of new
products. Therefore many of the changes are (or were) more or less inevitable.
Of course, these developments in real-world banking have not left banking theory
untouched. This theory has been substantially reconfigured in the past twenty years.
While in practice information technology has played a central role, also in banking theory
new insights about the role of information have acted as a catalyst for change.
Researchers have recognized that the banks' role as processors of information about their
customers may well be central to understanding why banks exist and how they function.
Banking theory is important. Without theory, past experience -- however
valuable -- would be the only teacher available. Without a theoretical framework, the
overwhelming tide of past events would make it virtually impossible to see the wood for
the trees. Moreover, the current environment in banking is largely outside our past
experience. Therefore experience alone could never provide the insights needed to
understand events and to shape policies to respond to them. Theory provides the insights.
This dissertation deals with banking theory. A sentence like this often sends an
implicit yet clear message to the reader: "If you are not a theorist, put this book aside. It
is not meant for you." The non-theorist reader then labels the thesis irrelevant and files it
in some obscure place. This introductory chapter, however, will attempt to explain the
relevance of modem banking theory to non-theorists, and to make this theory -- and this
dissertation in particular -- palatable to a more general audience of people interested in or
involved with banking. The style of this chapter, therefore, differs from the rest of the
thesis. Theorists may take this introduction for granted and directly tum to the more
sophisticated material in the other chapters. Practitioners could treat chapters 2 to 5 of
this thesis as if they were "only" a huge theoretical Appendix.
This introductory chapter does not pretend to be a complete survey article of
banking theory, for two reasons. The first is that completeness, if at all attainable, comes
at the cost of blurring the question that should be answered in any dissertation's
introductory chapter: Why was the thesis written at all? At the risk of somewhat
overstating the importance of this dissertation, I use the introduction to focus on the
dissertation's practical relevance. The second reason why this chapter has no pretention of
being complete is that it has no need to be complete. Some excellent surveys of banking
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theory exist already, such as Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) (about as close to
completeness as one could wish for), Boot and Van Goor (1994) (in Dutch), van Darnrne
(1994), Diamond and Dybvig (1986) (regulatory issues), Hellwig (1990), Sijben (1993)
(focusing on links between the financial and the real sector of the economy and on
financial fragility) and Vives (1990) (regulatory issues). Dowd (1992) focuses on the
optimality of debt contracts.
Section 1.1 discusses the tool-kit of current research on banking: game theory and
agency theory. Subsequently, section 1.2 describes some important recent developments
in the field of banking theory. This dissertation's contributions to the literature are
discussed in section 1.3. Section 1.4 concludes the introduction.
1.1. Game theory and agency models
Game theory: The science of strategy'
When, say, a firm manager wrestles with a strategic problem, he has to reason through
how other parties are going to act or react. What will his rivals do if he decides to build a
new plant? Will his employees work harder if he increases bonuses? How will
shareholders react to a dividend increase? To get the best answers to such questions, he
imagines himself in the other parties' shoes and seriously investigates their aims and the
options open to them. Insights from this investigation shed light on which path would be
the best to take.
Traditional economic theory largely ignored such interactions between parties.
Until game theory came along, theorists usually neglected the effects of the behavior of
one firm (or any other decision-making unit) on the behavior of others. That may be
acceptable in case of a monopolist firm without competitors, or when in a perfectly
competitive market the individual firm's actions do not make any difference to the overall
picture. However, in most cases managers cannot ignore the effects of their decisions on
the behavior of other parties. The traditional assumption that one firm's actions do not
3 This section borrows from McMillan (1992), Rasmusen (1989) and The Economist, October 15th 1994.
Van Damme and Heertje (1994) provide an interesting discussion of game theory in Dutch, focusing on tbe
contributions of the 1994 Nobel Prize laureates John Nash, Reinhard Selten and John Harsanyi.
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affect the actions of others reflects the exception rather than the rule.
In away, many business decisions are made like decisions in games. No chess
player moves his pieces without thinking about his opponent's reaction. The same holds
for good managers. According to IBM's founder Thomas J. Watson Sr., quoted by
McMillan (1992), "business is a game, the greatest game in the world if you know how
to play it."
Given the importance of strategic interactions, the usefulness of game theory can
be easily understood. Game theory deals with strategic interactions and provides a tool for
thinking about questions of strategy. It is about making optimal decisions in the light of
other parties' optimal responses. Or, more formally: "Game theory is the study of
rational behavior in situations involving interdependence" (McMillan 1992). In this
context, rational behavior means that the players pursue their goals in a purposeful,
systematic way. The goals themselves are taken as given. Whether a game theorist defines
a person to be rational, therefore, does not depend on that person's goals, but only on
how these goals are pursued. In addition, game theory assumes that the players know that
each player is rational.
Interdependence means that the actions of some player in a game affect the other
players. When deciding what to do, players must take into account all interdependencies
they are aware of. These interdependencies usually have two sides. On the one hand,
players often have a common interest in increasing "the size of the pie." On the other
hand, their interests often conflict with regard to how the pie should be divided. These
conflicts may reduce the size of the pie.
The classic example of this point is the Prisoner's Dilemma, a situation in which
individuals are in a conflict that hurts all of them. An example in banking is the
following. Consider two banks, called A and B, who do not have branch offices in some
village. Currently, these banks serve the villagers from a distant office and each bank
earns a profit of Dfl. 4,000 by providing these services. Both banks have the option to
open a branch in the village.
Suppose that if one bank opens a new branch office in the village and the other
does not, the expanding bank captures the entire market and is able to raise its profit to
Dfl. 10,000; the other bank's profit falls to zero. Moreover, assume that if both banks
simultaneously open a new branch, the profit of each bank declines to Dfl. 1,000 as a
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result of the start-up cost.
Now consider bank A. If B chooses to open a branch, A earns Dfl. 1,000 if it also
opens an office, but earns zero if it does not open one. If B chooses not to open a branch,
A earns Dfl. 10,000 it opens one, but earns Dfl. 4,000 if it chooses to maintain the status
quo by not opening a branch. In either case A is better off if it decides to open a branch.
For B exactly the same reasoning holds. As a result, both players open a branch and earn
a profit of only Dfl. 1,000, whereas if they both would have decided not to open a branch
they would still have earned a profit of Dfl. 4,000. Thus, the players' conflicting interests
in increasing their share of the profits lead to a situation in which the amount of profits
earned leaves both worse off.
Conflicts that hurt all the parties involved crop up in many different situations. In
game theory many models feature a trade-off in which distributional conflicts decrease the
total size of the pie.
The prominence of game theory was recently confirmed by the fact that the game
theorists Nash, Selten and Harsanyi were awarded the 1994 Nobel Prize in Economics. In
the light of the enormous influence of game theory on ideas about industrial organization,
banking, corporate finance, monetary economics, trade policy, bargaining theory and
virtually every other field of economics, this came as no surprise.
Agency and asymmetric information
Game theory has been used to study many different types of problems. Some of the most
relevant games have an interesting complication: information problems. One class of
models in which some people have more information than others consists of the so-caUed
"principal-agent models." This class is particularly relevant for banking theory. An
agency relationship exists when someone ("the agent") acts on behalf of someone else
("the principal"), and when as a result a conflict of interest may arise." Examples of
agency relationships abound: Managers act on behalf of their shareholders; employees
supply labor to their employers; doctors serve their patients; politicians represent their
voters, etc. In banking, agency relationships include bankers lending their depositors'
\
I
4 See Hart and Holmstrom (1987) for an excellent discussion of agency theory.
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I
I money to borrowers; firms investing bank loans; bank regulators serving the interests of
depositors or the general public, etc.
Suppose that the objectives of agents would always be in line with the objectives
of the principal. In that case the relationships between principals and agents would not
\ involve any specific agency problems. In the real world, however, objectives often cannot
I be automatically aligned. Employees (including bank employees) may prefer a quiet life,
whereas employers want them to work hard. In the absence of sanctions, borrowers
I
would rather keep a bank's money than repay it. Conflicting interests induce agency
problems and make the study of these problems relevant.
Conflicts of interest arise with information problems. Suppose that the principal
and the court (which has to enforce contracts) would be able to perfectly observe all the
agent's actions and characteristics. Then agency problems would not exist. The contract
between principal and agent could state that the agent would be rewarded for his services
only if he (the agent) would behave perfectly in line with the principal's goals. For
instance, the principal would then pay the employee only if the employee would do the
best he could.
Do outsiders, however, know whether the employee works at 100% or only 89%
of his abilities? Such all-knowing persons exist rarely in practice. Even Goethe's Faust
had to admit that he was not all-knowing: "Allwissend bin ich nicht, doch viel ist mir
bewusst" (Goethe, Faust I, Studierzimmer, 1582). Lack of perfect information creates
agency problems. Information problems (usually referred to as asymmetric informations
may allow some employees to work less hard than they would if bosses could perfectly
measure effort; these problems tempt some managers to pursue status rather than profit
maximization, induce some dentists to pull molars they should not have pulled, give some
borrowers the opportunity to run away with depositors' money, etc.
Thus, information as a topic is very important in economics. However, only since
the late 1960s has there been significant work done on asymmetric information in
economic theory. At this moment information economics is a prominent and widely
applied strand of the literature. As Rasmusen (1989) notes, in the old days an economist's
generic answer to someone who brought up peculiar behavior that seemed to contradict
basic theory was "It must be some kind of price discrimination." Today, he says, we have
a new answer: "It must be some kind of asymmetric information. "
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Let me briefly recap the general structure of an agency problem. If the principal
hires an agent to perform a task, the agent usually acquires an informational advantage
about his abilities and characteristics (his "type"), his actions, or the outside world at
some point in time. So in the principal-agent model the principal is the player with an
informational disadvantage. The agent has more information than the principal does. This
usually gives the agent some incentive to act against the principal's interests.
In general, agency analysis attempts to characterize the optimal way to deal with
the incentive problem. How could this be done? To reduce agency problems, the principal
may invest effort to acquire additional information, thus minimizing the informational
asymmetry. In the former communist countries, for example, governments tried hard to
become omniscient in order to prevent the agency problems inherent in a communist
economic system. The main focus of principal-agent theory, however, is to deliver some
optimal reward structure for the agent that alleviates the agency problem. The reward
structure can be based only on information that can be included in the contract. For
•
example, an agency problem between a salesperson who prefers to exert low effort and
his boss who prefers high sales, can be mitj$ated by paying the salesperson contingent on
his (observable and contractible) sales.
At this point it would be useful to look again briefly at the subtitle of this
dissertation. Also the non-technical reader should now have some idea of its meaning.
The thesis characterizes contracts that optimally deal with various agency problems in
banking and corporate finance.
Returning to agency in general, agency models can be distinguished into two
general classes, based on the particular information asymmetry involved. The first class
consists of all models featuring prior asymmetric information about the agent's type (for
instance about whether the agent is talented or untalented). We place these models under
the heading of adverse selection. So in an adverse selection model the agent is privately
aware of some "unchangeable" characteristic about himself or his merchandise already
before he starts interacting with the principal. 5 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that
adverse selection problems may, for instance, lead to credit rationing. Suppose two kinds
5 The classic adverse selection problem is Akerlof's (1970) 'lemons' problem in the used car market.
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of borrowers exist: "good" ones (with high success probabilities) and "bad" ones (with
low probabilities to succeed), and that banks cannot see the difference. Bad borrowers
may be willing to pay higher interest rates than good borrowers would pay, because bad
borrowers perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be low. So if banks raise
interest rates, the average "riskiness" of the portfolio of borrowers may rise. This adverse
effect may at some point reduce the bank's overall profit. The bank picks the interest rate
that maximizes bank profit. At this interest rate some borrowers may be denied credit,
even though they would be willing to pay even higher interest rates for the loan. The
interest rate does not rise, because higher interest rates would attract a relatively large
share of risky borrowers, thus reducing bank profit. Hence, credit is rationed.
In models of adverse selection, agents may credibly signal their type by taking an
observable action that is more costly for one type of agents than for another type. A well-
known example in banking is Bester's (1985) idea that the use of collateral may eliminate
the credit rationing problem identified by Stiglitz and Weiss. "Good" borrowers will be
more willing to bring in collateral to secure a loan than "bad" borrowers, because the
good ones are less likely to lose the collateral. A high amount of collateral may,
therefore, signal good borrower quality. In this dissertation, chapter 5 provides a clear
example of an adverse selection model: The borrower's type ("low-risk" or "high-risk") is
unobservable to the bank. The bank's goal is to identify the low-risk borrowers because
these are more profitable.
The second general class of agency problems consists of models of moral hazard.
I
In these models information asymmetries arise later in time, after the agent and the
principal have started to interact. In one subcategory the agent at some point in time
observes new information which the principal does not observe. For instance, the
I borrower, not the bank, privately observes the outcome of a debt-financed investmentproject." In the other subcategory of moral hazard problems, at one point in time the
agent takes an action that the principal does not observe. For instance, in chapter 3 of this
thesis the depositor does not observe whether the bank invests the depositor's money in a
profitable or a less profitable investment project.
6 This problem of "costly state verification" (Townsend 1979) is important in the banking literature. If the
entrepreneur privately observes the outcome of a project, financiers will generally prefer a debt contract, see
Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
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Methodological criticisms
Criticism of economic theory often focuses on the assumption that people act perfectly
rational. In reality, people (including economists) do not always seem to behave I
rationally. Rational behavior implies, for instance, that if shirking or fraud is profitable, /
profit-maximizing people will display this kind of behavior. Of course, in real life many I
people would not rigorously exploit such situations, even if there were no mechanisms at
work that would prevent them from doing so. However, a comparison with law gives
some motivation of the rationality assumption. The observation that most people would
.. never consider breaking a law has not prevented the introduction of laws. Lawmakers
choose as their starting point the worst-case yet realistic scenario that people may be
inclined to display behavior they should not display. The rationality assumption in agency
can, in some cases, be motivated by a similar reasoning. Agency theory deals with
optimal contracts. Contracts, like laws, are designed to bind those parties that would
otherwise rigorously exploit any given situation -- a case which the rationality assumption I
may cover. A more convincing discussion of the rationality assumption, however, is given
by Gary Becker in his 1992 Nobel lecture:
"Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic [way of looking at behavior .. J does not
assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method
of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. [..J Since the economic, or
rational choice, approach to behavior builds on a theory of individual decisions, criticisms
of this theory usually concentrate on particular assumptions about how these decisions are
made. Among other things, critics deny that individuals act consistently over time, and
question whether behavior is forward-looking. [However, ..J no approach of comparable
generality has yet been developed that offers serious competition to rational choice theory.
[ .. J My work may have sometimes assumed too much rationality, but I believe it has been
an antidote to the extensive research that does not credit people with enough rationality. "
A second criticism of economic theory concerns the use of models. Real-life
economic situations are often very complicated. Models help to deal with complexity. As
McMillan (1992) puts it, a model is to the real situation what a road map is to the region
it represents. The map is useful only if it can be understood, so only if it simplifies the
real world by omitting some features and highlighting others. Similarly, the models
examined in economic theory are simplifications. If the economist's aim would be to draw
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a literal picture of a complex problem, he would in many cases be no closer to a solution.
Often a better strategy is to break the problem into its components. Simplifying, that is,
model building, helps to capture the essence of a problem. "By exposing the essential
features of one situation, one can find a hitherto hidden common core to many apparently
diverse strategic situations. Thus it is not an appropriate criticism of modelling exercises
to say 'the world is more complicated than your models.' This is true by the very nature
of a model" (McMillan, 1992). The model is inappropriate only if it omits something that
is crucial for the problem under consideration.
Regarding models, there is a trend towards simplicity, which Rasmusen (1989)
calls "no-fat modelling." No-fat modelling aims to discover the simplest assumptions, the
barest model, to generate an interesting conclusion. It is useful to distinguish two types of
assumptions: critical assumptions and simplifying ones. Following Milgrom and Roberts
(1994), simplifying assumptions are made just to facilitate analyzing the model. They
make computations easier, but play no crucial role. They could be replaced by other
assumptions without changing the conclusions of the analysis. Critical assumptions are
more important. They characterize the economic environments in which the model might
be applied. Milgrom and Roberts (1994) define an assumption to be critical for a
particular conclusion if its failure implies that the conclusion fails.
About the relation between theory and empirical testing, Becker (1993) notes: "A
close relation between theory and empirical testing helps prevent both the theoretical
analysis and the empirical research from becoming sterile. Empirically oriented theories
encourage the development of new sources and types of data. ( .. ) At the same time,
puzzling empirical results force changes in theory. "
Empirical observations that cannot be explained by existing theories, may inspire
theorists to develop new models. How does this model building work in practice?
Rasmusen (1989) describes the process as follows: "The modeller starts with a vague
idea. He then models the idea formally in a simple way. The idea might survive intact, it
might be found formally meaningless, it might survive with qualifications, or its opposite
might tum out to be true. The modeller then uses the model to come up with precise
theorems, whose proofs may tell him still more about the idea. After the proofs, he goes
back to thinking in words, trying to understand more than whether the proofs are
mathematically correct." So theorists need the jargon and the mathematics to be able to
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think precisely and to find out which assumptions are critical. Still, their bottom-line
conclusions can usually be expressed in plain language.
These conclusions, of course, must be seen in the light of the objective of the
analysis. The model (and its assumptions) depend on what the researcher wants to
investigate. An important part of the story is introduced in the assumptions to nail down
the problem. An assumption that is good in one model, may well be bad in another.
Therefore a problem of interpretation arises when a conclusion is taken out of context.
Banking and agency
One "natural" and very general class of agency problems exists between people who bring
in money, and those who spend or invest it. In financial intermediation and corporate
finance such agency problems occur in many different disguises. Agency theory can
therefore fruitfully be applied to problems in banking and finance. The previous
discussion of game theory and agency theory may help to provide links between the
models of financial intermediation discussed in this dissertation and a much broader class \
of game-theoretical models. Many diverse problems in banking can be reduced to general
agency problems, and can be expressed in terms of moral hazard and adverse selection.
The next section gives a short overview of some important work in modem banking
theory that builds on the foundations laid by game and agency theory. It starts, however,
with a sketch of traditional ideas about banking.
1.2. Modern banking theory
The traditional view: Banks as transporters of funds
Why do banks exist? What service do they provide? The traditional answer to this
question, due to Gurley and Shaw (1960), is that banks lubricate the economic process by
making transactions go smoother. Bank intermediation is seen as some kind of
transportation (Hellwig 1991). Banks transport funds from people who have them but
don't use them to people who need them but do not have them. By doing so they reduce
frictions in the form of transaction costs and make the economy more efficient.
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In the traditional framework, any broadly available technological innovation that
reduces the transaction costs of transporting money from savers to entrepreneurs would be
a direct threat to the position of banks. Given the enormous speed of innovation in the
past two decades, proponents of this traditionalist view in the United States seriously
wonder today whether banks are dead. Boyd and Gertler (1994) note that the view that
US banks are shrinking in importance is held by banking executives, academics and high
officials in many branches of government, probably also because of the record levels of
I US bank failures and loan losses experienced in the late 1980s. Boyd and Gertler cite
I William Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
I
who recently stated that " .. the banking industry is becoming irrelevant economically, and
it's almost irrelevant politically .. " (Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1993). They also quote
Carter Golembe, Dean of bank consultants, who noted "the [.. ] major problems faced by
the banking industry, most notably its eroding competitive position in the financial
community and the crushing burden of regulation .. "
Notwithstanding this somewhat pessimistic consensus, Boyd and Gertler (1994)
find no evidence of a significant decline in US banking. After correcting for a number of
measurement issues (adjustments for off-balance sheet activities and for loans by foreign
\
banks in the US that were booked off-shore), they find that commercial banks' share of
total financial intermediation in the US has been roughly stable over the last four to five
decades. Moreover, while banks have maintained a relatively constant share of
I
intermediation, financial intermediation has been growing steadily relative to US gross
domestic product. Banks from the European Union (EU) seem to have grown faster than
their US competitors. Van Wensveen (1989) observes that among the world's 100 largest
banks, US banks have significantly lost ground to Japanese banks between 1975 and
1987, whereas EU banks have more or less maintained their position.
Boyd and Gertler show that banks have been able to respond to increased
competition from non-bank alternatives. Banks have changed the way they provide
traditional services and have developed new products. This is reflected -- among other
things -- by the rising importance of off-balance sheet activities, ranging from credit lines
to derivative products.
So banks are not as dead as some would argue. It seems that banks still have
\ added value in the provision of services even when non-bank alternative suppliers are
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present. Why? The traditionalist view would explain this by banks' cost-efficiency. This
can hardly be the whole story, however, as Benston (1994) and others argue that
specialized providers of financial services should in many cases be more cost-efficient
than traditional banks. It is difficult to reconcile the current prominence of banks with the
traditionalist view of banks acting merely as transporters of funds.
The agency view: Banks as monitors
Agency theory provides another piece of the puzzle. The modem view about banks can be 1
formulated in the jargon of agency theory discussed in section 1.1. In this view, banks
reduce problems of asymmetric information between firms and financiers: adverse
selection and moral hazard. Financiers typically have less information about firms than
entrepreneurs or managers, which poses a problem of adverse selection. Moreover,
managers are subject to various types of moral hazard which may harm financiers. For
example, managers may invest less effort than the financier wants them to; managers may
choose excessively risky strategies; managers may misreport the profits earned with a
project and abscond with some of the money; etc. Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the
first to recognize that such agency problems may cause difficulties for the provision of
finance to industry. The role of banks is to reduce these problems by engaging in
monitoring and control activities.
Agency theory helps to formalize some intuitive ideas about the role of banks.
Before granting a loan, bankers gather information about firms. In the jargon of agency
theory they do so to limit adverse selection. Moreover, bankers continue to monitor a
borrower after a loan has been made, to limit what theorists call moral hazard. It is
cheaper for one banker to gather this information on behalf of many depositors, than it is
for all depositors to invest monitoring effort by themselves. Moreover, if many depositors
were supposed to keep an eye on one borrower, coordination problems would arise.
Individual depositors would free-ride on the monitoring effort of other depositors. Total
monitoring effort might then become insufficient to discipline the borrower. The incentive
problems involved with delegated monitoring are mitigated if the bank builds up a well-
diversified portfolio. This reduces the risk that depositors do not get their money back.
So in addition to their "transportation" function, banks provide a real service by
gathering information, monitoring and controlling borrowers and providing a diversified
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portfolio. Diamond (1984) was the first to present an example in which these intuitive
ideas are explicitly studied.
x
Agency and the value of long-term relationships between banks and firms
If banks would be mere transporters of funds, as in the traditional view, it would be
difficult to understand the existence of long-term relationships between banks and firms.
Also in this respect, agency theory provides some more convincing explanations. When
agency problems are present, long-term relationships may be valuable.
Most managers will agree from their own experience that long-term relationships
with suppliers and buyers may help to reduce uncertainty with regard to, for instance, the
quality and specifications of bought products and the creditworthiness of buyers.
Moreover, when a buyer suddenly needs extra deliveries, the seller may be more inclined
to deliver urgently if buyer and seller have a long-term relationship.
Thus, long-term relationships may reduce the severity of agency problems for two
reasons. First, during the agency relationship parties learn about the characteristics of
their counterparties (Fama 1980). Second, parties may be willing to incur some extra
costs in the short run if they expect mutual benefits from the relationship in the longer
run. Therefore long-term relationships may increase flexibility and thus provide stability.
Similarly, in banking long-term relationships can be valuable. The first reason is
that information is often reusable to some extent (Fama 1985 and Chan, Greenbaum and
Thakor 1986). That is, if a banker invests effort to acquire information about a
prospective borrower today, in many cases part of this information will still be valuable
next year. The next year, this banker's monitoring cost will probably be smaller than if
he would not have had prior information. Moreover, a banker learns about the borrower's
type by monitoring the way the borrower handles an investment project. The banker has a
cost advantage relative to competitors that do not have this information. Empirical
evidence indicates that this cost advanta e is generally passed on -- at least partly -- to the
borrower (see references in Chapter 5). Therefore borrowers rofit from establishing a----~---
relationship with their banks.
~ --
If a firm and a bank have a long-term relationship, the bank may be more willing
to help the firm through difficult times. Thus, a second advantage of bank-firm
relationships is that they may reduce the cost of financial distress by increasing flexibility.
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Mayer (1988) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) present empirical evidence in
favor of this view.
Thus, agency theory has many applications in banking. Today the consensus position is
that it is impossible to understand banking without taking into account the agency
problems involved with financial intermediation.
1.3. This dissertation
The preceding part of this introductory chapter has tried to convince the reader of two
things:
1. Game theory and agency theory are useful tools of economic analysis and may be
helpful to think through many real-world problems.
2. The above point is particularly true in banking and corporate finance.
Chapters 2 - 5 of this dissertation study four different agency problems in banking. This
,
introduction has accomplished its goal if the next few pages manage to explain briefly
what these four problems are, and why they may be relevant not only for theorists but
also for bankers, regulators and borrowers.
Chapter 2: Bankruptcy litigation and optimal debt contracts
This chapter studies a credit market in which the borrower's investment return is not
publicly observable. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem: the successful borrower
may either repay his debt, or falsely report failure of the investment project and
repudiate. Shirking may be profitable if a chance exists that the firm's assets will not be
liquidated subsequently. In that case the successful entrepreneur earns an extra profit.
This moral hazard problem is a stylized way of saying that the borrower knows---
more about the project than the bank, and that this informational advantage may give the
borrower some room to act against the interests of the bank. Bankers will recognize some I
of their daily worries in this more general formulation. White (1984) indicates that
diversion of funds can be a problem in practice and may lead to financial distress. In
accordance with the principle of "no-fat modelling," the stylized representation of the
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problem is used as a short-cut to a class of more general formulations.
The credit market literature typically addresses the sketched moral hazard problem
by postulating that the creditor commits himself to liquidate the project when the
borrower defaults on his repayment obligations. That is, the threat of asset liquidation
should prevent the borrower from deliberately breaking his promise to repay. In practice,
however, default is not always followed by liquidation. When borrowing companies have
difficulties meeting their debt service, banks may voluntarily engage in rescue operations.
They may forgive part of the debt or swap debt for equity (as in the case of defaulting
third-world countries in the 1980s). This allows the firm to restructure its activities.
Alternatively, the firm may enter a legal bankruptcy procedure. Bankruptcy laws in many
countries explicitly entail provisions for the reorganization of firms in fmancial distress --
bankruptcy, thus, does not necessarily lead to liquidation. While this aspect of bankruptcy
is familiar to practitioners and bankruptcy lawyers, this is not the way bankruptcy has
been represented in most of the existing theoretical credit market literature.
Chapter 2 abandons the assumption that default is automatically followed by
liquidation. After default is reported, the bank has the option to forgive part of the debt
and allow the firm to reorganize, as in the real world. Alternatively, the borrower files
for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court then decides whether to liquidate or to reorganize
the firm. The court may interview some of the firm's personnel or scrutinize the firm's
books, and so is able to gather some extra information about whether the borrower
cheated or not. Still, I assume that the court cannot be completely sure about what
actually happened.
Chapter 2 shows how the bank's ability to commit to exercising the bankruptcy
option and the parameters of the bankruptcy procedure may influence the optimal debt
contract (i.e. interest and collateral). If default is reported, debt forgiveness before
bankruptcy and reorganization in bankruptcy provide opportunities for the successful
entrepreneur to escape liquidation in case of cheating and to yield an extra profit. The
higher the probability to escape liquidation in case of default, the higher the successful
borrower's incentive to falsely claim default. The bank anticipates this, and so may
require more collateral to counterbalance this negative incentive effect.
The chapter contains insights for the design of bankruptcy procedures that may be
relevant for a discussion currently going on in the Netherlands about changes in the
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"surseance" (reorganization) procedure of bankruptcy. Chapter 2 shows that the
bankruptcy procedure may affect corporate decisions prior to the onset of financial
distress. In the stylized formulation of the model, the bankruptcy procedure may have an
effect on the borrower's incentive to repay the debt in case of success. If banks anticipate
this, new debt contracts will also be affected by the bankruptcy procedure. Thus, if
changes in the bankruptcy procedure weaken the position of creditors in bankruptcy, \
rational creditors anticipate this when debt contracts are signed. This may have negative
consequences for the conditions and the availability of bank loans."
Another interesting result concerns the incentive to shirk. Consider two borrowers
differing only with regard to their ability to finish a project successfully. The "less risky"
borrower has a higher probability of success than does the "risky" borrower. The model
indicates that the riskier borrower not only has a lower success probability, but also has a
higher incentive to shirk in case of success. The reason is as follows. Assume that both
bank and borrower know that the borrower is of the risky type. Then the bank will not be
very surprised if the borrower reports project failure. This gives the risky borrower I
whose project succeeded, an incentive to cheat. i
Higher collateral requirements may counterbalance a higher incentive to shirk. The
chapter, thus, provides a theoretical explanation for something that most bankers will
recognize from their own experience: Risky borrowers usually have to provide more (
collateral than do less risky borrowers.
Chapter 3: Financial intermediation, bank failure and official assistance
Whereas chapter 2 deals with borrowers in financial difficulties, chapter 3 considers
banks in trouble. Recently, problem banks have received government assistance in a
number of countries. In the United States the troubled savings and loans (S&L) sector has
absorbed large amounts of taxpayers' money. Bail-outs have occurred in Finland,
Norway, Sweden, Australia and Spain, as well (see OECD (1992». The issue of
government assistance to problem banks, therefore, is of great practical interest.
With regard to official assistance, the International Monetary Fund (1991, p.46/47)
7 A similar position was taken by the Dutch bank association (NVB) concerning a proposal to oblige banks
to continue financing borrowers who have entered the "surseance-procedure (see Financieele Dagblad, May
19th, 1993).
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I notes: ".. a fundamental dilemma is that, while official assistance during a financial crisis
can limit the effects of the crisis in real activity and income, the knowledge or expectation
that such assistance will be available may alter the behavior of managers, creditors,
depositors and owners of financial institutions in such a way as to make a crisis more
likely." This comment suggests that the government faces a trade-off between the
advantageous effect of intervention -- reducing the social cost of bank failure --, and the
moral hazard problems involved with anticipated intervention. However, despite the huge
practical relevance of emergency assistance to banks, a clear understanding of the
problems involved has thus far been lacking. This chapter aims to contribute to the
understanding of this issue.
One role of government intervention in banking is comparable to the role of a
bankruptcy court in other industries. Depositors delegate the task of controlling bank
liquidation to the government, just like a firm's creditors delegate exercising the
bankruptcy procedure to a bankruptcy court. If the value of the bank as a going concern
would be higher than the liquidation value, private parties would not liquidate a bank that
reports default but sell it as a going concern. This might undermine the threat, and thus
the incentive effect, of bank liquidation. Chapter 3 suggests that government intervention
should ensure that banks reporting default do not always escape liquidation.
In addition, government intervention may involve assistance to banks in trouble.
To understand the benefit of government assistance, one must understand the cost of bank
failures. The monetary costs of banking crises are well known: If series of banks fail, the
money supply implodes, which has negative effects on the real economy. Chapter 3,
however, focuses on a non-monetary cost of bank failures: the informational capital that is
destroyed when a bank fails. Agency theory suggests that long-term bank-borrower
relations are valuable as information collection reduces agency costs. This helps to reduce
firms' cost of borrowing. If banks fail, much of this information will be lost. Bernanke
(1983) argues that the loss of banks' accumulated expertise, information and customer
relationships involved with financial collapse raised the cost of credit intermediation
during the Great Depression. This may have had a significant non-monetary effect on the
macro economy, in addition to the monetary effects of banking panics.
Chapter 3 investigates whether -- in addition to other motivations found in the
literature -- Bernanke's argument could have implications for government intervention in
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the banking industry. It builds a model of banking in which bank-borrower relationships
reduce the borrower's cost of borrowing. If banks fail, this advantage is lost because of
the loss of non-transferable information and implicit agreements. Large-scale bank failures
may then increase the cost of credit for a significant fraction of firms, imposing a non-
monetary cost on the economy. If the government provides assistance, it prevents this
social cost. The banks' socially valuable private information about their borrowers is then
maintained by keeping the banks alive.
A disadvantage of assistance is that anticipated government assistance may induce
bank managers to adopt excessively risky policies. How can the government prevent this
happening? The chapter indicates that the government should keep bank managers
uninformed about whether and when assistance will be made available. This strategy may
improve welfare and at the same time prevent the moral hazard problems. This accords
with Corrigan's (1990) statement before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Public Affairs that, with regard to intervention, the authorities should maintain a
policy of 'constructive ambiguity' about whether assistance should be made available to
banks in trouble. It is also in line with the observation by the IMF (1991) that " .. the
authorities in all major industrial countries have been purposely vague about when (if
ever) assistance would be made available to large institutions."
The paper is not concerned with the distinction between the central government
(with macro-economic responsibilities) and the bank supervisor's prudential role in bank
supervision. In practice, in most countries the supervisory authority (the central bank or
another government agency) is concerned -- among other things -- with preventing that
government assistance may become necessary, rather than with bail-outs. 8
Chapter 4: Collusion and hierarchy in banking
Is it relevant to study internal bank organization? It seems so, as bad management is still
the primary cause for bank failures -- at least outside periods of economic depression.
8 Muller (1990) formerly the chairman of the influential BasJe Committee on bank supervision ("Cooke
committee ") and a director of the Dutch central bank, describes this as follows: "Some countries have national
deposit insurance systems or otherwise implicitly undertake to protect bank depositors. In these countries,
supervision serves to protect the insurance fund or the government's own fund from loss." This reflects the
separation of responsibilities between bank supervisors and the central government. See also Van Nieuwkerk 's
(1994) discussion of the tasks of bank supervisors in the Netherlands.
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Bad management is usually reflected in bad loans. The internal causes of bank failure
include, among other things, improper loans to relatives or friends, too liberal lending
practices, fraud and insufficient loan-portfolio supervision (see references in chapter 4).
In the light of this observation it is remarkable that internal bank policy associated
with the credit function has received so little attention in the theoretical literature. It
seems important both for theorists and practitioners to improve the understanding of the
way banks organize their lending activities. Different lending policies may explain why in
similar economic environments some banks fail whereas other banks flourish.
In reality banks often delegate the task of borrower selection to loan officers, who
may be supervised by a so-called credit committee. How should a bank optimally
organize its lending activities? Chapter 4 addresses this question by focussing on an
agency problem that may arise between banks and their loan officers, and on the best way
to deal with this agency problem. Thus, this chapter analyzes the lending process in much
more detail than chapter 3, where the simplifying assumption was introduced that a bank






One can think of many agency problems between a bank and its loan officers, both
with regard to extending new loans and supervising already outstanding loans. This
chapter focuses on an agency problem between a bank and its loan officer in the process
of loan origination: Loan officers sometimes tend to be more optimistic about the quality
of a prospective borrower than people who are not directly involved with the borrower.
Banks hire loan officers to operate as "salesmen" in local credit markets. As a
result of the loan officer's close client contact, the officer will be better informed about
the borrower than will be any other individual in the bank. This implies that in principle
the loan officer, more than any other bank employee, should be in the best position to
assess the risk of a prospective borrower. Still, anecdotical evidence suggests that loan
officers may have a tendency to underestimate borrower risk. There are two explanations:
(a) The loan officer's personal involvement with the borrower may skew objectivity. (b)
The (career) incentive system for loan officers focuses more on new lending activities than
on project performance because it is difficult to make the loan officer's wage contingent
on the ultimate loan performance.
Chapter 4 studies the effect of the loan officer's personal relationship with the
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borrower on the loan officer's actions. The personal relationship between borrower and I
I
loan officer may involve some hidden "side transfer," such as common interests in the I
Ilocal community, friendship, borrower effort to convince the loan officer to grant the
loan, and (in extreme cases) payments in kind or financial bribes. In exchange for a side
transfer -- so if collusion occurs -- the loan officer sketches a more rosy picture about the
borrower to the bank owner than would be justified by the bare facts. In practice this
could happen in a very natural way, without even the loan officer being fully aware of it. I
As the possibility of collusion induces a principal-agent problem between the bank I
owner and the loan officer, a credit committee/credit department may be established to
supervise the loan officer." If involved, the credit committee would make the credit
decision after receiving a report by the loan officer containing information about the
borrower. The committee may perform a (costly) check of the contents of this report,
which should reveal whether collusion is likely to have occurred. I
Alternatively the credit decision may be delegated to the loan officer. Collusion I
may then be prevented if the loan officer's wage scheme is such that collusion makes
him/her no better off. This implies that the bank should then not only reward loan
officers for bringing in new borrowers, but also for rejecting prospective borrowers of
insufficient quality -- of course, without inducing loan officers to waste their time looking
for low-quality borrowers in order to subsequently reject them.
The model indicates that above some investment level it may be cheaper for the
bank to cope with collusion by involving the credit committee than by delegating the
credit decision to the loan officer. This may explain the casual empirical observation that
banks typically set a limit above which all loans must be approved by a credit committee.
Chapter 5: Internal finance versus bank debt. Reversing the pecking order theory of I
financing
Suppose that a firm wants to build up a good reputation with a bank to ensure favorable I
future loan conditions. Building up a reputation with a bank requires the bank to monitor
9 In practice the credit committee may also serve another goal: To improve the credit decision by bringing
in information that the loan officer does not have. This may concern industry-specific and macro-economic
information, previous experiences with similar borrowers in other regions, information about the bank's assets
mix such as the extent of diversification of the loan portfolio over geographic regions and industry sectors,
information about the cost of funds, etc. Chapter 4 does not consider this important function.
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firm activity: The bank's loan officer should talk with the firm's management, study the
firm's investment plans, scrutinize its books, etc. How can the firm induce the bank to
invest monitoring effort? Unlike external auditors, banks typically cannot be contractually
I obliged to monitor.
Chapter 5 argues that if bank monitoring effort is non-contractible, taking an
unsecured bank loan may be an efficient way for the firm to induce the bank to monitor
firm activity. Firms that want to build up a good reputation may then take bank loans
J even if they could finance projects internally.
These firms' preference for bank loans ahead of internal funds challenges a
prediction of Myers and Majluf's (1984) "pecking order theory" of financing. According
\ to this theory, firms will prefer to finance profitable investments internally rather than by
external funds (debt and outside equity), because information asymmetries with outsiders
will increase a firm's cost of external finance.
The thesis shows that this conclusion may fail to hold in a dynamic context. The
----reason is that in case of debt fmance banks gather information about firms -- so firms
may then build up a good reputation with their banks and profit from this reputation in
future periods. Internal finance does not have that advantage. In case of internal fmance,
banks have less incentive to become closely involved with a firm, so firms do not build
up a reputation as much as in case of debt finance. In the short run, internal finance may
be cheaper, but in the longer run the firm who starts to build up a reputation with his
bank early -- by taking a loan instead of fmancing internally -- may be better off. Its
reputation may allow the firm fairly easy access to a relatively cheap loan.
Of course, a firm will consider establishing a reputation with a bank only if the
bank allows the firm to profit from this reputation. Empirical evidence indicates that this
will generally be the case: Borrowers with no or short debt histories usually face less
favorable loan conditions than do borrowers with longer debt histories.
Chapter 5' s result that firms may prefer bank debt to internal finance is interesting
in the light of some recent empirical evidence. Ang and lung (1993) find that for a
sample of large South Korean firms, intermediate or longer-term borrowing from banks is
the preferred source, ahead of internal funds. De .Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992)
find that 49% of Dutch companies with short-term bank debt never use excess liquidity
for early repayment of short-term bank debt. Companies with bank debt are reluctant to
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repay early because of, among other things, (a) resulting changes in future loan conditions \
(10.6% of companies mention future changes in interest rates, 11. 3 % of companies
mention future changes in other loan conditions) and (b) resulting dependence on banks
for new loans in the future (19.8% of companies). This suggests that firms that have
(possibly superfluous) bank loans now, may have relatively easy access to relatively cheap
bank loans in the future. Chapter 5 gives an explanation for this phenomenon.
The chapter may also have implications for the theory of money demand.
Goodhart (1989) notes:
"Examination of the micro-economic determinants of the demand for money leaves
us with an awkward conclusion. That is that it is not easy to explain or to account at the
individual level for the amount of money balances held. Companies ( .. ) appear to hold
much larger balances than inventory-theoretic transactions demand models show to be
optimal. ( .. ) There is, perhaps, something of a puzzle to explain why such large balances
are held."
Chapter 5 may provide a new explanation. It implies that a firm may hold larger
cash balances than it needs for its day-to-day transactions, because it may choose to
finance a project with bank debt instead of internal funds to build up a reputation with the
bank. Thus, cash balances of firms may be higher than can be explained by inventory-
theoretic models of the transactions demand for money.
The chapter suggests that bank finance may increase with growth opportunities. ~
Firms may take unnecessary bank debt now if they expect to need the bank in the future
to finance larger investments. This is different from Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen
(1986) and Stulz (1990). There, debt may solve agency problems in firms that lack
growth opportunities. These authors argue that if a firm has cash that cannot be profitably
invested, firm managers may prefer to overinvest instead of paying out dividends to
shareholders. Debt may reduce this agency problem, because debt forces cash payouts at
certain dates. According to this theory, therefore, firms with ample cash and low growth
opportunities should use debt finance. Empirical results on this issue are mixed. Empirical
evidence by De Haan et al. (1992) and Kester (1986) supports my hypothesis. Kim and
Sorensen (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) present
empirical results in favor of the contrary prediction (see Harris and Raviv (1991».
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1.4. Conclusion
Almost four centuries ago, William Shakespeare recommended: "Neither a borrower, nor
a lender be" (Hamlet 1, 3, 1602). In his time this may have been wise advice. But should
it still be followed? I think not. This introductory chapter argues that the modern theory
of banking provides tools to cope with the problems involved with borrowing and lending.
In recent years, insights from game theory -- dealing with making optimal decisions in the
light of other parties' optimal responses -- and agency theory -- which analyzes games in
which one party is better informed than the other -- have had enormous impact on the
way we think about banking. The understanding of problems relating to financial
contracting is rapidly improving.
The first purpose of the introduction was to show that the modern theory may be
relevant not only for some inner circle of theorists, but also for those facing decisions-
about borrowing and lending in the real world. If you are about to lend or borrow, what
general lessons can you learn from modern banking theory?
1. Ask yourself what information the other party has -- or will acquire -- that you do
not have, or vice versa. It may be helpful to assign each particular information
problems to either of the categories adverse selection or moral hazard.
2. Evaluate how this information advantage may affect the other party's incentives.
To do so, place yourself in the other party's shoes. What would you do in that
situation? Would it be possible to take profitable actions at the cost of the
counterparty that cannot be precluded in the initial contract? Keep in mind that
incentive problems will often be more severe in one-shot games than in long-term
relationships, since in one-shot games it is impossible to build up reputations and
credibility. Moreover, be aware of other mechanisms that discipline your
counterparty, such as credit rating agencies, supervisors, laws and prisons.
3. Consider whether it is worthwhile to reduce information asymmetries by investing
in acquiring additional information, and if so, how this could be done.
4. If an incentive problem remains, think about the best way to deal with it -- indeed,
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this is what concerns most theoretical papers in the field.
In case of an adverse selection problem, try to design a contract that attracts a \
"good" counterparty but keeps away a "bad" one.
In case of a moral hazard problem, design a contract that is costly for the agent if \
he takes the "wrong" action, and which rewards him if he does the right thing.
Due to its young age, the theory still contains many blind spots. This dissertation
deals with some of them. The introductory chapter highlights the main insights emerging
from this thesis. A brief recapitulation:
1. Chapter 2: Typically, entrepreneurs are better informed about investments than
banks. This may create a moral hazard problem. If default does not always lead to
liquidation, firm managers may falsely claim that they are unable to repay. So the
bank's policy in case of borrower default (being "soft" or "tough") and the likely
outcome of the bankruptcy procedure (reorganization or liquidation) will affect the
borrower's incentive to repay. The incentive problem will be more severe for
"riskier" entrepreneurs than for "less risky" borrowers. The use of collateral,
however, may mitigate the incentive problem.
2. Chapter 3: Banks solve an adverse selection problem for their depositors if banks
accept high-quality borrowers and reject low-quality borrowers. A bank that has
invested much effort to obtain a high-quality loan portfolio is valuable. If this bank
incurs financial problems, providing assistance may seem worthwhile to allow
bank-borrower relations to continue. However, if this bank anticipates assistance,
it may prefer not to invest much effort in the quality of its loan portfolio in the
first place. To prevent this moral hazard problem, governments should keep bank
managers in the dark about whether and when assistance will be made available.
3. Chapter 4: Bank directors delegate the task of borrower selection to loan officers.
The personal relationship with a borrower may skew the loan officer's objectivity
about the borrower's risk. This induces a moral hazard problem, as the high-risk
borrower may try to influence the loan officer. For smaller loans the bank
optimally delegates the credit decision to the loan officer. To deal with the moral
hazard problem, the bank should then reward loan officers also for rejecting
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borrowers of insufficient quality. For larger loans the bank may alleviate the moral
hazard problem by involving a credit committee to check the loan officer's report.
4. Chapter 5: A firm that needs a bank loan in the future may want to establish a
reputation with its bank early on, to ensure fairly easy access to a relatively cheap
future loan. To establish a reputation it must induce the bank to monitor the firm,
but it cannot force the bank to do so. The firm may then prefer to take bank debt
even if it could finance its current project internally, and to put its own funds in a
demand deposit. The reason is that the maturity mismatch induces bank monitoring
if the bank faces the risk that the entrepreneur diverts the bank's funds. The firm
establishes a reputation by taking debt, giving the bank an incentive to monitor.
The remaining four chapters discuss these problems and their solutions in greater detail.







In a credit market where only the borrower directly observes the outcome of a debt-
financed investment project, a successful borrower may falsely claim project failure and
repudiate. Collateral and the bank's option to force the the borrower into filing for
bankruptcy provide repayment incentives. Bankruptcy does not necessarily lead to
liquidation of the borrower's assets, but may also imply reorganization. Given feasibility,
the equilibrium debt contract is affected by the bank's commitment to exercise the
bankruptcy option, the quality of the court's information and the penalty imposed on the
borrower convicted for cheating. Collateral increases with project risk.
This chapter is a revised version of Scheepens (1993). It is forthcoming in The European
Journal of Political Economy.
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THIs CHAPTER STUDIES a credit market in which the borrower's investment return is not
publicly observable. This gives rise to a moral hazard problem: the successful borrower
may either repay his debt, or falsely report failure of the investment project and
repudiate. Shirking may be profitable if there is a chance that the firm's assets will not be
liquidated subsequently. In that case the successful entrepreneur earns an extra profit.
White (1984) indicates that this problem may be relevant in practice. The credit market
literature typically addresses this moral hazard problem by postulating that the creditor
commits himself to liquidate the project when the borrower defaults on his repayment
obligations [see e.g. Hellwig (1977), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart and
Moore (1989)]. This assumption is questionable on two grounds: First, as liquidation
involves a deadweight cost, ex post the creditor may be better off if he forgives the debt.
So from a game-theoretic perspective liquidation may not constitute subgame perfect
behavior. Second, it can be empirically observed that bankruptcy is not always followed
by liquidation; bankruptcy laws in many countries explicitly entail provisions, in fact, for
the reorganization of firms in financial distress. Aghion and Bolton (1989, p.292) note
that the important feature of bankruptcy is that it constitutes a transfer of control that does
not necessarily lead to liquidation. While this aspect of bankruptcy is familiar to
practitioners and bankruptcy lawyers, this is not the way bankruptcy has been represented
in most of the existing credit market literature.
This chapter abandons the assumption that default is automatically followed by
liquidation. After default is reported, the creditor has the option to forgive part of the
debt, as e.g. in Bester (1994a) and Rajan (1992). Alternatively, the creditor may file the
borrower for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court then decides whether to liquidate or to
reorganize the firm. The court's decision is based on an imperfect signal that is correlated
with the true project return. One interpretation is that the bankruptcy court may interview
some of the firm's personnel or scrutinize the firm's books, but cannot be completely sure
about what really happened.
This chapter will show how the bank's ability to commit to exercise the bankruptcy
option and the parameters of the bankruptcy procedure may influence the equilibrium debt
contract (i.e. interest and collateral). If default is reported, debt forgiveness before
bankruptcy and reorganization in bankruptcy provide opportunities for the successful
entrepreneur to escape liquidation in case of cheating and to yield an extra profit. Thus,
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the successful borrower's incentive to falsely claim default is negatively correlated with
the bank's ability to commit to exercise the bankruptcy option and with the accuracy of
the court's decision. The chapter may also provide a theoretical explanation for the
empirical observation that the amount of collateral increases with the risk of an
investment project [see Berger and Udell (1990) and Leeth and Scott (1989)]. The riskier
borrower has a higher incentive to shirk in case of success because the ex post probability
that the project really failed is larger if the project is riskier. The higher incentive to shirk
may be counterbalanced by higher collateral requirements.
Whereas the main focus of chapter 2 is to improve the understanding of credit
contracts, it also contains interesting insights for the theory of bankruptcy. Brown (1989),
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), Giammarino (1989) and White (1989), among others,
have studied the effects of the design of the available bankruptcy procedure (especially
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code) on the decisions made in the period in which a
firm is already in fmancial distress, but before the firm is forced into filing for
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy procedure, however, may also affect corporate decisions
prior to the onset of financial distress. Bebchuk (1991) studies the effect that Chapter 11
has on the ex ante investment decision of a manager whose investment project is partly
debt-financed. He finds that the likelihood that a risky project will be chosen is greater
under the reorganization regime than under the no-reorganization regime. This chapter
adds to this literature by investigating the effect that the bankruptcy procedure may have
on the borrower's incentive to repay the debt in case of success. It shows that a negative
incentive effect may be mitigated by the use of collateral.
In general, the institution of bankruptcy may serve different objectives: (i) The
regulation of conflicts among creditors is an important concern of bankruptcy law. This
may prevent a costly race by individual creditors to be first to sue the firm for repayment
of their own claims. (ii) Bankruptcy may be an instrument to eliminate firms that are
economically inefficient [see e.g. White (1989)]. (iii) The threat of bankruptcy may serve
as a repayment incentive, as in the credit market literature. This chapter does not consider
the roles (i) and (ii). The first role is ruled out by the assumption that the debtor faces a
single creditor, so that conflicts among creditors do not occur. The second role is ruled
out by the assumption that the net present value of the borrower's project is positive. This
chapter focuses on bankruptcy as a repayment incentive.
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Despite the deadweight cost involved, bankruptcy as a repayment incentive may have a
positive effect on welfare. Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 648) put it this way: "Bankruptcy
is a costly business. But [.. ] without it contracts would be even more constrained and
welfare would be even lower." Cheating by the successful borrower reduces welfare,
because it may lead to costly and unnecessary liquidation. To discourage cheating by the
borrower, the court commits to the following decision rule: If the observed signal
indicates that the borrower was honest, then the firm must be reorganized. Otherwise the
firm must be liquidated. There is no commitment problem for the court.
The chapter uses a stylized bankruptcy mechanism that is, nevertheless, inspired by
real- world examples. In the United States firms filing for bankruptcy can be liquidated
under Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code or be reorganized under Chapter 11 of the
code. Liquidation amounts to a sale of the firm or its assets. Direct (administrative) and
indirect liquidation costs (lost sales, human capital, reputation, time, investment
opportunities etc.) may add up to high percentages of remaining assets. As an alternative
to liquidation, reorganization may be less costly. In the reorganization procedure the
firm's creditors (including stockholders) retain the enterprise and exchange their claims
against the company for new (usually lower) claims against the reorganized company.
This may be especially valuable when the scrap value of the firm is much less than its
value as a going concern, or when there are no outside buyers for the firm as a whole.
Reorganization may then significantly reduce deadweight loss. If bank and borrower fail
to voluntarily agree on renegotiation of the loan, the bankruptcy court may in a later stage
confirm a reorganization plan anyway, as long as each dissenting class is treated "fairly
and equitably" [see e.g. Bebchuk (1988) and White (1989)].
The stylized bankruptcy mechanism in this paper resembles Chapter 11 to the extent
that it allows for reorganization. In Chapter 11 the management of the firm -- the best
informed group -- remains in control. An important shortcoming is that thus they retain
considerable power to tilt the outcome of the Chapter 11 procedure toward reorganization
and the retention of their jobs [see e.g. Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) and White
(1993)]. This chapter abstracts from such considerations; the above mentioned authors and
others, in fact, recommend that the existing managers' control should be reduced during
the bankruptcy procedure and that the judge or a bankruptcy trustee should supervise the
process to prevent the use of this kind of power. The result will more resemble the
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system operating in France, where the administrator appointed by the bankruptcy court is
relatively powerful, or in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where creditors have
greater powers to reject the administrator's reorganization plan than in France.'
Section 2.1 describes the basic model. I make a distinction between the case of
precommitment against renegotiation of the initial contract (section 2.2) and the
renegotiation case in section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes. Proofs can be found in the
Appendix.
2.1. The model
Assume that a risk-neutral entrepreneur plans to undertake a project that requires an
initial investment of fixed size I. The project has two possible outcomes: with probability
q the project will be successful, yielding positive return Xs, and with probability 1 - q it
will fail, yielding positive return XF < I < Xs. The project return is independent of the
entrepreneur's effort. The parameters of the firm's investment project are public
knowledge. The entrepreneur has no liquid funds available to finance the investment; he
must raise the amount I from a risk-neutral outside lender.
The realization of the firm's project is observed costlessly by the entrepreneur; the
lender can observe the project return only after liquidation of the debtor's assets. Since
the original entrepreneur is assumed to be a better manager of the project than would be
outsiders, liquidation of the firm's assets is costly. The financier values the project's
revenue X as aX, with 0 < a < 1, thus losing an amount (1-a)X. In this situation a
standard debt contract is optimal [see Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985)]. So
the outside financial participation takes the form of a bank loan.
The debt contract, denoted by D, specifies a fixed repayment obligation R > I and
some amount of collateral C to be posted by the borrower. The borrower is assumed to
possess a certain amount of private wealth, W, that cannot be used to finance the project
(e.g. because it is illiquid). This wealth may (partly) be posted as collateral to secure the
! See e.g. Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) and references in their paper. In the Netherlands proposals are
being discussed that reduce the influence of creditors about the reorganization plan and increase the influence of
other involved parties such as shareholders and employees [see e.g. Meeter (1990, p.14)].
40 CHAPTER 2
bank loan, so 0 ~ C ~ W. The collateral is confiscated by the bank whenever the
borrower defaults on the loan. The transfer of collateral involves the deadweight cost
(l-B)C, with 0 < B < 1, so the bank values the collateral as Be. To enforce debt
repayment the contract specifies that the bank may force the borrower into filing for
bankruptcy if the borrower fails to pay his debt.
If a borrower files for bankruptcy, the court uses a costless but imperfect test to test
the null hypothesis Ho: the defendant is not guilty of cheating, against the alternative
hypothesis HI: the defendant is guilty. The following table describes the test's stylized
form; it contains the probabilities that the borrower's project is assigned to one of the






Assume lh < I' < 1. The test parameter is public knowledge.
The supply of loanable funds to the bank is unlimited at some exogenously given
deposit rate, which will be normalized to zero. The following game will be adopted to
analyze borrower and lender behavior. In the competition stage of the game, banks
compete by offering debt contracts D = (R,C). The firm may find none of the contracts
acceptable, in which case the game ends and all parties get zero payoff. Alternatively, the
entrepreneur's individual rationality constraint is satisfied and he will accept the most
favorable offer. Through competition, this offer generates zero expected profits to the
bank. This bank then transfers an amount of funds I from its depositors to the firm, and
the company undertakes the investment of size I. The banks whose offers have been
turned down receive zero payoff. Subsequently, the following renegotiation game is
played:
2 Section 2.4 discusses the implications of dropping the assumption that the type I and II errors in the
court's monitoring technology are equal.
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1. The project return is observed by the entrepreneur only.
2. The unsuccessful entrepreneur is (by assumption) unable to repay his debt R, as R > I
> XF, and is forced to report default. The successful entrepreneur has two options: he
can either make his debt payment R < Xs, or can falsely claim default. He adopts a
possibly mixed strategy. With probability d, he pretends project failure, 0 ~ d ~ 1,
while he repays his debt R with probability (l-d), In case of repayment, the game
ends. The entrepreneur earns a profit of X, - R; the bank receives a positive payoff of
R - I. If default is reported (either by the unsuccessful entrepreneur or by the cheating
successful entrepreneur), the bank will take over the collateral posted by the
entrepreneur and the game reaches its next stage:
3. The bank can choose either to force the defaulter into filing for bankruptcy, or to offer
a new contract in which the entrepreneur's debt is reduced to the maximum amount
that the unsuccessful borrower could repay XF. The bank also adopts a possibly mixed
strategy f, 0 ~ f ~ 1, where f denotes the probability of offering debt forgiveness. In
case of debt forgiveness the game ends. The bank earns XF + BC - I; the borrower
receives X, - XF - C if he was successful and - C otherwise.
4. Alternatively, if the borrower is forced into filing for bankruptcy, the court performs
an imperfect test to find out whether or not the borrower is unable to make his debt
payments. With probability r the court makes the right decision. If the court decides
that the borrower is guilty of cheating, i.e. that he is able to meet his obligations and
has falsely reported default, the bank will take over the project in addition to the
borrower's collateral and liquidate it; moreover, the borrower will be punished by a
nonpecuniary amount P ~ O. There is no room for ex post renegotiation of the court's
decision. If the firm is acquitted of cheating it will be reorganized, which is in both the
bank's and the borrower's interests if the court is right; payoffs are the same as in the
case of voluntary debt forgiveness by the bank.' So in case of bankruptcy, the
3 The assumption that reorganization in bankruptcy does not involve higher deadweight cost than debt
renegotiation outside of bankruptcy is motivated by the observation that in practice the deadweight cost of
reorganization in bankruptcy stems mainly from problems of conflict among creditors. Haugen and Senbet (1978)
argue that the truly significant penalty costs that are commonly attributed to bankruptcy are more appropriately
attributed to liquidation. They claim that costs of reorganizations in a legal setting can be avoided by having one
class of claimants acquire all other outstanding claims in the capital market, which will prevent costly conflicts
among creditors. Similarly, if there is only one creditor, as in this paper, the deadweight cost of reorganization
in bankruptcy may be low. Note, however, that for the results of this paper the division of bankruptcy costs over
the two possibilities in bankruptcy (reorganization and liquidation) is irrelevant. Only the total expected cost of
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successful firm expects to earn (1-r)CXs-XF)- I'P - C; the unsuccessful firm earns
-(l-r)p - C.
The players' payoffs depend on the debt contract D=(R,C), the exogenous "court
parameters" I' and P, and the equilibrium actions (d,t). Denote the entrepreneur's
expected payoff by U(R,C,r,p,d,t), and the bank's expected profit by V(R,C,r,p,d,t).4
Any given debt contract D = (R,C) induces a subgame perfect equilibrium (d.f) in
stages 1 - 4 of the renegotiation game. A contract D = (R,C) is said to be feasible if
there is an equilibrium (d.f) such that U(R,C,r,p,d,t) ;;:::0 and V(R,C,r,p,d,t) ;;:::O.
The following assumptions are always maintained:
I > XF + W (1)
~>~ m
qXs + (1-q)XF > I (3)
q[raXs + (l-r)XFl + (l-q)[(1-r)a + r]XF + BW < I (4)
Assumption (1) rules out the motive for collaterization in Barro (1976) and Benjamin
(1978), where the borrower repays only if the value of the collateral exceeds his debt. As
R > I, it implies that the successful borrower would prefer to default if default would
have no further consequences, thus pointing at the need for a bankruptcy procedure. Also
it implies that default is a risk for the bank: the bank cannot recover the loan's face value
I if the project fails. Assumption (2) states that the expected revenue to the creditor from
liquidation of the assets of a successful borrower exceeds the gain from renegotiation. If
this inequality would not hold, then the bank would never file any borrowers for
bankruptcy for the borrower is relevant, because the threat of incurring this cost serves to prevent the successful
firm from cheating. This cost is strictly positive.
4 The entrepreneur's expected profit is equal to
U(R,C,r,p,d,t) = q{ d [f(XS-XF-C)+ (l-t){r(-p-C) + (l-r)(XS-xF-C)}) + (l-d)(Xs - R)}
+ (l-q){ f(-C) + (l-t)[(l-r)(-P-C) + r(-C)] }
The bank's expected profit equals
vrn.c.r.r.e.n = q(l-d)R + qd{ f[XF+BC] + (l-t)[r(aXs+BC) + (l-r)(XF+BC)] }
+ (l-q){ f[XF+BC] + (l-t)[(1-r)(aXF+BC) + r(XF+BC)] } - I
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bankruptcy, because it could only lose by doing so. Assumption (3) implies that the firm
can operate profitably; the investment project has positive net present value. Assumption
(4) refers to the situation in which the successful borrower would choose always to report
default (d = 1). The bank would respond to this by never offering debt forgiveness (f =
0). In this situation, by assumption (4) the bank earns negative expected profits
irrespective of the amount of collateral C ~ W. As a consequence of (4), the bank will
offer a contract such that it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to choose d = 1.
In the renegotiation game the bank's decision variable is f, the probability of offering
debt forgiveness. The (successful) entrepreneur's decision variable is d, the probability of
claiming default after the best outcome of the project X, is observed.
2.2. Commitment against renegotiation
This section considers the game described above under the assumption that the bank is
committed not to offer debt forgiveness. This means that f == O. Notice that as in Gale
and Hellwig (1985), the initial contract is incomplete in the sense that the bank cannot
impose bankruptcy with some contractually specified probability. The assumption that the
bank's right in the event of default is deterministic is motivated by both a practical and a
theoretical observation. The practical observation is that loan contracts specifying a
random allocation of ownership rights are hardly observed. The theoretical justification is
that random devices are difficult to verify, so that it may be costly to make stochastic
outcomes contractible.
Proposition 1: There exist r, I' with r",r such that the equilibrium in case of
precommitment against renegotiation if == 0) has the following features:
(a) If I' < r, there is no feasible contract.
(b) If r > r, a feasible debt contract fj is signed such that VcR,t,r,P,d.I=O)=O . The
equilibrium in the renegotiation subgame satisfies d.=0 . The optimal amount of
coLlateraLc is characterized as follows:
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(i) If f<I' , then the equilibrium amount of collateral c is positive and strictly
decreasing in I' and in P.
(ii) If f>f , then the optimal amount of collateral is zero: (;=0
The quality of the court's information, reflected by I', influences the equilibrium debt
contract in an unambiguous way. Proposition 1 shows that if the court's information falls
below some minimum quality standard, then the market for corporate debt may collapse.
The reason is the adverse effect of the court on the borrower's incentive to repay his debt
in case the project succeeds. If the court's information is sufficiently precise, however,
then in equilibrium precommitment against renegotiation induces the successful borrower
never to claim project failure. The higher the court's accuracy, the lower the amount of
collateral required to withhold the successful borrower from repudiating.
The penalty P for cheating plays a dual role with regard to its effect on the equilibrium
outcome. On one hand, a higher P increases the borrower's fear of conviction and lowers
the amount of collateral needed in equilibrium, so there is a trade-off between collateral
and punishment. On the other band, P is a pure deadweight cost. If it is high, then the
borrower's individual rationality constraint becomes binding or may even be violated. In
the latter case no feasible contract exists. If the borrower's individual rationality
constraint is binding, a rise in P reduces the area in which lending is feasible. Because of
these two effects, one could in principle determine some welfare-maximizing value p'. Of
course, p' would depend on the parameters of the model, of which the project's success
probability q is one. In order to attain p' the judge would have to discriminate among
borrowers. Entrepreneurs with varying success probabilities would face different penalties
if convicted for cheating. This type of "class justice" violates a basic principle of justice,
because in practice a conviction should not be a function of the borrower's characteristics,
but rather of his actions. We are therefore not concerned with determining p' and take P
to be exogenous.
The equilibrium interest rate is not directly affected by the nonpecuniary penalty P, as
the bank does not directly benefit from a conviction. Through the equilibrium amount of
collateral, P may have an indirect effect on the equilibrium interest rate. Higher P may
reduce the required level of collateral. A lower level of collateral raises the equilibrium
interest rate at which the bank earns zero profit. Therefore, ceteris paribus a higher
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nonpecuniary penalty may result in a higher equilibrium interest rate. Higher quality of
the court's administration of justice (higher I') leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate.
The wealthy entrepreneur may get a loan in situations in which he would not be
financed if he were poorer, since the range for r in which a feasible contract exists may
be larger if the borrower can bring in more wealth as collateral. 5 Conversely, borrowers
may be denied credit if they face a binding constraint on the amount of collateral they are
able to provide. In different contexts Bester (1987) and Besanko and Thakor (1987) derive
a similar result.
Proposition 2: Assume that the creditor is precommitted not to offer debt forgiveness.
If r-r-r , the equilibrium amount of collateral is strictly decreasing in the project's
success probability q.
The intuition for this result is that for higher risk of project failure, i.e. lower q,
repudiation becomes more attractive. Given that default is reported, the (ex post)
probability that the project actually has failed is the higher the lower q is. This increases
the incentive for the successful firm to shirk. Given rand P, this incentive may be
counterbalanced by higher collateral requirements to induce honest behavior.
The model thus provides a theoretical explanation for the sorting-by-observed-risk
paradigm [see Berger and Udell (1990)], referring to the situation whereby observably
risky borrowers (i.e. borrowers with a relatively low probability to succeed) may be
required to pledge collateral, while observably safe borrowers need not do so. Bester
(1994a) presents a model in which it is optimal for the borrower to bring in his total
wealth as collateral if the risk of project failure is above some critical value; should the
risk be less than the critical value, zero collateral is optimal. This positive relation
between the risk of project failure and the equilibrium amount of collateral is found only
if renegotiation of the initial debt contract is possible. My model extends Bester's result
in two ways. First, this model features a positive relationship between risk and collateral
also in a situation without renegotiation. This phenomenon occurs because in the model
5 This can be seen from the proof of proposition 1 by the fact that the lower bound r may be decreasing in
w; r is decreasing in W if rM < r...
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debt may be forgiven even without voluntary contract renegotiation, as the model allows
for the chance of debt forgiveness in the reorganization procedure of bankruptcy.
Collateral may be needed to make voluntary default unattractive, thus preventing the
successful firm from speculating on debt forgiveness in case of reorganization due to
inaccuracy of the court's decision. Second, in my model the amount of collateral required
may depend continuously on the risk of project failure. The model explains why a certain
type of borrower pledges collateral and another type does not; it also shows that the
optimal amount of collateral can take any value in the closed interval [O,W], depending
on the success probability q.
Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991) also find that under certain conditions collateral is
pledged by borrowers with observably higher risk. In their model, however, the
unobservability of borrower effort plays a critical role. High borrower effort reduces the
probability of default. Collateral may induce the borrower to exert high effort, to reduce
the probability that the collateral is seized. High-risk borrowers post more collateral than
do low-risk borrowers if the high-risk borrowers' marginal productivity of effort is
higher.
Contrary to the sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm, most theoretical studies consider
the situation where banks are totally uninformed about borrower risks. Besanko and
Thakor (1987), Bester (1985, 1987) and Chan and Kanatas (1985) show that low-risk
entrepreneurs can then reveal themselves by accepting relatively high collateral
requirements, which would be unattractive for firms with relatively high probabilities of
default. As outside collateral may serve as an incentive or screening device, these studies
predict that lower-risk borrowers pledge more collateral than do higher-risk borrowers.
This can be referred to as the sorting-by-private-information. paradigm [Berger and Udell
(1990)]. In the banking community, conventional wisdom tends to favor the sorting-by-
observed-risk paradigm to the sorting-by-private-information paradigm. 6 Berger and
Udell (1990) and Leeth and Scott (1989) present empirical evidence supporting this view.
6 See e.g. Van den Brink (1981) and references in Berger and Udell (1990).
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2.3. Absence of precommitment against renegotiation
In the previous section it was assumed that the bank was committed not to offer debt
forgiveness. In this section, the bank considers filing the borrower for bankruptcy to be
an option rather than a necessity after default is reported. First I shall analyze whether the
outcome (j,d) = (0,0) of the past section can be part of an equilibrium path, and
whether other pure strategy equilibria exist.
Proposition 3: Assume that there is no commitment against renegotiation of the initial
debt contract. Suppose a feasibLe contract D has been signed. Then if,d) = (0,0) is a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies of the renegotiation game onLy if
the bankruptcy procedure imposes no deadweight Loss, i.e. onLy if either a = 1 or I' = 1.
If a < 1 or I' < 1, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium of the renegotiation game.
In section 2.1, a and I' were restricted to be strictly smaller than 1. Under this
assumption no pure-strategy equilibria exist, thus calling for mixed-strategy equilibria. As
seen in the previous section, in case of precommitment against renegotiation the
borrower's repayment behavior reveals his private information about the project outcome:
only the unsuccessful borrower reports default. If renegotiation is possible, this is no
longer the case; in a mixed-strategy equilibrium the bank cannot deduce the project
outcome with certainty from the borrower's repayment behavior. After observing default,
the bank updates its beliefs about the outcome of the investment project; its posterior
probability G(d) that the project has been successful is given by Bayes' rule: G(d) =
qd/ (qd + 1-q). In equilibrium the successful debtor picks the probability to repudiate d*
such that after default is reported, the bank is exactly indifferent between offering debt
forgiveness or filing the borrower for bankruptcy. Given this value d", in equilibrium the
bank chooses the probability of offering debt forgiveness f such that the successful
borrower is indifferent between repayment and repudiation.
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Proposition 4: Assume that there is no commitment against renegotiation of the initial
debt contract. Given that a feasible debt contract D = (R,C) is signed, the unique
equilibrium of the renegotiation game is given by
a: (l-q)(l-cx)(l-I')XF
qr(cxXS-XF)
Here, 0 < a < 1 and f < 1. Moreover, f ;:::0 if and only if C exceeds some critical
value {/
Given D, the way in which according to Proposition 4 the accuracy of the court's
decision influences the equilibrium of the renegotiation game follows intuitively. The
equilibrium probability of the successful borrower to report default d" is decreasing in I',
because a higher probability of being caught cheating lowers the successful borrower's
incentive to cheat about the project outcome. The bank will respond to this by offering
debt forgiveness with relatively high probability, which explains why the equilibrium
probability I to offer debt forgiveness is increasing in I'. As one must have I ;:::° in
equilibrium, the equilibrium contract must satisfy C ;:::max[O,.c'].
Proposition 5: Assume that no commitment exists against renegotiation of the initial debt
contract. There is a unique critical value I" < 1 such that a higher amount of collateral
increases borrower profit if I' < r*, and a higher amount of collateral decreases
borrower profit if r > r*.
The proof of Proposition 1 reveals that in the commitment case a higher amount of
collateral always reduces the borrower's payoff. In the renegotiation case, however, this
need not be the case, despite the associated deadweight loss. The reason is that, according
to Proposition 4, more collateral increases the probability of debt forgiveness I. More
collateral reduces the expected deadweight loss from liquidation because it reduces the
probability that the parties end up in court. If this reduction of deadweight loss due to
higher I outweighs the "direct" deadweight cost involved with collateral, then the total
effect of more collateral on the borrower's payoff is positive.
To see why the impact of collateral on the borrower's payoff depends on the court's
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information parameter P, note the following. The specification of f' reveals that the effect
of collateral on f is greater for lower values of P. This is so because a lower value of P
raises d' and the probability (qd' + l-q) that the collateral C will be transferred. Thus, the
impact of a given amount of collateral on the borrower's incentive to repay would be
higher for a lower value of P. This explains the role of the critical value P*. If P > P*,
the role of collateral in the absence of commitment is very much like its role in the
commitment case: The borrower's profit decreases with the amount of collateral specified
in the debt contract. Bank competition thus ensures a minimal amount of collateral. If a
contract D is signed, the lower bound C ;::: max[O,.c'], which follows from Proposition 4,
will be binding. If P < P*, the situation changes. The bank maximizes borrower profit by
maximizing the amount of collateral. If a feasible contract is signed, the amount of
collateral will thus be such that the borrower's wealth constraint C ~ W is binding.
Proposition 6: There exist II, r' and r- with II ~ r' and r- < 1 such that the
equilibrium in the absence of precommitment has the following features:
(a) There always is a feasible contract if P ;:::maxff.l, T"]. When II ~ P < I", a feasible
contract exists only if P is small enough (P < p*) and the borrower's wealth W is
large enough.
(b) Whenever a contract is feasible, the equilibrium contract D* satisfies
V(R*,C',P, P,d',/) = O. The equilibrium in the renegotiation subgame satisfies
o ~ f < 1 and 0 < a < 1.
(c) When a contract D* is signed, the amount of collateral C* is characterized as follows:
(i) If P < P*, then C* = W.
(ii) If p* ~ P < r' , then C* = c. where Q is positive, strictly
decreasing in P and independent of P.
(iii) If P ;:::maxfi", r' J, then C* = o.
In case of precommitment against renegotiation, a tradeoff exists between the level of
collateral C and the penalty P. In case of renegotiation, P does not directly affect the
equilibrium amount of collateral; higher P, however, increases the equilibrium probability
of voluntary debt forgiveness f', which reflects the bank's reaction to the effect of the
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penalty on the borrower's incentive to repay. A higher P may thus increase welfare,
despite the fact that any penalty P > 0 involves a pure deadweight loss. Although
optimizing the court's actions has not been a concern in this chapter, it is clear that for a
satisfactory functioning of the market for corporate debt, the penalty for cheating about
the project outcome should reflect a compromise between the two contrary effects that are
pursued: that on the successful borrower's incentive to repay versus the aim to avoid
unnecessary deadweight loss.
The borrower's wealth influences his chances to get a loan in two ways. It can be
verified that r' is decreasing in W. So the range of r where a feasible contract exists is
larger if the borrower can put up more wealth as collateral. Moreover, if r < I", lending
is feasible only if the borrower's wealth is sufficiently large.
Proposition 7: Assume that no precommitment exists against renegotiation of the initial
debt contract and that a contract D* is signed. If r' < r < 1" , the equilibrium amount
of collateral is strictly decreasing in the project's success probability q.
Analogous to Proposition 2, my model provides a theoretical explanation for the
sorting-by-observed-risk paradigm also in case of renegotiation.
What effect does a "tough" position of the bank with regard to its treatment of
defaulters (precommitment against renegotiation) have on the equilibrium amount of
collateral? And how does this affect the entrepreneur's expected profit?
Proposition 8:
(a) If lending is feasible in case of commitment and in case of renegotiation, then the
equilibrium amount of collateral required is either smaller in case of commitment than
in case of renegotiation, or equal to zero in both cases.
(b) For P sufficiently large, the entrepreneur's payoff is higher in the renegotiation case
than in the commitment case.
The intuition for Proposition 8(a) is that the "tougher" position of the bank in case of
precomrnitment against renegotiation reduces the successful borrower's incentive to cheat
compared to the situation of renegotiation. As a result, in case of precomrnitment a lower
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amount of collateral suffices.
Despite the fact that the borrower puts up more collateral in the renegotiation case, his
profit may still be higher under renegotiation than under precommitment. The reason is
that in court the borrower's assets may be liquidated, in which case the borrower incurs
the deadweight penalty P. The bank's ability to renegotiate the debt contract reduces the
probability that the borrower will be filed for bankruptcy and punished by P. The
deadweight cost involved with collateral is higher, however, because the borrower puts up
more collateral than he would in case of commitment. If P is large, the extra deadweight
cost involved with collateral may be outweighed by the lower probability that the
borrower incurs the penalty P. In that case the borrower is better off if the bank makes no
precommitment with regard to filing the defaulting borrower for bankruptcy. This implies
that if a feasible contract exists in case of renegotiation, it need not exist in case of
precommitment.
Important for the result in Proposition 8(b) is that the initial contract is incomplete --
that it does not allow for randomization. If stochastic debt forgiveness were contractible,
the bank would have the option to commit to f = r, so that the borrower's payoff in case
of commitment would never be lower than his payoff in the absence of commitment. In
that case the "renegotiation-proofness" principle would apply, implying that the absence
of commitment lowers welfare. This proposition demonstrates how this principle may fail
to hold for incomplete contracts [see Bester (1994a)].
2.4. Concluding remarks
This chapter has studied how the creditor's option to force the borrower into filing for
bankruptcy may affect the borrower's repayment incentive and the equilibrium debt
contract. Since only the borrower directly observes the investment's return, the successful
borrower may falsely claim project failure and repudiate. The institution of bankruptcy
discourages this type of behavior. Bankruptcy court contributes to welfare if its accuracy
is high enough to compensate for its social cost. If bankruptcy is highly inefficient, debt
forgiveness may increase welfare compared to precommitment against forgiveness. The
reason is that forgiveness may prevent court involvement. The model also provides a
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theoretical explanation for the empirically relevant situation that observably risky
borrowers pledge more collateral than do observably safe borrowers.
The bankruptcy procedure in this chapter takes a simple and stylized form. An
interesting extension would be to allow for differences in type I and type II errors of the
court's monitoring technology. Under the assumption that the debtor's investment project
has positive net present value, the bankruptcy court's role is to provide a repayment
incentive in case of success. In the renegotiation case, type I errors -- liquidating the
assets of the borrower who is not guilty of cheating -- increase the successful borrower's
probability d' of repudiating. This can be seen as follows." Although the successful
borrower's incentive to repay is not directly affected by the type I error, this error
reduces the efficiency of the court. Therefore the bank may be less willing to file the
borrower for bankruptcy, given that default has been reported. The successful
entrepreneur anticipates this, which increases his incentive to shirk: d' increases. In turn
the bank may counterbalance the higher incentive to cheat by higher collateral
requirements. The type II error -- the probability that the borrower who is guilty of
cheating is not liquidated -- directly influences the successful borrower's incentive to
cheat. To counterbalance this, the bank chooses a lower equilibrium probability of debt
forgiveness f if the type II error is higher. The equilibrium amount of collateral need not
be affected.
Another generalization with regard to the testing technology would be to let the
accuracy of the court's test vary with its cost [see e.g. Nalebuff and Scharfstein (1987)].
The court would then have to select the optimal effort of gathering information about the
state of the firm.
7 Formally. this follows from the equilibrium of the renegotiation game in case of different type I and type
IT errors. Denote by 1 - g the type I error. and by 1 - k the type ITerror. The equilibrium of the renegotiation
game is then given by
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 1: First I discuss some equilibrium conditions and introduce some
definitions. Then I state the maximization problem to which the equilibrium debt contract
is the solution.
I start by showing that if a contract D is feasible, one must have d = 0. By (4), the
bank's individual rationality constraint is satisfied only if d < 1, so only if
X, - R ~ (1-r)[Xs - XF - C] - I'(C + P) (5)
If (5) is binding and d > 0, the bank: could increase its profit by slightly lowering R,
inducing the borrower to select d = 0. So if f :: 0, d = ° in equilibrium.




Note that R > I by (1).
The borrower's individual rationality constraint is given by
U(R,C,r,p,d=O,f::O) = q(1-d)(Xs-R) - (1-q)[C + (1-r)P] ~ °
This holds only if R < Xs. Substitute (6) to see that U(R,C,r,p,d=Oj=O):?O is given by
qXs + (1-q)XF[1-(1-a)(1-r)] - (l-q)[(1-B)C+(l-r)p] - I ~ °
Write (7) as H - (1-q)(I-B)C ~ 0, with
H :: qXs + (1-q)XF[I-(l-a)(l-r)] - (l-q)(1-r)P - I
(7)
Condition (7) holds iff C is smaller than some critical value C - H/[(l-q)(l-B)].
Combine this with the borrower's wealth constraint C ~ W to obtain
C~M=Min[C\WJ (8)
As we must have C ~ 0, a necessary condition for lending to be feasible for the
borrower is M ~ 0, so H ~ O. This is the case for
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I-qX -(l-q)(aX -P)r~r :: S F
M (l-q)(l-a)XF+(l-q)P
(9)
So condition (9) ensures that M ~ O.
Define two critical values for I' as follows:
(10)
where I'M is as in (9) and the other two expressions are given by:
I-XF[1-(l-q)(1-a)] -M[P +q(l-PH
q(XS-XF+P)+(1-q)(1-a)XF
Now state the problem.
The optimal debt contract is the outcome of the following optimization problem:
Max U(D,r,p,d=O,f=O)
s.t. (5), (6), (8) and (9).
By (7), the entrepreneur's payoff is maximized if C is minimized. Thus, the optimal
contract picks the interest rate from (6) and minimizes C subject to the conditions 0 ::;;C
::;; M and (5). The latter condition can be restated in terms of C: substituting (6) and




If lending is feasible, so if (6) holds and if C is in the closed interval [O,M], then in
equilibrium C is minimized to equal c = Max[O;Q. It can be checked easily that
Q~O iff rd' B and CsM iff r~rA . These observations make it straightforward to
derive the results of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2: By the proof of Proposition I, for I'<p<r one has C=C , which
is strictly decreasing in q. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: By assumption (4), d = 1 will never be part of an equilibrium
path. Also f = 1 cannot yield an equilibrium, because by R > I and (1) the successful
entrepreneur will optimally choose d = 1 in response to f = 1. The only candidate for a
pure-strategy equilibrium is thus (f,d) = (0,0). This proves uniqueness. I continue by
showing that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium only if a = 1 or r = 1. By
Proposition I, d = 0 is the best response to f = O. Given d = 0, the bank has an
incentive to raise f to 1 unless the bankruptcy procedure in court involves no deadweight
cost. So f = 0 can only be the optimal response to d = 0 if a = 1 and/or r = l.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: After the debtor has reported default and the bank has seized the
collateral, and given the posterior probability G(d) = qd/(qd+l-q) that the borrower has
cheated, d* is such that the bank is indifferent between forgiving or filing for bankruptcy:
XF = G(d)[raXs + (1-r)XFl + (l-G(d))[(I-r)aXF + rXFl (11)
We have d* > 0 by assumption (2), XF > 0 and a,r,q < l. To see that d" < I, note
that if (11) would hold for d = I, then (4) would be violated by (1). Therefore (11) holds
only for d" < 1.
The equilibrium value f" follows from the condition that the successful entrepreneur must
in equilibrium be indifferent between either reporting default or paying his debt R:
f(Xs-XF-C) + (l-f){r(-p-C) + (l-r)(Xs-xF-C)} = X, - R (12)
By (1) and R ~ I we have r < 1. The condition f' ~ 0 requires
C ~ R - XF - r(XS-xF+P) == ~I





Substitute R* into the expression for ~I to obtain
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Q.E.D.
Note that R* > I.
Proof of Proposition 5: Use (12) and substitute R*, d" and f into U(R,C,r,p,d,f) to












The borrower's profit decreases in C iff A > 0; else if A < 0 it increases in C. Tedious
calculations yield that A is strictly increasing in I', and that if I' = 1, A > O. A unique
critical value I" < 1 for I' thus exists, such that A > 0 iff I' > I". It can be shown that
I" is increasing in P. Q.E.D.
Mf == Min[W, BfA] if r > r"
M' == W tr r < r*
The proof of Proposition 6 requires the following two lemmas:
Define
Lemma 1: There are two critical values r and :£i' such that s: ~ 0 iff I' :::;;:£if , and
s: :::;;M/ iff r ~r.
Proof: c. as defined in the proof of Proposition 4, decreases in I' as d* decreases in I'
and ql'(l-d") increases in I'. If M' = W, the statement directly follows. If M' = BfA, the
proof requires the observation that ~'A - B decreases with r. Q.E.D.
With regard to B, given by (14):
Lemma 2: There is a unique critical value ro < 1 such that B > 0 iff I' > I"'.
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Proof: Consider B as given by (14). Tedious calculations yield that B is strictly increasing
in I', and that if r = 1, B > O. So there exists a unique critical value I" < 1 for I',
such that B > 0 iff r > roo It can be shown that I" is increasing in P. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: The contract D* solves the following maximization problem:
Max, U(R*,C,r,p,d*,i) = B - A.C
S.t. R = R* ; d = d"; f = rand
Max[O; hi] ~ C ~ W (15)
Proposition 4 yields 0 ~ d*,r < 1 if (15) is satisfied. Feasibility of D* requires
B - A.C ;:::0 (16)
Note that (16) implies R+ < Xs.
(a) Distinguish between r ;:::I" and r < I".
If r > r* (A ;:::0), (16) reduces to C ~ BfA. Combine this with (15) to obtain
Max[O; hi] ~ C ~ Min[W, BfA] == M' (15')
A necessary condition for (15') to hold is M' ;:::0, so B ;:::O. Lemma 2 reveals that this
is the case iff r ;::: I". If r ;::: I'", a feasible contract exists iff h' ~ M'. Lemma 1 states
that h' ~ M' is equivalent to r ;::: rio So if r ;::: I", a feasible contract exists if r ;:::
maxrr',r°].
If r < r* (A < 0), (16) reduces to C ;:::BfA. Combine this with (15) to obtain
Max[O; hi; BfA] ~ C s W == M' (15")
First consider r ;::: r-, so B ;::: O. Then BfA < 0 by r < r*. Lending is feasible if h'
~ W, so if I' ;:::r by lemma 1. So if r < I", a feasible contract exists if r ;:::
maxrr',rO]. Next consider r < r-, so B < O. Then we have BfA > O. A feasible
contract exists if BfA ~ W (so W "sufficiently large") and hi ~ W (so r ;::: I' by
lemma 1).
(b) follows directly from the specification of the maximization problem.
(c) Given that a feasible contract exists, distinguish (i) r < I". C is maximized, so C' =
W by (15/'). (ii) r ;:::r'. C is minimized, so C* = Max[O,h'] by (15'). Now by lemma 1,
C* = h' if r < 1" ; else C* = O. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: Proposition 6 gives conditions for which C* = hi. h' is strictly
58 CHAPTER 2
decreasing in q, as d' decreases in q. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: (a) It is easy to check from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4 that
hi > h. Now Propositions 1 and 6 yield the following. Assume that lending is feasible in
both the commitment case and the renegotiation case. If r < I", C* = W ~ C by the
wealth constraint. If r ~ r', C* max[O; hi] ~ C = max[O; g by hi ~ h. This
proves (a).
(b) In case of commitment the borrower's profit equals
U(D,r,p,d=O,f=O) = ~ - (l-q)(l-B)C, see (7).
The proof of Proposition 5 reveals that in case of renegotiation, the borrower's profit
equals B - A.C. The borrower's profit in case of renegotiation exceeds the profit in case
of commitment if the following holds:
~ - (l-q)(l-B) C ~ B - AC* (17)
If C = C* = 0, (17) holds iff ~ - B ~ O. It can be shown that
l1-B
d*(I-XF) I-X
- (l-q)(l-a)(l-r)XF - (l-q)(l-r)P[ 1_ F]
(I-d') (l-d*)qr(Xs-xF+P)
If P is sufficiently large, both the last term and the entire expression will be negative. So
if C = C* = 0, there exists a PI such that (17) will hold if P ~ Pl' If C < C*, it
suffices to prove that (17) holds for C = 0 and C* = W. (17) reduces to
~ - B ~ -AW
Iff < I", -AW > 0 so there exists a P, < PI such that(17) holds ifP ~ Pz· If I' > I",






Banks control valuable private information about borrowers. A nonmonetary cost of bank
failure may be that this information is lost (Bernanke 1983). This chapter develops a
dynamic search model of banking to examine the regulatory implications of this view.
Official assistance prevents the destruction of informational capital as it allows banks to
continue their operations. However, assistance may undermine market discipline if banks
anticipate being bailed out. An optimal policy of 'constructive ambiguity' (Corrigan 1990)
is hence derived, in which official assistance reduces the real cost associated with bank
failure, taking into account the negative incentive effects of government intervention.
This chapter is a revised version of Scheepens (1994).
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THE PREVIOUS CHAPTER has dealt with borrowers in financial difficulties. This chapter
considers the case in which banks themselves are in trouble. This issue remains all too
relevant. Recently, difficulties in the banking industry have involved bail-outs in a
number of countries. In the United States the troubled savings and loans sector has
absorbed large amounts of taxpayers' money. Bail-outs have occurred in Finland,
Norway, Sweden, Australia and Spain, as well (see OECD (1992». The scale of
government assistance in the Scandinavian countries has become so large that the
Nederlandsche Bank (1993) characterizes the resulting situation as de facto
nationalization, enforced by circumstances, of a significant part of the banking system.
This chapter focuses on the informational capital that is destroyed when a bank
fails. In a seminal paper, Bernanke (1983) argues that the loss of banks' accumulated
expertise, information and customer relationships involved with financial collapse raised
the cost of credit intermediation during the Great Depression. This may have had a
significant nonmonetary effect on the macro economy, in addition to the monetary effects
of banking panics. Recent microeconomic papers support the hypothesis that bank failure
may involve informational costs. Siovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993; SSP hereafter)
present empirical evidence that bank financial distress harms client firms as a result of
their loss of relationship-based cost advantages intrinsic to bank lending.' James (1991)
finds that significant going-concern value is lost if the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) liquidates a failed bank, because no well-developed secondary market
for the bank's assets exists due to information asymmetries between the bank and other
market participants concerning the quality of the assets. Bernanke (1993), Petersen and
Rajan (1994) and SSP suggest that the informational cost involved with bank failure may
have implications for banking supervision. Theoretical support for this conjecture seems
important.
Chapter 3 studies the public policy implication of the view that information capital
is lost in case of bank failure. It analyzes a trade-off between the informational cost of
1 This can be explainedby the view that bankloansare 'insidedebt.' That is, bank loansare differentfrom
publicly placed debt because banks know more about a company'sprospects than outside investorsdo. Banks
have the capacity to provide cheap 'informed' funds as opposed to costly 'uninformed' funds provided by
outsiders (see e.g. Fama (1985), James (1987), Sharpe (1990), Diamond(1991), Rajan (1992». SSP note that
informationgeneratedby a bank's loan officersconsistsof implicitas well as explicit evaluationsof corporate
managersand associatedlendingcommitments.Unlikemore concreteforms of data, this kind of informationis
difficult to transfercredibly.
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bank failure and the moral hazard problems involved with anticipated assistance.
Thus, the chapter is not concerned with other important roles for government
intervention in the banking industry. For instance, the chapter does not consider the role
of the government with regard to preventing bank runs, where intervention may be useful
because otherwise a coordination problem among depositors might lead to liquidation of a
solvent bank.' Also, failure of a single bank may induce a domino-effect (see e.g.
Paroush (1988», providing an extra motivation for official assistance. This chapter does
not explicitly take the domino-effect into account; it considers the ultimate informational
cost of (a series at) bank failures. This cost will, of course, be higher if bank failures are
more contagious. In addition, the chapter does not deal with the separation of
responsibilities between bank supervisors and the central government. In practice,
preventing that banks will incur financial difficulties is a task of the bank supervisor,
whereas once a bank is in trouble, decisions on official assistance are often made by the
central government (see e.g. Muller (1990) and Van Nieuwkerk (1994». Here I do not
make this important distinction. Instead I use both "central government" and "bank
supervisor" to mean the authority deciding on bank closure and assistance.
I propose a two-period search model of banking. According to Bernanke (1983),
the real service performed by the banking system is the differentiation between good and
bad borrowers. The cost of credit intermediation, defmed as the cost of channeling funds
from depositors into the hands of high-quality borrowers, includes screening, monitoring
and accounting costs. "Banks presumably choose operating procedures that minimize the
cost of credit intermediation. This is done by (a) developing expertise at evaluating
potential borrowers; (b) establishing long-term relationships with customers; and (c)
offering loan conditions that encourage potential borrowers to self-select in a favorable
way. "3 In my model, presumption (a) is reflected in the banks' search technology. At a
cost banks are able to search for an investment project and monitor its quality. 4
2 See e.g. Bryant (1980), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Postlewaite and
Vives (1988).
3 Bernanke (1983, p.263). I do not consider debt contracts that induce self-selection by borrowers. See e.g.
Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Milde and Riley (1988) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
4 In a broader sense search effort also includes the loan review process aimed at maintaining the quality of
a bank's loan portfolio.
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Search effort involves a moral hazard problem, as it is unobservable for outsiders
and therefore non-contractible. Hence, banks will search only if they have the incentive to
search. This chapter studies how competition for deposits and government intervention
may affect this incentive. It is assumed that only the searching bank observes the quality
of a monitored project. A bank that has invested search effort may still fail, for instance
as a result of adverse economic conditions or market risks. Its probability of failure is
much lower, however, than for a bank that has not invested search effort.
In case of bank intermediation only the investing bank costlessly observes the
project's return realization. The latter informational assumption ensures that a standard
debt contract (in this case a fixed-repayment deposit contract) is optimal (see Diamond
(1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985».
If a bank has identified a high-quality project in period 1, it may in the second
period reinvest in the same project at zero search cost. Information is reusable (see Chan
et ai. (1986», so the bank can minimize the cost of fmancial intermediation by
establishing long-term relationships with good borrowers. This reflects Bernanke's
presumption (b). Berger and Udell (1994) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) present
empirical evidence that bank-frrrn relationships reduce the cost of financial intermediation.
The model is related to Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). The main differences are
the following. First, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) focus on the effect of bank
information on the bank-borrower relation, whereas I am interested in bank regulation.'
Second, I assume that banks have to compete for deposits before they are able to make
loans. Including a deposit market in the model is important because banking supervision
seems to be concerned particularly with the liability side of bank balance sheets." In
Rajan (1992) the deposit market is not explicitly defined, whereas in Sharpe (1990) it is
uncompetitive. Third, in chapter 3 the important agency problem between a depositor and
its bank concerns the bank's incentive not to invest search effort. This may induce
5 Also this motivates why I do not consider problems of determining the borrowing firm's optimal capital
structure. See e.g. Allen and Winton (1992) for a recent survey of this literature.
6 This can be explained as follows. With regard to monetary supervision this is where the money is.
Moreover, in the policy-oriented literature it is often assumed that small depositors are imperfectly informed
about the bank's activities. Consequently, protecting these depositors against mismanagement or fraud is
considered to be an important objective of bank supervision, see e.g. Kareken (1986) and Muller (1990).
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excessively risky investments, as in the one-period model of Bester (1994b).7 In Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992) this agency problem is absent.
In my model government intervention may be useful. In practice, regulators
control exit (and entry) for the banking industry, just as bankruptcy courts control exit in
most other industries. For example, in the US the state bank chartering agency, or the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of national banks, is responsible for
declaring a bank insolvent (see e.g. James (1991). The model provides a clear rationale
for this, even under the assumption that the government agency's information is no better
than that of the bank's depositor. Suppose that the government (or some independent
agency) would not interfere with financially distressed banks, and suppose that some bank
B would report default to its depositor. Then the depositor would value this bank at its
liquidation value. Other banks might value bank B higher if they could take over this
bank as a going concern -- for example, because some of bank B's private information
might then be retained. The depositor would therefore not liquidate bank B, but would
inform other banks that bank B had reported default. Competition between these banks
would enable the depositor to demand the value of bank B as a going concern, in
exchange for foregoing his own right to liquidate the bank. Consequently bank B would
always escape liquidation; the incentive effect of liquidation would thus disappear due to
the depositors' inability to commit to exercising the liquidation option in case of default.
As a result, market discipline would suffer (banks would not search for good investments,
for instance), and so would social welfare. Therefore the government may increase
welfare by preventing uncontrolled private-market bank rescues that would undermine the
threat, and thus the incentive effect, of liquidation. So in this chapter the private sector is
not tough enough. This contrasts with other strands of the literature where government
intervention may be needed because private markets are too tough, like in the bank-run
literature.
As an alternative to liquidation, the government agency may engage in assisting
the troubled bank. In practice, assistance may take one of two forms (see e.g. James
7 In Chan (1983) and Diamond (1991), the bank's search/monitoring effort is publicly observable. They do
not consider the moral hazard problem of the reliability of information production, unlike Bester (1994b) and this
paper. As a result of this moral hazard problem, banks may earn strictly positive profits despite competition for
deposits, because banks would not search if searching would not be profitable for them.
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(1991) and SSP): (a) providing open bank assistance and taking direct control of bank
management and operations, or (b) arranging for the purcbase or merger of the troubled
institution with another bank. Assistance involves some transaction cost. The model may
explain why assistance can be a useful alternative to liquidation. If a bank has identified a
good investment project in period 1 and this project fails due to.bad luck, a positive effect
af government assistance may be that some socially valuable information about the good
investment is maintained by keeping the bank alive. The information would be last if the
authorities would allow the bank to fail. The model indicates that a mixed strategy with
regard to assistance may be optimal, as it may improve welfare and at the same time
prevent the moral hazard problems. This is in accordance with Corrigan's (1990)
statement before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Public Affairs that
with regard to intervention the authorities should maintain a policy of 'constructive
ambiguity' about whether assistance should be made available to banks in trouble. It is
also in line with the observation by the IMF (1991, p.47) that "... the authorities in all
major industrial countries have been purposely vague about when (if ever) assistance
would be made available to large institutions."
The implications of the 'inside debt' notion for banking supervision may be
relevant for the dispute over whether central banks should in addition to their narrowly
defined monetary tasks also protect lending and other functions of banks. According to
Bernanke (1993), this dispute turns on whether major problems in the banking system
would be disruptive to the economy for reasons over and above any effects they had on
the money supply. This may be the case if banks possess valuable non-transferable private
information about borrowers. In practice the responsibility of the monetary authorities
seems to extend beyond the narrowly defmed tasks of controlling the growth rates of the
monetary aggregates or influencing the level and structure of interest rates. Brimmer
(1989), for example, notes that in addition to these tasks, the Federal Reserve System
"has a major responsibility in the containment of those types of risks which threaten to
disrupt the fabric of the financial system which is so vital to the economy at large" (see
also Muller (1990». SSP go one step further by noting that "the government's Willingness
to support a bank rather than allow its liquidation is a public policy judgement that
liquidation leads to significant losses in social welfare because gains associated with
accrual of private information by screening and monitoring, and the development of
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borrower reputation associated with continuous relations, are bank specific and
nonsalvageable. "
Section 3.1 sets out the basic model. The second period is studied in section 3.2.
Section 3.3 analyzes the two-period model under the assumption that banks that report
default are always liquidated. Section 3.4 studies the goverrunent's decision about whether
to provide assistance. Section 3.5 discusses the assumptions of the model and some
possible extensions. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1. The model
The model features a two-period economy in which all economic agents are risk-neutral.
A. Investment projects
An infinite number of investment projects are available' A project may last for two
periods if it is not liquidated in period l. There are two types of projects. A fraction q, 0
< q < 1, is of the low-risk or good type, with success probability Pg' Fraction 1-q is of
the high-risk or bad type, with success probability Po < Pg' In each period projects yield
return X in case of success and zero in case of failure. Return realizations in both periods
are independent and the success probability of each project is constant over time."
Assume PbX > 1. Each project requires an investment of size 1 per period. Funds are
scarce in both periods, and are possessed by the depositors.
B. Depositors
Depositors exist for one period only. Each period features a finite number (M) of
8 In a survey among 1,828 Dutch companies performed by the Dutch central bank's research department
(de Haan et al. 1992, p.155), no less than 80.5% of the respondents indicated that there is no scarcity of
sufficiently profitable investment projects. The assumption of infinitely many investment projects simplifies the
analysis: if it is optimal for the bank to search for a good project in round 1, then it is optimal to search in each
round.
9 Entrepreneurial talent may motivate the assumption why the borrower's type is assumed to be constant
over time. For simplicity I have nOI used a more general formulation like that found, for example, in Chan,
Greenbaum and Thaker (1986), where some fraction of borrowers change types from the first to the second
period.
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depositors, each possessing one unit of capital, who are unable to observe the quality of
an investment project. With regard to the investment decision, they face two options. The
first is to invest directly in a project with unobserved quality. In this case the expected
probability of success equals 12;: qpg + (l-q)Pb' and the depositor costlessly observes the
return realization of the project. The alternative option is to deposit funds with banks.
Any returns on investment are consumed immediately.
C. Banks
There is Bertrand-competition for deposits among banks. Banks have the specific ability
to search for and judge investment projects. By investing a positive effort cost c (the
"search cost"), the bank privately observes whether an investment project is of the good
or bad type. Once the bank has invested search effort, it encounters no information
problems on the asset side of its balance sheet. Outsiders cannot verify whether the bank
searches or not. A bank may invest in a project using one unit of funds from a depositor.
The bank invests in one project, financed by one depositor. This prevents a coordination
problem between depositors; thus a bank run will not emerge in equilibrium. In order to
attract funds, the bank offers some deposit rate r ;::: 1. When the bank finances a project,
the depositor cannot directly observe the outcome of the project. Banks may therefore
cheat about the return realization of the project. If a bank reports default, the depositor
requires the government to liquidate the bank. This acts as a repayment incentive for the
bank. In case of liquidation, the depositor receives the liquidation revenue. Banks may
operate during two periods, unless they are liquidated in period 1.
Assumption 1: The search cost c is such that in period 1 depositors prefer bank finance
to direct investment.
Section 3.3 derives the critical value c, and restates this assumption as c ~ c..
D. Sequence of events
1. In Qeriod 1 banks offer gross deposit rates r.. M banks manage to become active,
that is, to attract one unit of deposits each. Banks may search for good investment
projects or invest the depositor's funds at random.
2. If the project succeeds, the bank has two options. The bank may act honestly and
repay its depositors the promised amount of r.. Alternatively, since the project
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return is unobservable to the depositor the bank may cheat and falsely claim
project failure. Any profit generated in period 1 is consumed by the bank owner.
3. If the financed project fails, the bank cannot repay its depositor and must report
default. The depositor reports this to the government. IO In this case there are two
possibilities. The first is that the bank's remaining assets are liquidated. This is a
standard incentive scheme, which induces the bank to repay if successful. In case
of liquidation the bank's active period ends. Alternatively, the government assists
the bank. Assistance implies that the bank is kept alive and is able to reinvest in
period 2. An exact description of government policy is given in section 3.4.
4. In period 2, N2 :s; M banks invested in period 1 and were not liquidated (because
they repaid their depositors or because they were assisted by the government).
Refer to these banks as "reinvesting banks." Depositors are able to distinguish
reinvesting banks from new banks. Reinvesting banks have an informational
advantage, and compete only with new banks. Reinvesting banks will attract
deposits and simply reinvest into the good project they discovered in the first
period without incurring the search cost again. M - N2 second-period depositors
may either invest their funds with new banks, or may finance a project directly
without observing its quality. Contrary to reinvesting banks, new banks have not
acquired private information about projects in period 1.
S. At the end of period two the economy ends. Banks that did not repay are
liquidated.
3.2. Equilibrium in the second period
The interesting case is when all active banks have invested search effort in the first
period. These banks may reuse their information in period 2, which produces an
informational rent. This section derives the equilibrium of the period 2 subgame, given
that all active banks have searched in period 1. Banks that do not repay depositors are
10 This assumption is motivated in the introductory section. If the resolution of financial distress could take
place without government intervention, default of a successful bank would not be punished by liquidation. This
would induce moral hazard problems, so the depositor might not put his funds in a bank in the first place.
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liquidated at the end of period 2. This prevents cheating about the project return by
successful banks, since honest behavior will be shown to yield positive profits.
A. New banks
Consider a depositor that has two options: either invest with a new bank, or invest by
himself, at random. If new banks do not search for good projects, depositors would rather
invest the funds by themselves. Depositors cannot observe a bank's search behavior, so
they must be sure that the bank has the incentive to search in case of bank intermediation.
The bank has this incentive if its profit in case of search is sufficiently high, so if the
deposit rate is sufficiently low:
Lemma 1: In period 2, searching is optimal for new banks iff
- X cr2:::;; r '" - ---
2 q(pg -ll)
Proof: As there are infinitely many projects, after each round of searching the decision
whether or not to search is the same. In case of search the new bank identifies a good
project in the first round with probability q, incurring search cost c > 0; otherwise it
searches again. The bank's expected profit in period 2, given repayment obligation r2, is
(1)
VN(rz)= qpg(X-rz)- c + (1-q)VN(r2)
so VN(r2)= piX-r2) - c/q (2)
The bank earns 12(X-r2)in period 2 when investing at random. Searching is optimal for
new banks iff VN(r2)~ 12(X-r2),so iff (1) holds. Q.E.D.
Intermediation by new banks takes place only if (1) is satisfied.
B. Period 2 equilibrium
Reinvesting banks exploit their informational advantage. This implies that if new banks
are active and search for good projects, reinvesting banks offer the same deposit rate as
new banks but earn a profit that is higher by the saved search cost c/q. If depositors
prefer direct investment to investment through new banks, reinvesting banks charge the
rate that makes depositors indifferent between direct investment and the reinvesting bank.
Competition for deposits determines the equilibrium deposit rate. If intermediation
by new banks takes place, competition for deposits drives up r2 until (1) is binding. Given
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r2, depositors earn pgr2 when depositing with a reinvesting bank or a new bank. If
depositors invest their funds directly into projects picked at random, the depositor's
expected return equals llX. So period 2 depositors prefer searching new banks to direct
investment iff
Pg f2 :2: llX ,
i.e. iff c ::;;Cz == q(Pg-I1)2X/pg (3)
In that case new banks earn strictly positive profits in period 2 by (1), (2) and c > O.
Reinvesting banks' profits, given by
vR(r2)= pg(X-r2) ,
are even higher. We have proven the following:
Proposition 1: Assume that all active banks invest in good projects in period 1. Then the
(4)
equilibrium of the period 2 subgame can be characterized as follows:
a) If c ::;;<» in period 2 both reinvesting banks and new banks are active as financial
intermediaries. All banks offer the same deposit rate r*2 = f2 . All active banks
make positive profits, but reinvesting banks' profits are higher by c/q.
b) If c > c2: in period 2 only reinvesting banks act as financial intermediaries. They
offer gross deposit rate r*2 = aX/Pg and make positive profits. New banks are
inactive.
At the start of period 2, reinvesting banks have an informational advantage about an
investment project. This creates some monopoly power vis-a-vis period 2 depositors,
which allows reinvesting banks to earn positive profits in period 2. This is a standard
result, see e.g. Sharpe (1990).11 New banks also earn a strictly positive profit if they are
active in period 2, despite competition for deposits. This is because the banks' search
effort is non-verifiable to outsiders and therefore non-contractible. As in Bester (1994b),
new banks search only if searching is profitable -- so if deposit rates are not too high. If
search effort were contractible, the deposit contract could oblige the bank to search.
Competition for deposits would then leave only zero expected profit for the bank.
11If projects would be financed in the first period by more than one bank, the reinvesting banks' period 2
information monopoly would disappear. Bertrand competition between banks would leave only zero reinvestment
profit. However, the next section will show that period 1 depositors are not hurt by the banks' period 2
monopoly power, but instead profit from it. In combination with the search cost of financial intermediation, this
explains why my assumption that banks finance only one project may arise endogenously in period 1. Sharpe's
(1990) model has no transaction costs involved with borrowing and lending. Therefore his assumption that in
period 1 projects are financed by only one bank could not arise endogenously.
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3.3. Period one, no official assistance
In this section I assume that if the bank reports default, it is liquidated. That is, the
government does not provide assistance to any bank. In turn the successful bank will not
cheat about the project outcome. Depositors may prefer bank intermediation only if banks
search for a good project; else, depositors would rather invest by themselves.
A. Period one equilibrium
Proposition 2: In the absence of government assistance there is a critical search cost c/
> c2 such that in period 1 banks search for good projects iff c ~ c/. The equilibrium
deposit rate is r/' = '1 > '2 . All active banks earn positive expected profits over two
periods.
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 2' s proof follows much the same lines as the proof of proposition 1. It
derives the bank's two-period payoff from searching and from investing at random, and
determine for which values of r1 the former exceeds the latter. This is the search
condition, analogous to (1). Given the search condition, the proof derives a condition in
terms of c such that depositors prefer searching banks to random investment, like (3).
Some fraction of the bank's expected period 2 reinvestment profit is competed
away in period 1. Still, as search effort is non-contractible, banks search only if it is
profitable for them. Therefore the active banks' overall profits are strictly positive. This
result differs from Sharpe (1990), where banks earn zero profit over two periods. The
reason is that in Sharpe's model banks are unable to search, so there is no need to induce
them to search.
Von Thadden (1991) concludes that a financial system that manages to solve the
monitoring problem well may have an advantage in financing long-term investment (see
also Mayer (1988».12 The results here point in the same direction. If the search cost is
12 In Von Thadden's model, the bank's information about the firm's type allows the firm to choose a
profitable long-run investment strategy that yields low returns initially instead of a less profitable short-run
strategy that generates higher returns initially but lower returns later on. As the bank knows the firm's type, the
firm does not run the risk of being liquidated just because initial returns are low, for the bank knows that
ultimately returns will be high. Therefore bank finance facilitates long-term investment strategies.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, BANK FAILURE AND OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE 71
not too high (c s c.), banks solve an adverse selection problem on behalf of the
depositors. The high-quality investment projects they select have a relatively high
probability of profitable reinvestment. If banks would be inefficient (c > c.), depositors
would invest their funds at random in a project with unobserved quality, with a lower
probability of reinvestment. So efficient financial intermediaries increase the probability
that profitable long-term financing occurs." This insight may help to understand a
problem faced by the previously communist countries. Calvo and Frenkel (1991) observe
that the complex system of information necessary to assess risk and credit-worthiness is
underdeveloped in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, for there were no incentives to
accumulate such information under the communist regimes. They note that the difficulties
in assessing credit-worthiness of individual enterprises in these countries could result in
an equilibrium in which socially profitable long-term projects may be postponed while
less profitable short-term investments are undertaken.
Proposition 2 makes it possible to restate assumption 1 (see section 3.1) as
follows:
Assumption 1: C ::; c;
B. The social cost of early liquidation
Section 3.4 examines official assistance as a means to reduce the welfare loss of
liquidation of a bank at the end of period 1 ("early liquidation"). If a bank has identified a
good project in period 1 and is not liquidated, in period 2 it may simply reinvest in the
same project without incurring the search cost again. Early liquidation of the bank
precludes this socially desirable reinvestment opportunity. By liquidating a bank in period
1, the depositor imposes a negative externality on the agents that are active in period 2.
To determine the cost of early liquidation, note that reinvestment in the good
project generates the amount pgX of social welfare in period 2. By proposition 1, new
banks are active in the second period if the search cost satisfies c ::; c2. A new bank
generates pgX - c/q of social welfare in period 2. In this case the loss of welfare as a
\3 A reverse relation may also hold. If Co < c ~ c., in period 2 new projects are financed directly by
depositors, whereas in period 1 banks are active. The prospect of a long-term investment project at the start of
period 1 facilitates financial intermediation. The absence of this prospect at the start of period 2 leads to
disintermediation of new banks.
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result of early liquidation equals c/q. If c > Cz, period 2 depositors prefer direct
investment. Welfare in case of direct investment equals QX. The difference in welfare
compared to a project financed by a reinvesting bank is equal to (Pg-Q)X. This provides
the following result:
Proposition 3: Assume that all banks invest in good projects in period 1. Then the social
cost L of liquidating a bank at the end of period 1 can be characterized as follows:
a) if c ~ c2• the cost of early liquidation equals L = c1q ;
b) if c > c2• the cost of early liquidation equals L = (PdllX.
This proposition states the real cost involved with bank failure. The cost is increasing in
c, so the reinvestment option is more valuable for higher search cost. Government
assistance may reduce this cost of early liquidation.
3.4. Period one, government assistance
This section studies the game when the government may choose to assist banks in trouble.
The government aims at maximizing social welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs of all banks
and depositors over two periods minus the cost of assistance), subject to the conditions
that banks search and do not cheat in equilibrium. It can be shown that highest welfare is
indeed obtained if banks search and do not cheat, unless the transaction cost of
government assistance is very low. All agents know the government's objective function.
The order of moves is as follows.
1. At the beginning of period 1 the government commits to a combination of
parameters (f.L, Y(f.L)) , where f.L is the probability that the government bails out a
bank: that reports default in period 1 and Y(f.L) is the amount paid to the depositor
in case of a bailout. The assumption that the government is able to commit to f.L <
1 will be discussed below. Y(f.L) is such that depositors are indifferent between
liquidation of the bank and accepting the transfer offered by the government. In
equilibrium the government picks the welfare-maximizing combination (f.L*,Y(f.L'».
2. Banks compete for deposits, mayor may not search for good projects, invest
depositors' funds and privately observe the returns of their projects.
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3. Banks report success (followed by repayment) or default (followed by liquidation
or assistance). In case of assistance, the government compensates depositors to
keep them from exercising the liquidation option. This enables the assisted banks
in the second period to reinvest in the same project as in period 1.
Since the economy ends at the end of period 2, the government plays no intervention role
in that period.
In addition, assume: 14 (a) The government does not observe the actual outcome
of the project. Assistance may thus adversely affect the banks' incentive to repay
depositors in case of success. (b) The government does not observe an individual bank's
search behavior. Assistance may have an effect on the banks' incentive to search. (c) The
direct cost of official assistance is equal to aY(J.t). There are different interpretations for
this cost, depending on who pays for the bailout. Taxpayers may be charged for it; in that
case direct cost of assistance may be interpreted as the cost of distortionary taxation.
Distortionary taxation inflicts disutility $(1+a) on taxpayers in order to levy $1 for the
state. Alternatively if government assistance takes the form of, say, helping to arrange the
takeover of the defaulting bank by another bank, one can think of aY(J.t) as consisting of
the administrative cost of the takeover, the cost of determining the value of the defaulting
bank's assets, et cetera.
To determine this direct cost of assistance, note that Y(J.t) depends on the bank's
behavior (search or not search, cheat or not cheat). The bank's behavior will be shown to
depend on u, Four different cases of bank behavior can be distinguished in period 1:
Searching A B
No cheating Cheating
No searching C D
If J.t is such that case A or case C behavior emerge, banks report default only if the
project really failed. In that case the expected liquidation revenue to depositors is zero
and so is the direct cost of assistance aY(J.t). In case B, the depositor's expected revenue
from liquidating the bank, given that it has reported default, equals pgX, so Y(J.t) = pgX
14 Section 3.5 discusses the assumptions.
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and cx.Y(/1-) = apgX. Similarly, cx.Y(/1-) = CXQX in case D.
The direct benefit of assistance consists of the saved cost of early liquidation. If
banks search and do not cheat, for given /1- the saved cost of early liquidation equals /1-L,
with L given by proposition 3.
This presentation helps to motivate the assumption that the government is able to
commit to /1-.15 Assume that if the government picks /1- = 1 > /1-' once, it loses the
reputation that it induces banks to display type A behavior." Given that a bank has
searched and does not cheat (type A behavior), the extra welfare from picking /1- = 1
equals (1-/1-*)L. If as a result K other banks find out about the government's softness,
these banks will be tempted to cheat and/or not to invest search effort. On balance this
involves a significant welfare loss unless K is very small (see also the payoffs (5)-(8».
A. Incentive effects of assistance
The government's objective that banks search and do not cheat in equilibrium, implies
that the government picks /1- such that the bank displays type A behavior (see the table).
The bank does not cheat if its payoffs in cases A and C exceed those in cases Band D.
To state the next lemma, defme
91(/1-) == (l-/1-)[X + VR(r2*)]
and 9Z</1-) == (l-/1-)[X + VB(r/)] < 91(/1-)
Lemma 2: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
/1-. Given that the bank has privately observed project success in period 1, its repayment
behavior can be characterized as follows:
(a) If the bank has searched, it repays the depositor if r] ~ 9](/1-) ; otherwise, if r1 >
91(/1-), the bank cheats about the project return and reports project failure.
(b) If the bank has invested at random, it repays the depositor if r1 ~ 92(/1-) ;
otherwise, if r] > 9i/1-) , the bank cheats about the project return and reports
project failure.
Proof: Consider W(rt>[2) and Wo(rl,r:z}as defmed in the proof of Proposition 2. In cases
15 In monetary policy, Cukierman (1992) also assumes that the government is able to precommit.
16 This implies that the government does not deal with all institutions at the same time. According to Kane
(1990, p.756), the FDIC deals with one institution at a time.
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A, B, C and D the bank's expected profit over two periods, given u, equals, respectively,
A(r"r2) = W(rj,r2) + (1-pg)p.VR(r2) (5)
B(r"r0 = pgp.[X+ VR(r2)]+ (1-pg)p.VR(r2)- c/q (6)
C(rl,r2) = WO(rl,r2) + (1-Q)p.Q(X-r2) (7)
and'? D(r"r0 = QJI.[X+Vs(r0] + (l-Q)p.Q(X-r2) (8)
Statement (a) simply follows from the fact that A(rl,r2*) ~ B(rl,r2*) iff r, ~ 8,(p.).
Statement (b) follows from the fact that C(r"r2*) ~ D(rl,r2*) iff r, ~ 8ip.). Q.E.D.
If the project succeeds, the randomly investing bank may have a higher incentive to cheat
about the project return than the bank that has searched, as 8ip.) < 81(p.). The reason
can be found in the randomly investing bank's lower success probability. Given that
default is reported, the randomly investing bank's (ex post) probability that the project
really failed is relatively high. This increases the incentive to shirk.
To see the effect of assistance on search effort, assume that banks do not cheat.
For a given value of r., government assistance increases the payoff of a bank that
searches by (1-p~p.VR(r2)(see (5». It increases the payoff of a randomly investing bank
by (1-Q)p.Q(X-r0, see (7). A comparison of the two expressions yields
Lemma 3: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
u, Assistance decreases the bank's incentive to search in period 1if
Pg{l-Pg) < pJI-EJ (9)
Randomly investing banks have a higher probability of receiving assistance than do banks
that search for good projects, for two reasons. The projects of randomly investing banks
are more likely to fail, and in case of success these banks may have a higher incentive to
cheat. So government assistance may yield unfavorable incentive effects. However, the ex
post benefit of assistance is higher for banks that have searched.
B. Constraints on government assistance
Three types of constraints occur in the government's welfare maximization problem. The
17 In the cases C and D, given project failure in period 1, the conditional probability that the project of
unobserved quality is of the good type equals
q(l-pg)/[q(l-p.) + (l-q)(1-Pb») < q. So if banks are assisted in this case, banks invest at random in a new project
with unobserved quality in period 2.
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first type consists of the incentive constraints. The government wants banks to search and
not to cheat. For given rl this is attained if A(rt,r2*) is the highest bank payoff. Define
and 8ij.1) =" [l62(j.1) +(Pg -Jl}83(1l)
Pg
Note that if (9) holds, 83(J.t) and 84(J.t) are decreasing in J.t.
Lemma 4: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
J.t. Banks search and do not cheat in period 1 iff r] s 8 dJ.t) , r] s 8;(J.t) and r] S 84 (J.t).
Proof: One has A(rl,r2") ~ B(rl,r2") iff r, S 81(J.t); A(rl,r2*) ~ C(rl,rz") iff r, S 8iJ.t);
and A(rl,rz*) ~ D(rl,rz*) iff rl S 84(J.t). Q.E.D.
As the government wants banks to search and not to cheat, the deposit rate r, should
satisfy the restrictions of lemma 4: rl S 8j(J.t), i = 1,3,4. One problem is, however, that
competition for deposits in period 1 does not automatically lead to an equilibrium deposit
rate rl that satisfies these restrictions. If banks would search for good projects and cheat
about the project revenue in case of success (type B behavior), the depositor's expected
payoff would be equal to its maximum value Y(J.t) = PgX. Competition for deposits may
result in an equilibrium in which only the banks that would follow the adverse type B
policy would attract deposits. Refer to this as the type B equilibrium. In this equilibrium
banks and depositors would exploit the taxpayers, because the cheating bank would still
be assisted with probability J.t. This involves high costs of distortionary taxation. The
government wants to prevent the type B equilibrium. Of course if the government could
regulate deposit rates, the type B equilibrium could be ruled out easily. The government
could set a deposit rate ceiling such that the restrictions of lemma 4 would be satisfied: r,
S 8j(J.t), i = 1,3,4. I assume, however, that the government cannot regulate deposit
rates. In that case the type B equilibrium can be ruled out by imposing an upper bound on
J.t, to discourage banks to display type B behavior. To state the next lemma, define
and
j.1A =" c.2,l2.,q _
[Pg -1l-IlVi-Jl}](X -r;) + (Pg -1l)X
J.ta = VR(r2")/[X+VR(rZ*)]
(10)
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Lemma 5: Assume that if a bank reports default, the government assists with probability
Jl. If Jl ::;;Jll = Max[JlA,JlJ, banks will not offer deposit rates that violate the conditions
of lemma 4.
Proof: See Appendix.
If Jl ::;;Jll is binding in equilibrium, a deposit rate ceiling could increase welfare. In case
of a deposit rate ceiling, the assistance probability Jl could be higher than in the absence
of deposit rate regulation.
The third constraint to the welfare maximization problem is the bank activity constraint:
Pgrl ;:::I1.X (11)
Government assistance may favor cheating and random investment by banks. To
counterbalance this effect, the deposit rate that induces banks to search and not to cheat,
may be decreasing in u, It should not decrease so much that depositors strictly prefer
direct investment to bank intermediation. Therefore condition (11) may be binding.
C. The optimal intervention policy
The government maximizes welfare by maximizing Jl, subject to the conditions in
lemma's 3 and 4 and to condition (11). To state the following result, define
(p -p)(P f -p)Q
and II '" g g1
t"3 •
1Jl(1-]l.) -Pi1-Pg)] Vir2)
Proposition 4: Assume that it is optimal that banks search and do not cheat about the
project return. Then there is a critical search cost CA > c2 such that the optimal
probability Jl' of government assistance to banks that have reported default is given by:
a) If c ::;;CA>Jl* = Jll with 0 < Jll < 1.
b) If CA < c ::;;c., Jl' = Min[Jl2,JlJ with 0 s Min[Jl2,JlJ < Jll'




The government is not interested in the distribution of welfare between banks and
depositors as determined by the deposit rate. It picks the highest f..I. such that banks search
and do not cheat and such that depositors prefer bank intermediation to direct finance.
Government assistance may undermine the bank's incentive to search. In that case the
equilibrium deposit rate in case of assistance is lower than in the absence of assistance.
One could refer to this as "implicit deposit rate regulation." Although assistance increases
welfare, period 1 depositors may be worse off as a result of possible unfavorable
incentive effects of intervention.
Figure 1 draws the optimal assistance probability f..I.' as a function of the search
cost c, given that (9) holds." The shape of the curve can be understood as follows. If
the search cost c is not too large (c s cA), banks search even if the deposit rate is
relatively high. Competition for deposits ensures that depositors strictly prefer bank
intermediation over direct investment. The deposit rate that prevents the moral hazard
problems of assistance decreases with the search cost c. As can be verified, the bank's
overall profit increases with the search cost c. Therefore moral hazard problems decrease
Figure 1. Optimal intervention probability f..I.'









18 If government intervention does not favor random investment over searching, i.e. if 8.(1') is increasing in
1', then we have cA > Ct. In that case the conditions for proposition 4b) and 4c) are not satisfied.
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with c. This enables the government to pick a higher assistance probability: /1-* is
increasing in c ::; CA- If the search cost c rises above the critical value cA, the deposit rate
has decreased so much that depositors no longer strictly prefer bank intermediation. To
prevent the deposit rate becoming too low for bank intermediation, the government has to
reduce the moral hazard problems of assistance. It does so by lowering the assistance
probability /1-* as a function of the search cost c.
With regard to official assistance, therefore, the authorities adopt a mixed strategy.
This prevents the moral hazard problems involved with anticipated assistance and at the
same time reduces the social cost of failures of financial institutions. Banks can never be
certain about the action that the government will take. This is in line with Corrigan's
(1990, P.14) view that " .. market discipline will be better served in a context in which
the authorities maintain a policy of what I would like to call 'constructive ambiguity' as
to what they will do .. ". It also gives some theoretical background to the observation by
the International Monetary Fund (1991, p. 47) that "the authorities in all major countries
have been purposely vague about when (if ever) assistance would be made available to
large institutions .. ,,19
3.5. Model robustness and generalizations
This section discusses some assumptions and suggests possible extensions of the model.
A. The size of banks
If projects are not perfectly correlated, the probability that the bank cannot fulfill its
obligations to depositors decreases with the number of projects in which it invests (see
Diamond (1984». This model, for simplicity, assumes that a bank attracts only one unit
of funds and invests this in one project. However, as long as the probability of default is
positive also for well-diversified banks, governments may still have to decide about
19 Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) develop a theory about a central bank's monetary policy, in which
ambiguity also plays a role. However, in their model there is ambiguity about the central bank's (politically
motivated) objective function, whereas in my model there is ambiguity about which action the banking supervisor
will take.
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whether official assistance should be made available. Boyd and Runkle (1993) present
empirical evidence showing that the risk of default for large banks is not necessarily
smaller than the risk of default for small banks. Moreover, the probability that a large
bank facing problems receives assistance may be higher than a small bank facing
problems, because the large bank's information value may well be higher.
An extended model could allow banks to attract funds from many depositors, and
invest these in many projects. If the coordination problems between depositors are
solved," it would be interesting to have a model of optimal bank size that would not
feature a natural monopoly of a perfectly diversified, almost risk-free bank. Delegation
costs due to incentive problems within the bank -- like the problem studied in Chapter 4 --
may provide a limit to the optimal size of a bank. If the incentive problems between, for
instance, the bank principal and the loan officers increase with bank size, the optimal
bank size may be smaller than the natural monopoly outcome. This is an important topic
for future research.
B. The government's information: concentrated versus dispersed banking systems
In the model the government's information is strictly limited. Suppose that the
government would be able to observe some signal S imperfectly correlated with an
individual bank's search effort, in line with "the supervisor's role to assure himself that
(bank) management is competent, has proper controls, procedures and standards in place"
(see Muller (1990)). In that case a bank that has searched and reports default would
receive assistance with a higher probability than would a bank that has not searched.
Consequently, government assistance might have a positive incentive effect on the bank's
search behavior. If this positive effect would not be outweighed by a negative effect on
the bank's incentive to cheat, the extra information could allow the government to be
somewhat more lenient. Suppose that it is easier for the government to obtain information
about bank behavior in concentrated banking systems (like those in many European
20 If returns of diversification make the deposit rate a function of the number N of investment projects, a
coordination problem may arise in the competition stage of the game. In equilibrium beliefs about the amount of
funds that an individual bank will attract have to coincide with the amount of funds the bank really attracts. This
coordination problem would be solved e.g. by the assumption that depositors deposit their funds sequentially,
observe the choices of their predecessors and know that their predecessors know this. An ex post coordination
problem may be that 'bank runs may occur. Deposit insurance may be necessary.
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countries) than in widely dispersed banking systems (like in the US). Supervisors in
concentrated banking systems might then allow themselves to rescue banks with somewhat
higher probability than in dispersed banking systems."
C. Cross-border bank supervision
If a bank has branches in many different countries, its (informational) value is spread
over many countries. If this bank enters fmancial difficulties, a free rider problem
between national governments may emerge: Who should pay for a bail-out? This problem
may make the event of assistance more unlikely. On the one hand this may have an extra
disciplining effect on international banks. On the other hand, valuable bank information is
more likely to be lost in case of problems. Another (opposite) free-rider problem that
could arise, is: Who should take the unpopular decision to close an internationally active
bank? This free-rider problem might exacerbate the problem studied by Kane (1990) and
Boot and Thakor (1993), where authorities are reluctant to close a bank. Models of cross-
border bank supervision should also take into account the free-rider problems involved
with the monitoring of banks by bank supervisors. This chapter does not address
monitoring by bank supervisors. Still, international free-rider problems regarding this type
of monitoring may be important. Crossing of geographical boundaries leads to extra
attunement problems in banking supervision (see e.g. De Nederlandsche Bank, Annual
report 1991). The recent BCCI affair has given a new impetus to the attempts of banking
supervisors to come to universally accepted principles on supervision of internationally
operating banks and financial conglomerates.
D. Alternative ways to reduce the moral hazard problems
Bank capital might reduce the banks' moral hazard problems involved with government
intervention. Alternatively, the government could oblige assisted banks to make a
21 However, if the government would be better informed than the market would be, this could give rise to
an incentive problem of the type studied in Boot and Thakor (1993) (B&T) and in Kane (1990). Kane (1990)
describes political motives that explain why "unlike a private salvor, the Resolution Trust Company (a successor
of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation) is saddled with the additional objective of slowing down
official recognition of the full size of FSLlC's losses." Thus, there may be a principal-agent problem between
taxpayers and their agent, the supervisor, preventing the supervisor from managing its affairs at minimum
taxpayer cost. In B&T, uncertainty about the regulator's ability to monitor the bank's assets creates a desire for
the regulator to acquire a reputation as a capable monitor, and this desire distorts his bank closure policy.
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payment to the government in case of success in period 2. A second-period tax T could
be introduced for banks that have received assistance in period 1 and are subsequently
successful in period 2. T could involve a cost of tax collection. The expected second-
period tax equals PsT for banks that reinvest in a high-quality project. One must have PgT
~ c/q, because otherwise second-period depositors would prefer new searching banks
instead of assisted banks facing a tax burden. T would negatively affect the bank's
second-period incentives to repay in case of success. On the other hand T may have a
favorable influence on the bank's period 1 incentives, as the profit from cheating is
lowered. Inclusion of T would change some of the calculations but not the qualitative
results. In practice, this kind of taxation occurs if official assistance implies
nationalization of the bank, in which case future dividend payments from the bank to the
government can be considered as repayment by the bank.
E. The bank-borrower relation
Bester (1994b), Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1990) show that bank intermediation may alter
the share of the total project revenue that the entrepreneur is able to acquire. This chapter
does not go into such distribution problems. The bank acquires the entire project revenue,
as there are infinitely many entrepreneurs. The model may easily be extended with a
framework that allows bargaining between bank and borrower, as in Bester (1994b).
3.6. Conclusion
Banks may possess valuable private, non-transferable information about borrowers. This
chapter argues that government intervention may be useful if bank failure implies that this
information is lost. Depositors delegate the task of controlling bank liquidation to the
government. If the (information) value of the bank as a going concern would be higher
than the liquidation value, private parties would not liquidate a bank that reports default
but sell it as a going concern. This might undermine the threat, and thus the incentive
effect, of bank liquidation. Government intervention should ensure that banks that report
default do not always escape liquidation. In addition, government intervention may
involve assistance to banks in trouble. The chapter studies the trade-off between the
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informational benefit of assistance (preserving a bank's valuable private information) and
the negative effect that anticipated assistance may have on market discipline. The tasks
performed by the government could also be performed by some independent agency,
except for that of raising taxes to bailout banks.
Of course, the failure of a single bank affects only a narrow set of borrowers.
Much of the debate on the need for official safety nets has focused on the contagion or
systemic risk that the failure of illiquid or legally insolvent financial institutions can
create. Only widespread failures of financial institutions would disrupt normal bank-
borrower relationships and cause a credit "squeeze" that would force non-financial firms
to sharply curtail their output and employment (see Bernanke (1983) and IMF (1991)).
Avoiding the real costs of a banking (or liquidity) crisis has been an important
consideration in formulating public policies. The exact magnitude of these costs is subject
to dispute, although the perception of policymakers is that they can be substantial. It
would be interesting to extend the model with Paroush's (1988) assumption that the
failure of any single bank would entail a chain reaction. The inclusion of
interdependencies among banks could provide the link between the microeconomic theory
of this model and possible macroeconomic implications for banking supervision. The
extended model might help to explain why the responsibility of the monetary authorities
seems to extend beyond the narrowly defined monetary tasks of controlling the growth
rates of the monetary aggregates or influencing the level and structure of interest rates, to
include the containment of those types of risks which threaten to disrupt the fabric of the
fmancial system (see Brimmer (1989)).
,
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Proof of proposition 2: The organization of the proof is as follows. First, I derive the
search condition analogous to (1). To do so, I derive the bank's two-period payoff from
searching and from investing at random, and determine for which values of r, the former
exceeds the latter. Given the search condition, the condition is derived such that
depositors prefer searching banks to random investment, analogous to (3).
The bank's payoff from search: If the bank searches in period 1, success in period 1 leads
to reinvestment in period 2, generating the reinvestment profit VR(r2),see (4). The bank's
two-period profit, given r., r2 and the expected period 1 search cost c/q (as in (2», equals
W(rl,r0 = pg[X - r, + VR(r0] - c/q (12)
The bank's payoff from random investment: Given r., if the bank does not search but
instead invests at random in a project with unobserved quality, the bank's success
probability in period 1 is p. If the project succeeds, in period 2 the bank may reinvest in
the same project. If the project is successful in period 1, the bank calculates the following
conditional probability that the project is of the good type: Q' == qpgip > q. The period
2 success probability for this project is p' == Q'Pg+(1-Q')Pb' with p < p' < Pg. So this
bank's expected period 2 profit in case of reinvestment equals
VB(r2) = p'(X-r2) (13)
The bank's expected payoff over two periods equals"
WO(rl,r2) = p[X - r, + VB(r2)] (14)
Banks' search behavior in period 1: Let r2*be the period 2 equilibrium deposit rate given
that banks search in period 1. An individual bank does not deviate from the search path
iff W(rl,r2*) ~ WO(rl>r2*),see (12) and (14), so iff
_ PgVi'2*)-p-Vi'2') _ •'1 ~ r2 + = '1 (15)Pg -p-
Another constraint on r, is the liquidity constraint r, ~ X. Since depositors live only for
a single period, period 1 depositors cannot receive more than the period 1 project revenue
X. A period 1 deposit rate such that banks search for good projects must satisfy
22 The successful deviating bank's alternative option in period 2 is not to use the period 1 information, but
instead to act as a new bank. It never chooses this option. In equilibrium the new bank is indifferent between
search and random investment, so by g' > Q the deviating bank strictly prefers reinvestment.
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'I ~Min[rl;X] :; r. (16)
Period 1 equilibrium: If banks intermediate, competition for deposits makes (16) binding.
If c ~ ~, period 1 depositors also prefer bank intermediation, as T) >T2 ; thus (16) is
binding. If c > c2, depositors prefer searching banks to direct finance iff pgrl' ~ QX. If
rl' = X, this holds trivially. If rl' < X, by (4), (13) and (15) one has Pg r. ~ QX iff
c ~ CI == c2 + q(pg-Q)(pg2-W')X/pg (17)
If c = c., r.' = QX/pg < X. So c ~ CI is necessary and sufficient for a search
equilibrium to arise. By r." ~ X we have WO(rl',r2*) > O. In combination with W(rl,r2')
~ WO(rt>r2*), see (15), this proves that searching banks earn positive expected profits that
rise in c. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: Distinguish two cases. (i) If the bank searches and does not cheat if r,
= X, the depositor earns pgX and does not prefer the type B equilibrium. The searching
bank does not cheat iff A(X,r2') ~ B(X,r2*), so iff X ~ 91(JL) or equivalently JL ~ JLB'
One has X = 91(JLB) > 92(JLB), so randomly investing banks cheat by lemma 2: C(X,f2')
< D(X,r2*). Given JL = JLB' the assumption that the bank searches for r, = X is satisfied
if A(X,r2*) ~ D(X,r2*), i.e if X ~ 9iJLB), which is equivalent to B(X,r2*) ~ D(X,r2') by
X = 91(JLB)' The condition B(X,rz') ~ D(X,r2*) is satisfied if c is small enough. So for c
small enough, X = 91(JLB) ~ 9iJLB) < 9iJLB), and depositors earn the maximum payoff
PgX. (ii) For larger c, the condition X s 94(JLB) is no longer satisfied. To induce banks
to search and not to cheat, r, < X. Depositors would prefer the type B equilibrium,
earning PgX. The type B equilibrium is ruled out if, given that banks cheat, it is not
profitable for them to search -- so if B(rl,r2*) ~ D(rl,r/). This is equivalent to JL ~ JLA'
Given that JL ~ JLA, banks do not search if the conditions of lemma 4 are violated. In that
case depositors would be better off without bank intermediation.
To show that JLB ~ JLA iff X ~ 94(JLB), note that 91(JL) ~ 94(JL) iff JL ~ JLA' As 91(JLB) =
X, we have X ~ 94(JLB) iff JLB s JLA' Q.E.D.
Proof of QroQosition 4: The government maximizes JL subject to rj S 9j(JL), i=I,3,4
(lemma 4); Pgrl ~ QX, see (11); r, ~ X; and JL s JLI (lemma 5). By lemma 5, if c is
small enough, one has rl = X, JL = JLB ~ JLA and r, S 9lJLB), i=1,3,4. The condition
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Pgrl ~ Q.Xis satisfied trivially. For c somewhat larger, I" = I"A > I"B' and r, = 81(I"A)
= 8il"A) < X, with 8il"J < 83(I"J. The condition Pgrl ~ Q.Xis satisfied if c ::;;c2, as
81(I"A) > '2' If c > ~, pgrl ~ Q.Xis equivalent to pg81(I"A) ~ Q.X,which holds iff
c ~ c '" q[(Pg -[l)X+pgVir;)]MA
A •piX+Vir2)]
with MA the denominator of I"A' see (10). It can be seen easily that 0 < 1"1 < 1.
b) If c > cA, condition (11) is not satisfied for I" = 1"1' Distinguish two cases. (i) cA >
c.. This is the case if r, = 8il") increases in 1". Proposition 4a) applies for all c ::;; c..
(ii) cA < C ::;; c., so 8il") is decreasing in 1". Condition (11) is binding only if I" < 1"1'
If C is only "slightly" greater than cA, c; < C ::;; some cB, we have r, = 8il") > 8ll").
As 8il") ::;; 83(1") iff r, ~ 8il") , the condition rl ::;; 8il") is still not binding. The
binding constraints are r, ::;; 8il") and (11). I" solves pg8il") ~ Q.X,so I" = 1"2 < 1"1' If
C > cB, the condition 8il"2) > 8ll"2) is no longer satisfied, so rl ::;; 83(1") < 8il") is
binding. I" solves pg83(1") ~ Q.X,so I" = 1"3 < 1"2. The numerator of 1"3 is nonnegative by
C ::;; cl. The denominator is nonnegative if cB < C s CJ• The reason is that otherwise
83(1") would be increasing in 1", in which case cB would be greater than c..
To determine rl" note that for C ::;; cA, rJ ::;; 81(1"1) is binding in combination with either






This chapter studies an agency problem between a bank and its loan officer in the process
of loan origination. The loan officer privately observes a prospective borrower's quality.
A high-risk borrower may offer a side transfer to the loan officer (collusion) to induce
him/her to understate the borrower's risk when reporting to the bank owner. The bank, fry
involving a credit committee in the loan approval process, may prevent this problem.
Banks optimally set a loan limit above which all loans must be approved by the
committee. Collusion may occur in equilibrium only if the bank cannot precommit to the
probability that the credit committee actually checks the loan officer's credit proposal.
This chapter is virtually identical to Scheepens (1995). I
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MOST US BANK FAILURES outside periods of severe economic depression can be attributed
to internal causes; the failures, that is, were caused by factors or circumstances that
competent or honest managers and directors would have prevented or avoided (see Sinkey
(1979, p.17». The internal causes include, among other things: Improper loans to
"insiders" such as relatives, business associates or friends,' managerial weaknesses in
loan-portfolio supervision, lack of proper audits, controls and systems, liberal lending
practices and overlending, excessive financial statement and collateral documentation
exceptions and fraud (see Hill (1975), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1988),
Sinkey (1979, 1992), Williams et at. (1991)). Sinkey (1992) concludes that among those
responsible for the deposit-insurance debacle are the managers of insured depositories,
who did a poor job of monitoring their employees and their borrowers.
Given these observations, and given that -- as predicted by economic theory (e.g.
Diamond (1984)) -- many banks are large organizations, internal incentive problems
associated with the bank's credit function have received relatively little attention in the
modern theory of financial intermediation under asymmetric information. 2 It seems
important to improve the understanding of how banks organize their lending activities.
Chapter 3 has modelled the bank's lending policy in a very stylized way. In that
chapter the bank could choose either to invest "search effort" -- enabling it to obtain and
maintain a high-quality loan portfolio -- or not to invest this effort -- leading to a loan
portfolio of lower quality. Chapter 4 extends the analysis of the previous chapter by
analyzing the lending process in more detail. What problems have to be solved if a bank
wants to "invest search effort," that is, if it wants to adopt a sound lending policy? How
should such a policy be designed? These questions are the focus of chapter 4.
\
I This chapter focuses on an agency problem between a bank and its loan officer in the
I According to Hill (1975) this caused 38 out of 67 US bank failures between 1960 and 1974.
2 Udell's (1989) empirical paper is an exception. Nakamura (1993) mentions the internal agency problem
associated with lending. Bolton and Dewatripont (1991) apply Radner's (1993) model of decentralized
information processing to financial intermediation. A related literature considers agency problems between a
bank manager and the bank owners. Mester (1989) gives an overview of empirical work in this area. Mester
(1991) presents empirical evidence on the existence of such a problem in the savings and loans (S&L) industry.
Hermalin and Wallace (1994) simultaneously consider this agency problem and an agency problem between
shareholders and debtholders in the S&L industry. This chapter also relates to the recent corporate finance
literature on intra-firm incentive problems, see Thakor (1993) for an overview of this field.
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process of loan origination.' Banks hire loan officers to operate as "salesmen" in local
credit markets, unlike in Broecker (1990), where the bank principal himself is involved
with loan origination. Generally the loan officer knows more about the borrower than
does any other individual in the bank because of his/her critical role in the solicitation and
negotiation of the loan (Udell (1989». This implies that the loan officer, more than any
other bank employee, is in the best position to assess the risk of a prospective borrower.
Nevertheless, anecdotical evidence suggests that loan officers may have a tendency to
underestimate borrower risk. There are two explanations: (a) The loan officer's personal
involvement with the borrower may skew objectivity (Albert (1993), Langman (in
Financieele Dagblad, 1 March 1991), Pirok (1993».4 (b) The (career) incentive system
for loan officers focuses more on new lending activities than on project performance
(Drake (1993), Kilby (1993), Sinkey (1992».5 With regard to the incentive system, the
bank could make the loan officer's wage contingent on the profit that is ultimately earned
on the loan (see Holmstrom (1979) and Shavell (1979». It may be costly to do so,
however, for several reasons. Risk aversion on the part of the loan officer is one. Also if
the loan officer is risk-neutral, as in this chapter, placing high emphasis on project
performance may be costly. If the performance of the loan depends not only on the loan
officer's effort in project selection, but also on efforts made by other persons providing
advisory or monitoring services, it may be difficult to determine whether project failure is
the loan officer's fault. Moreover, the ultimate profit of granting a loan is usually realized
only after a relatively long period of time. The loan officer is free to quit his/her job I
3 The bank's credit function consists of two components: loan origination and loan monitoring. Loan
origination includes loan officer effort in soliciting and negotiating the new loan, pre-approval credit analysis
conducted by the loan officer and the credit department, and scrutiny by those vested with credit approval ,
authority. Loan monitoring, on the other hand, consists of post-approval credit analysis in order to detect
deterioration in loan quality (see UdeIl (1989». Although this paper deals with loan origination, with some
modifications the model may also be applicable to loan monitoring (see section 4.5).
4 In a worst-case scenario, the integrity of the lending relationship may be vulnerable to corruption if the
loan officer receives kickbacks or has an undisclosed financial interest in the borrowing concerns. As an
example, the Financial Times (14 September 1993) reports: "Bribery, negligence and fraud cost Hungarian banks I
$ 170m. [.. J Bank managers are aIleged to have accepted bribes to underscore credit risk, overlook faked
security or grant preferential loans." UdeIl (1989) remarks that while this type of behavior certainly does not
characterize a large fraction of commercial loan relationships, it does seem to characterize a significant fraction
of those banks that have failed.
5 According to Kilby (1993), at least until recently the lending process within the World Bank could be
characterized as such.
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before debt repayment is due, or may pass away. A (legal) limited liability constraint and
insufficient loan officer wealth (after consumptive needs have been satisfied) may prevent
negative wages. The practical observation that the incentive system for loan officers often
focuses more on new lending activities than on project performance, seems to indicate
that the costs of paying loan officers contingent on loan performance may be higher than
the benefits. Given this incentive structure, chapter 4 focuses on the effect of the loan
officer's personal relationship with the borrower on the loan officer's actions.
To model this effect, I assume that the personal relationship between borrower and
loan officer may involve some hidden side transfer, such as common interests in the local
community, friendship, borrower effort to convince the loan officer to grant the loan, and
(in extreme cases) non-monetary or monetary bribes. An (unprofitable) low-quality
borrower may collude with the loan officer. In exchange for a side transfer, the loan
officer may hide unfavorable information about the borrower, such that -- based on the
information that is presented to the principal -- the bank would decide to grant a loan."
Chapter 4 analyzes the bank's optimal (i.e. profit-maximizing) policy of coping with
collusion. Thus, it is related to the theory of (collusion in) organizations, see e.g. Kofman
and Lawarree (1993, K&L hereafter), Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Tirole (1992). In
this literature, the role of a "supervisor" is to reduce the asymmetry of information
between the principal and the agent. Consider now the borrower to be the agent; the role
of this supervisor is then played by the loan officer. However, the possibility of collusion
induces a principal-agent problem between the loan officer and the principal. The loan
officer may therefore be supervised by another supervisor, which can be referred to as the
credit committee/credit department. If such a credit committee is involved, it makes the
credit decision after having received a report by the loan officer containing information
about the borrower. 7 It may perform a costly check of this report, which reveals whether
6 Three remarks regarding side transfers and collusion: (i) Some of the examples of side transfers given in
the text, such as borrower effort to influence the loan officer, are not really transfers of utility. In the context of
this paper they can still be labelled side transfers if the borrower bears a cost in order to affect the loan officer.
(ii) Note that side transfers may have incentive positive effects as well, if they motivate loan officers to invest
high effort in lending. This is in line with Albert's (1993) observation that in practice many of the elements that
motivate an account officer are imposed by external factors. This paper neglects such positive incentive effects.
See section 4.5 for a discussion. (iii) Note that the problem of collusion studied in this chapter is different from a
I free rider problem of the type studied in Holmstrom (1982).
7 Van den Brink (1981, Ch. 9) describes what kind of information such a report should contain.
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collusion has occurred." The credit committee is an incorruptible supervisor, as in Baron
and Besanko (1984) and the external auditor in K&L, for instance because it is located far
away at the head-office, where the borrower has no access to it.9
Alternatively the credit decision may be delegated to the loan officer. Collusion may
be prevented if the loan officer's wage scheme is such that collusion does not make
him/her better off. In that case the loan officer's wage will increase with the maximum
side transfer that the borrower is able to pay in order to prevent collusion. Other than in
most of the collusion literature (e.g. K&L, Tirole (1992)), this maximum side transfer
increases with the investment level. So the cost of preventing collusion through delegation
increases with the loan size 1.
To cope with collusion, the bank has to choose between either delegating the credit
decision to the loan officer or involving the credit committee. The model indicates that
above some investment level it is cheaper to involve the credit committee at fixed cost per
check than to delegate the credit decision to the loan officer, because the cost of
delegation increases with the loan size. This may explain the practical observation that
banks typically set a limit above which all loans must be approved by a credit committee.
Udell (1989) reports that only 16% of banks in a survey do not approve loans based on a
credit committee limit.
The chapter also studies the ex post commitment problem that may be associated with
a check by the credit committee. As a result of this problem, collusion may occur in
equilibrium. It will be shown that delegating the credit decision to the loan officer, which
implies ex ante commitment not to involve the credit committee, may help to avoid the
commitment problem. Thus, delegation may keep the bank from financing unprofitable
projects. Also in Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) delegation may serve to commit against
financing unprofitable projects, but for a different reason. Their model of adverse
selection shows that it may become sequentially optimal to refinance projects that are ex
8 In practice the credit committee may also serve another goal (see e.g. Pirok (1993»: To improve the
credit decision by bringing in information that the loan officer does not have. This may concern industry-specific
and macro-economic information, previous experiences with similar borrowers in other regions, information
about the bank's assets mix such as the extent of diversification of the loan portfolio over geographic regions and
industry sectors, information about the cost of funds, etcetera. See section 4.5 for a discussion.
9 I do not consider the incentive problem in Sah and Stiglitz (1986). There the lower bureau in a hierarchy
anticipates that the upper bureau will recheck its decisions, so screening may become less conservative.
Penalizing the lower bureau if the upper bureau comes to a different conclusion may mitigate this problem.
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ante unprofitable, once they have begun. If the economy is decentralized, credit is granted
by small banks. As a small bank may be unable to extend the additional credit itself once
the project has performed badly in the initial period, decentralization of credit may serve
as a commitment device against refinancing, which may prevent unprofitable projects
from ever being financed.
Section 4.1 describes the basic model. Section 4.2 studies the collusion game. Section
4.3 considers the case in which the principal can precommit to some probability of calling
in the credit committee. In section 4.4 commitment is absent. Section 4.5 discusses
possible extensions of the model. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter.
4.1. The model
, The bank owner (principal), the loan officer and the credit committee together form a
bank. Borrowers demand bank loans. The principal, who seeks to maximize bank profit,
owns the funds to be lent out, but is unable to meet and monitor borrowers directly. He
delegates this task to the loan officer. All agents are risk-neutral.
A. Borrowers
There are many borrowers, who are endowed with projects. A project needs an initial
investment of some exogenously given size I > O. As the borrower does not have liquid
funds available, he needs a bank loan of size I. In case of investment, the project yields
XI if successful (constant returns to scale) and zero if it fails. There are two types of
borrowers. A fraction q of the borrowers is of the good type, with success probability 0
< Pg < 1. A fraction l-q is of the bad type, with success probability 0 < 1\ < Pg·
Define by 12the average success probability:
12== qpg + (l-qjp,
A bad borrower's project is assumed to be unprofitable. That is, PbX < 1. On average,
projects are profitable: 12X> 1.
B. The loan officer and the information structure
The loan officer represents the bank in the credit market. Her expected wage should at
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least equal her reservation utility ~, which is normalized to equal ~ = O. The loan
officer randomly meets prospective borrowers. To identify a borrower's type, she
performs a costless but imperfect test. Let the parameter r denote the probability that the
test reveals the borrower's type. The following table describes the test: 10
Good borrower (g) Bad borrower (b)
Test result: 'Good' (G) r 0
Test result: 'Inconclusive' (0) i.r i-r
Test result: 'Bad' (B) 0 r
Only the loan officer and the borrower costlessly observe the test result. The loan officer
must report a signal L to the principal, L f' {G,o,B}. Assume that the signal is hard
information. That is, if a conclusive test result is obtained by the loan officer (G or B)
and the test result is revealed to the principal, it is convincing evidence. Alternatively, the
loan officer may hide the conclusive test result and report that the test was inconclusive
(0). If an inconclusive test result 0 is obtained, the loan officer cannot report a conclusive
result; in that case the loan officer must report L = e. Thus, the loan officer has some
discretion only if a conclusive test result is obtained.
The loan officer reporting an inconclusive test result can be compared to the
secondhand car dealer in Shin (1994). Suppose you ask this dealer whether a secondhand ,
car you are considering buying has been in an accident, and the dealer then replies he
does not know. This reply usually leaves open two possibilities. Either the dealer knows I
that the car has been in an accident but is holding back this information, or the dealer is I
genuinely ignorant as to whether the car has been in an accident. l
The interpretation of the information structure in terms of information hiding assumes
that in order to be able to be conclusive about a prospective borrower's type, some
minimum amount of information is necessary. If the amount of information obtained by
the loan officer is sufficient to draw a definite conclusion, she may hide part of it. In that
case the information she presents to the principal is insufficient to be conclusive about the
10 Alternatively one could assume that the test is costly and allow the loan officer to choose whether to






borrower's type. If the amount of information available to the loan officer is insufficient
to be conclusive, she is unable to create some extra false information that would convince
I the principal of the opposite. n
C. Collusion
Given the loan officer's discretion after a conclusive test result is found, collusion may
occur. That is, a borrower may offer a non-monetary side transfer s to the loan officer to
induce her to hide the conclusive evidence and to send an inconclusive report Ii'! to the
principal instead." The loan officer's valuation of the side transfer s equals as. Assume
that 0 < a < 1, where the assumption a < 1 implies that collusion involves a
deadweight cost. The loan officer values a wage of one dollar higher than a side transfer
of one dollar, perhaps because she does not like to hide evidence or because she wants to
be compensated for the risk of being caught colluding. If collusion would be considered
"morally objectionable," a Iowa could be interpreted as a high level of morality. The
loan officer will accept the offered side transfer only if this makes her better off.
Acceptance of the transfer implies, as in K&L, that the loan officer abides by her
commitment to hide information, although it is not possible to enforce a side contract in
court. Tirole (1992, p.156) discusses non-judicial mechanisms that ensure enforceability
of side contracts and concludes that the approach that assumes enforceability as given
"may offer a realistic description of side contracting, and that it still yields precious
insights when it does not. "
D. The credit committee
The credit committee does not collude with anyone, as it resides in the bank's headoffice,
u The technical motivation for this information structure is its role in simplifying the analysis. It implies
that the principal may suspect collusion only if the loan officer has reported an inconclusive test result. If the
good signal would not be hard information, then also after receiving a good signal the principal might suspect
collusion. This would add another subgame to the game tree, which would not be fundamentally different from
the case considered here.
12 The borrower is assumed to have some non-monetary endowment from which he makes the side transfer.
The assumption of non-monetary side transfers simplifies the analysis in yet another way. If the side transfer
would be monetary, the amount to be borrowed would depend on the size of the side transfer. If the demanded
loan size would signal future collusion, the problem of collusion would disappear in an unconvincing way. This
possibility should have to be ruled out if side transfers would be monetary.
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near the principal and far away from the local credit market. 13 Since a conclusive report
is hard information, only inconclusive reports will be sent to the credit committee. In that \
case the committee, which then makes the credit decision, may perform a check of the 1
loan officer's report at cost C, which is observed by the principal. If the borrower and the
loan officer have colluded, the check reveals this to the principal. Borrower and loan
officer do not observe whether the credit committee performs a check or not. 14
E. Interest rates and wages
The borrower's repayment obligation rI is contingent on the ultimate signal that the
principal receives about the borrower. If the credit committee does not check, the ultimate
signal comes from the loan officer's report; otherwise it comes from the committee's
check. Define by rG and r0 gross interest rates (repayment obligations per dollar of the
loan) contingent on a good and an inconclusive signal, respectively, where 1 < rG < r,
< X. The borrower with a bad signal does not receive a loan as loans to bad borrowers
generate losses (PbX < 1). Take the rates rG and r0 as exogenously given. An extended
model may endogenize these rates (through a model of bank competition, for example).
Assume that rG generates nonnegative profit to the bank if it lends to good borrowers: rG
::?: lIPg· Also assume that r0 is such that if the loan officer has reported an inconclusive
test result, it is profitable for the principal to grant a loan at interest rate r0 even if the
borrower with a bad test result always colludes and if this collusion is never detected:
(1)
Here (1-r) is the fraction of borrowers with an inconclusive test result; .Q is the average
success probability of the entire population of borrowers; and (l-q)f' is the fraction of
borrowers that are of the bad type and have a bad test result. This condition is not
essential but simplifies the analysis, because it implies that whenever the bank receives an
inconclusive test result, it will grant a loan.
The principal determines the loan officer's wage scheme w
I
\
13 If the committee itself would be involved in meeting borrowers, it would also be exposed to collusion.
Moreover, I assume the wage cost involved with the credit committee screening borrowers directly to be very
high. So the loan officer is the more cost efficient solution to the screening problem.
14 This implies that borrower and loan officer cannot distinguish between the case in which the committee
has not checked the report, and the case in which the committee has checked, but collusion did not occur.
Consequently the wage will be the same in these two cases, and so will the interest rate.
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public information. Following the reasoning in the introductory section, the principal
cannot reward the loan officer contingent on debt repayment by the borrower. The loan
officer's wage is contingent on the report she sends to the principal. If no collusion is
detected, wo, wB and we denote the loan officers' wages contingent on a good, a bad and
an inconclusive test report, respectively. The loan officer's limited liability constraint
requires wo, wB, we ~ O. If collusion is detected, the loan officer does not receive her
wage but is punished by an exogenous nonpecuniary penalty P > 0 (e.g. dismissal)." A
(legal) limited liability constraint for employees bounds P from above: P < < oc
Otherwise the collusion problem would disappear trivially for P close to infinity.
F. The sequence of events
1. The principal offers a contract specifying a wage scheme wand specifying that the
loan officer will be punished by the (exogenous) penalty P if collusion is detected. If
the principal is able to precommit to some probability Jl that an inconclusive report is
checked by the credit committee, also Jl is part of the contract (0 ~ Jl ~ 1).
2. The loan officer is randomly matched with one borrower and (costlessly) employs the
test. Loan officer and borrower jointly observe the result.
3. The borrower may offer a side transfer s to the loan officer. The loan officer may
accept or reject s. Denote by a, 0 ~ a ~ 1, the probability that she accepts it.
4. The loan officer reports a signal L to the principal. If she has accepted the side
transfer s, she abides by her commitment to report L = 0 regardless of the test result.
Otherwise she truly reports the test result.
5. If the principal receives an inconclusive report (L = 0) and the probability Jl that he
calls in the credit committee has not been contracted in stage 1 of the game, the
principal may engage the credit committee to perform a check, possibly using a mixed
strategy Jl (0 ~ Jl ~ 1).
6. Contracts are implemented.
15 Alternatively it could be assumed that the principal could choose some optimal P" in the interval [0.
PMAX] (and pMAX not too large). It is not difficult to show that then P' = pMAX both in the commitment case
(section 4.3) and in the no-comrnitment case (section 4.4).
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4.2. The collusion game
Collusion may occur only if the loan officer has some discretion, i.e. only if the loan
officer has observed a conclusive test result.
A. The bad test result
If the loan officer has observed a bad test result, when will collusion occur? Define s(p,)
as the highest side transfer the bad borrower with a bad test result would be willing to
pay to the loan officer, given u, Then s(p,) must equal the bad borrower's expected gain
from collusion. After collusion, with probability I-p, the credit committee does not check
the loan officer's report. Only then the borrower receives a loan I, which enables him to
invest I and earn positive expected profit. So we have
s(p,) = (l-p,)Pt,[X - rell
Assume that the borrower with a bad test result offers some side transfer s ~ s(p,) to the
loan officer to hide the result. The loan officer rejects this offer and truly reports the test
result if her wage when reporting the true result is higher than her payoff when colluding:
WB > as + (l-P,)We- p,P (2)
The side transfer is accepted if the reverse holds. If (2) is an equality, the loan officer is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the side transfer.
Suppose that a bad test result has been observed and that collusion occurs. If the bank
does not detect collusion, the loan officer receives wage w". A higher We' thus, makes it
more costly for the bank to prevent or reduce collusion (see (2». So preventing collusion
is cheapest for the bank if we = o.
B. The good test result
It is not in the good borrower's interest that the loan officer hides a conclusive test result.
The good borrower will, therefore, not offer a side transfer to the loan officer to hide the
conclusive test result. Conversely, the loan officer could threaten the borrower to hide the
good test result. This threat, however, is not credible if wG > we' If wG = we' the loan
officer will be indifferent between executing the threat and not doing so. As a tie-
breaking rule, it will be assumed that the loan officer truly reports the good test result in
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that case." The principal prevents collusion and at the same time minimizes wage cost if
he sets WG = W", Combine this with the observation that W" = 0 is the bank's best policy
if the loan officer would observe a bad test result, to obtain the equilibrium condition
wG = W" = 0 (3)
To minimize bank cost, this condition must hold. Given that (3) holds, collusion may
occur only if the loan officer observes a bad test result.
In this model -- where the loan officer only meets one borrower -- the loan officer's wage
is positive only if a bad project is reported. Suppose that in an extended model the loan
officer would have the opportunity to meet more borrowers before she picks one. Then if
(3) would hold, it might be the case that the loan officer would continue searching until
she would have found a bad borrower. To prevent this type of adverse behavior, the bank
should then raise WG to induce the loan officer to pick a good borrower when she meets
one. In that case (3) would not hold, but instead WG > w",
C. The collusion case
As a point of reference I will now briefly examine the case in which the bank does not
prevent collusion between the borrower with a bad test result and the loan officer.
Collusion will then occur whenever a bad test result is found. The bank's expected loss
on borrowers with a bad test result equals (l-q)r(w" - 1)1, which is negative by P1X <
1. In this case the bank's expected profit equals:
7r = RI + (1-q)r(Pbr" - 1)1 (4)
where RI is the expected payoff to the bank on borrowers that do not collude, that is,
those borrowers with good or inconclusive test results." By (1), bank profit (4) exceeds
zero. This implies that by assumption the bank will always be able to adopt a policy such
that lending is profitable. The question is, how much more the bank could earn when
efficiently coping with collusion. The chapter will show that reducing collusion may
significantly increase bank profit.
16 To justify this rule, note that any arbitrarily small increase of wGor a small probability of being checked
would result in the same decision.
17 R = qr(pgrG - 1) + (1-r)(Q.r. - 1).
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4.3. Contractible checking
This section assumes that the probability fJ. that the credit committee checks an
inconclusive report is contractible. That is, fJ.is chosen as part of the contract between the
principal and the loan officer in stage 1 of the game and the principal sticks to this
contract." The principal picks the combination (fJ., wB) that maximizes bank profit. First
it will be shown that in this case the principal will always prevent collusion.
A. Collusion-proofness
A strategy is collusion-proof if it always prevents collusion. Collusion does certainly not
occur if the maximum side transfer s(fJ.) that the bad borrower would be willing to pay, is
insufficient to make the loan officer better off colluding. In this case of commitment to fJ.,
if the loan officer is indifferent between accepting the side transfer or not, we use the tie-
breaking rule that she rejects the transfer: collusion does not occur." Substituting s by
s(fJ.) in (2) and using (3) yields the collusion-proofness constraint:
wB ~ as(fJ.) - fJ.P (5)
If the collusion-proofness constraint (5) holds, no side transfer that the borrower would be
willing to pay could induce the loan officer to hide a bad test result. Define wB'(p')as the
value for WB such that the collusion-proofness constraint is exactly binding if this value is
nonnegative; if this value would be negative, wB'(fJ.)is zero:
wB'{fJ.)== max[ as(fJ.)-fJ.P ; 0] (6)
If the collusion-proofness constraint (5) is binding, the bank's expected profit equals
'If = RI - (l-r)fJ.C - (l-q)rwB'(fJ.) (7)
where (l-r)fJ.C is the expected cost of involving the credit committee.
A simple collusion-proof strategy for the bank is setting (wB, fJ.) = (wB'(O),O). This
strategy prevents collusion without involving the credit committee. Comparing (4) and (7)
yields that this simple collusion-proof strategy generates higher bank profit than allowing
18 In section 4.4 we discuss the commitment problem associated with checking. A reputation mechanism
may prevent this problem. In a repeated game, new borrowers could learn whether the credit committee checks
with the contracted probability p. or not. If not, the bank loses the reputation for being tough on collusion.
19 To justify this rule, note that any arbitrarily small increase in Ws or p. would generate the same outcome.
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collusion, by (6), a < 1 and PbX < 1. The bank will therefore always use a collusion-
proof contract (WB' /1-) in the commitment case. The collusion-proofuess constraint (5) will
be satisfied in equilibrium.
B. Optimal strategy
It has been shown that an optimal contract (/1-, wB) will be such that the collusion-proofuess
constraint (5) is satisfied. Given that (3) holds in equilibrium, the principal's problem is
to maximize bank profit (7) subject to WB ~ 0 (loan officer's limited liability and
individual rationality constraint) and 0 ::; /1- ::; 1. To state the next Proposition, define
and
Note that 0 < /1-1 < 1.
II '" (I - DC - (l-q)rP
(l-q)raPb(X - r.)
/1-1 = WB/(O)/(WB/(O) + P) (8)
Proposition 1: Assume that the principal is able to commit to /1-. In equilibrium the
principal chooses a policy that prevents collusion. The optimal policy is the following:
a) If I ::; [I, the principal optimally picks /1-" = 0 and WB* = w/(O) > O.
b) If I > [I, the principal optimally picks /1-' = /1-/ and WB* = O.
The principal's profit is positive and increasing in 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that if the bank is able to commit to /1-, it prefers to prevent collusion.
The credit committee will be involved (/1- > 0) only with relatively large loans (I > II).
If the loan size is smaller, the principal prefers no check (/1- = 0) and delegates the credit
decision to the loan officer. The intuition for this result is as follows. The side transfer
that the borrower is willing to pay increases with the investment level I. As a result, the
cost of preventing collusion if the credit committee is not involved (/1- = 0) increases
linearly with I, as the bank pays expected wage (l-q)rWB/(O) to the loan officer to prevent
collusion. Alternatively the bank commits to some probability /1-1 of checking the
inconclusive report in combination with paying zero wage to the loan officer. In that case
preventing collusion involves expected cost (1-r)/1-1C. This cost also increases with the
loan size I, because the probability /1-1 of a check is increasing in I: The larger the loan,
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the higher the maximum side transfer s(J!) in case of collusion, which requires a higher
probability J!' of checking to prevent collusion. However, the cost (l-r)J!IC is upwardly
bounded by J!' < 1. Therefore above some critical investment level I' it will be cheaper
to involve the credit committee than to delegate the credit decision to the loan officer.
Thus, the proposition gives a theoretical explanation for a situation that is quite common
in practice: Many banks grant their loan officers a "credit limit" I', such that the credit
decision is delegated to the loan officer if the amount of the loan is smaller than I',
whereas for loans larger than II the credit decision is made centrally, by the credit
committee (see e.g. Udell (1989».
If the cost of a check is sufficiently low, C ~ (l-q)rp / [1- I'], the critical credit limit I'
is smaller than zero. In that case for all investment levels I > 0 the credit decision is
made at a centralized level (J!. = J!').
4.4. Contract incompleteness
This section assumes contract incompleteness in the sense that the principal is unable to
commit to J!. In that case a commitment problem may arise because ex post (that is, after
having received an inconclusive test report) the principal may want to reduce the cost of
checking. This implies that in equilibrium the probability J! must be subgarne-perfect, that
is, it must be the principal's optimal choice after he has received an inconclusive report.
In this case bank profit will not be higher than in the commitment case of section 4.3.
The reason is that in the commitment case the principal always has the option to choose
the outcome of the no-commitment case, but not vice versa.
A. Delegation to avoid the commitment problem
The commitment problem associated with J! does not exist if setting 11- = 0 is optimal, as
in Proposition 1, part a. Indeed, in stage 5 of the game the principal then knows that
collusion has not occurred and so he minimizes his cost by not calling in the credit
committee. To avoid the commitment problem concerning 11-, the principal can thus
prevent collusion by setting wB = wB'(O).The credit committee will not be involved (J! =
0) and the credit decision is delegated to the loan officer.
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B. Involving the credit committee
This section considers only those equilibria in which the credit committee will be involved
with positive probability p- > 0, which implies wB < wB'(O) (otherwise p- = 0 in
equilibrium). Given p- > 0, now consider the borrower's decision as to which side
transfer to offer, if any; the loan officer's decision whether to accept it; and the
principal's decision whether to check an inconclusive report. Using backward induction,
start with the principal's decision to check an inconclusive report in stage 5 of the game.
The principal: After the principal has received an inconclusive report, p- = 1 will
never constitute an equilibrium. The reason is that the collusion-proofness constraint (5) is
satisfied for p- = 1, so collusion does not occur. Then the principal prefers not to monitor
(p- = 0), which contradicts the choice to monitor with probability p- = 1. So in
equilibrium p- < 1.
After the principal has received an inconclusive report, he must in equilibrium be
indifferent between a check of the report, involving cost C, and no check. Given that the
borrower with a bad test result has colluded with the loan officer with probability (J, the
principal calculates the following conditional probability B(a) that collusion has occurred:
P( (J) = (1-q)ra
(l-r)+(I-q)ra
If collusion has occurred, a check ensures that the loan will not be granted. In the
absence of a check, the loan is granted by assumption (1), so the check may prevent a
loss of (Pbre-1)1 < O. The condition that the principal is indifferent between a check of
the inconclusive report, involving a cost C, and no check, is then given by:
8(a)(1 - Pbr,,)1= C (9)
Of course, condition (9) may be satisfied only if a check is useful in case a = 1:
C < B(1)(l - We)1
so only if
I > II == [B(I)(l - Pbr.)]-IC (10)
If condition (10) does not hold, a check is too costly relative to the size I of the loan. The
principal prefers not to use the credit committee, but instead moves to prevent collusion
by choosing wB = W8'(0). Thus, the restriction of this section to consider only those
equilibria with p- > 0, implies that (10) must hold.
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Note that if (10) holds, 0 < d < 1. d is increasing in C and decreasing in I.
The loan officer: After the loan officer has observed a bad test result, the situation in
which she strictly prefers to accept the bribe s offered by the bad borrower (o = 1)
cannot constitute an equilibrium. The reason is that then the principal would have the
incentive to check the loan officer's report with probability /1- = 1. The loan officer
anticipates this; o = 1 is thus not her best choice.
If she would choose o = 0, the principal would prefer no check (/1-= 0). This contradicts
the assumption of this section to consider equilibria with /1-> O.
Therefore if /1- > 0 in equilibrium, the loan officer must be indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the side transfer s, given wB, /1-and P:
WB = as - /1-P (12)
The borrower with a bad test result: Whenever the size of the side transfer s is such
that (12) holds for s < s(/1-), the borrower would raise s by any arbitrarily small amount
such that the loan officer would strictly prefer to accept the bribe (o = 1). This does not
constitute an equilibrium, as explained. The borrower will stop raising s when the transfer
equals the maximum transfer s(/1-)that the borrower can afford:
s = s(/1-) (13)
In equilibrium (13) must hold; the borrower is thus indifferent between offering the
equilibrium side transfer s = s(/1-)and not offering it. Note that /1- = /1-' (see (8» solves
(12) and (13) for WB = O.
C. The principal's optimal policy in stage 1: the wage decision
The principal determines the borrower's wage structure w in stage 1 of the game. With
regard to Wo and w." condition (3) holds in equilibrium. With regard to WB (the wage if
the loan officer sends a bad test result) the principal has two options. The first option,
described in subsection 4.4.A, is to choose WB = wB'(O). In that case even if the credit
committee is not involved (/1- = 0), the principal prevents collusion (o = 0) by (5). The
second option, described in subsection 4.4.B, is to pick WB < wB'(O) and allow for some
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collusion. Which of the two options maximizes the principal's payoff?
Proposition 2: Assume that the principal is not able to commit to J.L > O. There exists a
unique critical loan size 12 > max{t,lll such that the principal's optimal policy can be
characterized as follows:
a) If I ~ 12 ' the principal optimally picks wBo WBI(O) , so J.L0 O. Collusion does not
occur.
b) If I > 12 ' the principal optimally picks wBo = 0 < WBf (0), so J.L' = J.L'.A bad
borrower with a bad test result colludes with the loan officer with probability if, where
o < if ~ 1. In case of collusion, the equilibrium side transfer satisfies s· = s(J.L').
The principal's profit is positive and increasing in I.
Proof: See Appendix.
Like Proposition 1, Proposition 2 is also in line with the practical observation that banks
typically set a loan limit above which all loans must be approved by the credit committee.
An important difference with Proposition 1, however, is that in the incomplete contract
case collusion occurs in equilibrium if the credit committee is involved (J.L = J.LI). The
principal has the option to prevent collusion by delegating the credit decision to the loan
officer. Nevertheless, for I > 12, allowing some collusion in combination with a check by
the credit committee is more profitable for the principal than would be preventing all
collusion by delegating the credit decision to the loan officer.
The parameter space where delegation is optimal is larger in the no-commitment case
than in the commitment case." The absence of commitment favors delegation. The
reason is that delegation serves as a commitment device against collusion. It helps to
prevent unprofitable projects from ever being undertaken.
Also in Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) delegation may serve to commit against
financing unprofitable projects. The reason is very different, however. Dewatripont and
Maskin (1990) consider a model of adverse selection in which it may become sequentially
optimal to refmance projects that are ex ante unprofitable once they have begun. In a
decentralized economy, the credit decision is made by small banks. Decentralization of
20 This is in line with a result by Khalil and Lawarree (1994), who show that the absence of commitment
power to an auditing strategy decreases the returns from auditing to the principal.
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credit may serve as a commitment device against refinancing because the small bank may
be unable to extend the additional credit itself, once the project has performed badly in
the initial period. Decentralization may thus prevent unprofitable projects from ever being
undertaken. Both Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) and this model may underline the view
that better incentive mechanisms can often be designed within decentralized economic
systems (see Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Sah and Stiglitz (1986)).
The model contributes to the theory of collusion in several ways. First, it does not
derive the principal's optimal policy in terms of the side transfer technology or the
auditing technology, but in terms of project size. Second, it shows that even in the
absence of commitment to Il, there exists a critical project size such that checks will take
place also if collusion involves low deadweight cost. This as opposed to a result by Khalil
and Lawarree (1994), where in the absence of commitment to an auditing strategy no
audits take place if collusion involves sufficiently low deadweight cost. Third, in this
model the threat of being punished if caught colluding provides an incentive for truth-
telling, as in K&L and Khalil and Lawarree (1994). It is different, however, with regard
to the question of who may be punished. In this model the principal cannot punish the
borrower (i.e. the agent who offers the bribe), as it seems strange to allow a bank to
punish a borrower outside of bankruptcy. The principal can only punish the agent who
accepts the bribe (the loan officer). In K&L and Khalil and Lawarree (1994), the agent
offering the bribe (the manager) can also be punished by the principal, to prevent this
agent from shirking his job. The maximum bribe that this agent would pay increases with
the penalty imposed on him when shirking. In my model the maximum bribe depends on
the bad borrower's expected project return and on the probability of being checked, which
decreases with the penalty imposed on the loan officer when caught colluding.
Compare Propositions 1 and 2. In both cases the principal may choose the same policy
(Il, wB) = (Il', 0). There is an important difference, however, between the equilibrium in
the commitment case (Proposition 1, part b) and in the no-commitment case (Proposition
2, part b). In case of commitment, collusion does not occur in equilibrium. If it would
occur, the principal would be better off increasing Il' by an infinitely small amount, thus
preventing collusion. If commitment is absent, collusion occurs in equilibrium with
positive probability (J = d. If collusion would never occur, ex post it would be optimal
for the principal to lower Il to zero -- and thus no equilibrium would exist.
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4.5. Model extensions
This section discusses some of the assumptions of the model, and suggests directions for
future research.
A. Long-term relationships between loan officer and borrower
This chapter maintains the simplifying assumption that the collusive agreement is
enforceable. An alternative approach would trace the foundations of enforceability to
repeated interaction and reputation. Tirole (1992) expects that many insights obtained with
the enforceability approach will carry over to self-enforcing side contracts. Still, it would
be interesting to make the model multi-period, and to study the following trade-off. If a
loan officer would serve many periods, her knowledge about the local (prospective)
borrowers increases. This makes it possible for her to analyze more credit proposals in
one period than could a less-experienced loan officer. On the other hand, multi-period
relationships between a loan officer and a borrower may result in collusive behavior.
There might be some optimal length of time to the loan officer - borrower relationship.
B. The loan officer's effort
In this chapter the loan officer's effort is irrelevant for the type of borrower she
discovers. Moreover, collusion may only harm, not benefit, the principal.
An alternative model could allow the side transfer to have a positive incentive effect as
well. If a side transfer would motivate the loan officer to invest high effort in the
generation of business, the transfer might also be good for the principal. Thus, there
might be a trade-off between the positive (incentive) aspect and the negative (collusive)
aspect of side transfers.
Moreover, the prospect of being checked might negatively affect the loan officer's
incentive to exert high effort, as in Aghion and Tirole (1994). In this case it is interesting
that the role of the loan officer (the corruptible supervisor) combines the roles of K&L's
manager (production) and their internal auditor (supervision). In an extension of K&L, if
checking the internal auditor would depress his effort level, this would have only an
indirect effect on production (for which the manager is responsible). In my model the
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bank's output (loan production) might be directly affected.
C. The informational role of the credit committee
The credit committee (supported by its staft) is one of the places where the bank's private
information is collected and stored. This information plays an important role in the
literature that views bank debt as 'inside debt' (see e.g. Fama (1985), James (1987),
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)). I ignore this role by making the simplifying assumption
that all the relevant information to assess loan quality and profitability that is available !
within the bank is known also to the loan officer. The task of the credit committee is then i
to prevent or at least to reduce collusion.
However, introducing the informational role of the credit committee could have
interesting implications. Suppose that the credit committee has information that the loan
officer does not have. In that case it may be more difficult to detect collusion, because it,
may be harder to distinguish the case in which collusion has occurred from the case in
which the loan officer had insufficient information to filter out the bad borrower. The \
loan officer may, after having received a bribe, pretend to the credit committee that she
had insufficient information to be conclusive.
D. Alternative applications of the model
Chapter 4 presents a model of loan origination. With some modifications the model may
be applicable to loan monitoring as well. In the loan review process, one could imagine
the borrower paying a side transfer to the loan officer to keep the loan officer from
reporting project deterioration. In that case the model may give a theoretical justification
for Udell's (1989) empirical results indicating that the true purpose of commercial loan
review is to address an agency problem between a bank and its commercial loan officers.
Incentive problems between the management and the shareholders of a firm may be
analyzed using a model in which a manager and the employees of a firm collude against
the interests of the shareholders. Collusion may explain why managers may hang on to
projects that should be divested in the interest of value maximization, providing an
alternative to the explanation given by Boot (1992) where a manager may be reluctant to
divest because a divestiture may be interpreted as an admission that he made an
inappropriate project choice.
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The model may also be applied to, for instance, purchasing management. A company
(the principal in our model) could employ a purchasing manager (the loan officer) to test
a product's quality. The purchasing manager might be bribed by the seller (the borrower)
to overstate the quality of the project.
4.6. Conclusion
In the recent literature on banking under asymmetric information, agency problems within
the bank have received little attention, despite the fact that in practice avoiding such
problems may be critical for bank asset quality. Chapter 4 has partly filled this gap by
incorporating elements from the literature on collusion in bureaucracies (see Tirole (1992)
for an overview) in the theory of banking. The chapter has analyzed a model in which the
low-quality borrower may want to collude with the loan officer in order to be granted a
loan that is unprofitable for the bank. To increase bank profit, the bank must find an
efficient way to cope with collusion. For reasons explained in this chapter's introductory
section it may be costly to prevent collusion by making the loan officer's wage contingent
on the profit that is ultimately earned on the loan (Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979)).
Chapter 4 explains the role the credit committee could play in coping with this agency
problem. It shows why, in practice, banks that have a credit committee typically set a
dollar amount above which all loans must be approved by the committee, and that
delegation may help to avoid a commitment problem associated with a check by the credit
committee.
The modem theory of financial intermediation makes two related predictions about
scale effects in banking firms: Large banking firms will be less likely to fail and more
cost efficient than small banking firms. However, Boyd and Runkle (1993) find no
empirical evidence that large banking firms are less likely to fail than are smaller ones. In
fact, ex post evidence shows that in recent years large US banking firms have failed
somewhat more often. Although chapter 4 does not deal with the relation between bank
size and profits, it shows that a larger bank organization, in which the bank owner
delegates the credit function to loan officers, may suffer from internal incentive problems
I
J
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that would not occur if the bank owner himself would be involved with loan
production." Differences in the way in which banks organize their lending activities and
in their abilities to cope with internal agency problems may explain why some banks are
more successful in exploiting the returns to scale of their activities than are other banks,
and why in similar economic environments some banks fail whereas other banks flourish.
21 See also Mester (1991) and Nakamura (1993). Millon and Thakor (1985) present a model of information
gathering agencies (IGA's), e.g. credit rating agencies, financial newsletters etc., in which an IGA that is larger
(has more employees/"screening agents") is able to process more information about individual investments, as
employees share information. There is a free-rider problem, however, because employees' effort levels are
unobservable. Group formation worsens the severity of this moral hazard problem, because individual employees




Appendix to Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 1: The principal maximizes bank profit (7), subject to wB ~ 0 and 0
~ p.. ~ 1. First we show that in equilibrium we will have p.. ~ p..1. Consider wB'(p..), see
(6). If as(p..)-p..P < 0, or equivalently p.. > p..' (see (8», one has WB/(p..) = 0 by (6); the
loan officer's individual rationality constraint is binding. The principal can increase his
profit by lowering p.. to p..1 and keeping WB/(p..) constant at zero; this reduces the cost of
checking and still prevents collusion. Therefore in equilibrium p.. ~ p..1 and wB'(p..) =
as(p..)-p..P ~ O. Given p.. ::;; p..', (7) can be rewritten as
11" = RI - (l-r)p..c - (l-q)r[as(p..)-p..P] = RI - p..M- (l-q)rwB'(O)
where M == (l-r)C - (l-qjf'P - (l-q)rWB/(O).
If M < 0 the principal maximizes profit by picking the highest p.. ~ p..'and choosing the
corresponding wage wB'(p..); if M ~ 0 the principal optimally chooses the lowest p.. ~ O.
It can be checked easily that M < 0 if and only if I > II. So we have
a) If I ~ I', the principal prefers to set p.. as low as possible (p.. = 0) and picks WB
WB'(O)to prevent collusion.
b) If I > I', the principal optimally picks p.. = p..1 and wB = WB'(p../) = O.
It is easy to check that the principal's profit (7) is positive and increases with I. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove the proposition, define
12 == _C_ + (l-r)C
I-Pbr 0 (l-q)raPb(X -r 0)
It is easy to check that 12 > max[I',II]. The principal has two options available. The first
is to pick (wB, p..) = (WB/(O), 0). In that case the principal prevents collusion without a
check. His profit is given by (7). By Proposition 1, this strategy will certainly be optimal
for I ~ II. The second option is to allow some collusion in equilibrium: p.. > 0, so WB <
WB'(O). If the principal picks WB < WB/(O), the optimal choice is wB' = O. It follows from
subsection 4.4.B that the Bayesian equilibrium of the collusion game is given by (p..',d).
Moreover, subsection 4.4.B explains that this strategy will never be optimal for I ~ II
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(see (10». Given I > II, the principal's profit when picking wB = 0 < WB'(O) is given \
by22
7r = RI - (1-q)rd(1-Pbr.)1 (14)
This is nonnegative and increasing in I for all d < 1, by (4). The principal picks the
profit-maximizing strategy.
a) As explained, (WB*'P.*)= (wB'(O),O) for I ~ maxjl.il']. If I > max[II,I'], the principal
prefers (WB*'P.*)= (wB'(O),O) if and only if (7) exceeds (14). It is easy to check that this
is the case if and only if I ~ 12.
b) For I > 12, (14) exceeds (7). It is easy to check that the loan officer's individual I
rationality constraint holds, given d and p.'.23 Q.E.D.
22A more general expression of the principal's profit, given Ws = 0, is
"If" = Rl - O-r)JL/C - (l-q)fu/[O-JLI)(I-Pbr.)I + JLIC].
By (9), this is equivalent to (14).
23 The loan officer's individual rationality constraint is given by
E(w,u,JL) = (1-q)fu'(as-JLP) + (l-q)rO-ul)ws ~ ~
If (12) holds, this reduces to E(w) = (l-q)fws ~ o.

CHAPTER 5
INTERNAL FINANCE VERSUS BANK DEBT:
REVERSING THE PECKING ORDER THEORY
OF FINANCING
Summary
This chapter considers a two-period model in which a firm facing information asymmetries
with outsiders needs outside financing in period 2. If a firm establishes a reputation with
a bank already in the first period, it may reduce the cost and increase the availability of
bank debt in the second period. To establish such a reputation, the firm must induce the
bank to monitor in period I. Bank monitoring effort is non-contractible, so the firm
induces the bank to monitor by taking an unsecured bank loan. In period I a bank loan
may then be preferable to internal finance. This reverses a result by Myers and Majluf
(/984) where firms always prefer to finance profitable investments internally.
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THIs CHAPTER'S FOCUS differs from the preceding three chapters in that it considers a
problem from the angle of the borrower, whereas the other chapters viewed problems
from the side of banks or depositors. In this chapter, like in chapter 3, bank-borrower
relations are valuable, as in time they reduce the agency cost of bank debt. Chapter 5
XI addresses the question whether this value may induce a firm to become a borrower, that/ is, to take a bank loan, even if it could finance its project internally.
Information asymmetries with outsiders will increase a firm's cost of external finance.
According to Myers and Majluf's (1984) "pecking order" theory of financing, firms will
therefore prefer to finance profitable investments internally, ahead of debt and outside
equity (see also Myers (1984)). This chapter will show that in a two-period model that
conclusion may fail to hold. This chapter develops a model featuring imperfect
information about firm types. A low-risk firm may borrow from a bank, even if it does
not need a loan, to build up a reputation as a good customer. Later on, when it needs
outside finance to undertake a larger project, its reputation may allow the firm easier
access to a relatively cheap loan. Thus, buildE!g_ up a reputation allows the firm to reap
benefits of the type discussed first by Fama (1985).
To establish a reputation in the first period, the low-risk firm has to induce the bank to
invest monitoring effort. The direct effect of bank monitoring is that it prevents the
entrepreneur from taking the money and running away. 1 Monitoring ensures that the firm
ties the borrowed funds up by investing them in the project. If the bank fails to monitor,
by assumption the entrepreneur does not invest but diverts the funds. Suppose that firms
of the good type have profitable projects and firms of the bad type do not. Then firm
activity may be a signal of firm quality. A good firm may credibly signal its type to the
bank by inducing the bank to monitor firm activity. This by-product of bank monitoring
enables the firm to obtain a loan at favorable conditions in the second period. The bank
acquires information about the firm's type as a by-product of its monitoring the fact that
the firm actually invests, as in Sharpe (1990).
If the bank could contractually commit to a given level of monitoring, the good firm
1 The assumptionthat any cash flows receivedby the firm can be divertedby the firm manageron a one-
to-one basis is also madeby Hart and Moore (1989) and Boltonand Scharfstein(1990). In Calomirisand Kahn
(1991) the banker may abscondwith a proportionof the bank's assets,whichis preventedif depositors monitor.
White (1984) indicatesthat diversioncan be a problem in practice, and that this problem is more severe for
liquidassets than for fixedassets.
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could simply pay the bank a fee to monitor. But the more plausible case is when a bank
cannot contractually commit to monitoring, as in Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Bester
(1994) and in chapter 3 of this thesis. Then the bank monitors only if it faces the risk that
the entrepreneur will abscond with the bank's money. This is the case if the firm takes an
unsecured bank loan. So if a firm wants to be monitored to establish a reputation with a
bank, it may take a bank loan -- even if it could do without the loan by financing
internally. The moral hazard problem associated with bank monitoring works to increase
reliance on bank debt, as opposed to a result by Besanko and Kanatas (1993). So
"stockpiling" cash by raising more financing than needed for the first-period investment is
a good signal, as it induces bank monitoring. In Thakor (1993), where stockpiling cash
does not induce any monitoring, it would be viewed as a bad signal.
Of course, a firm will consider establishing a reputation with a bank only if the bank
allows the firm to profit from this reputation. Empirical evidence by Berger and Udell
(1994), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993) justifies my
assumption that this is the case. Borrowers with no debt histories, or shorter histories,
generally face less favorable loan conditions than do borrowers with longer debt histories.
This chapter's result that firms may prefer bank debt to internal finance reverses a
prediction of the pecking order theory of financing? It is interesting also in the light of
some recent empirical evidence. Ang and Jung (1993) find that for a sample of large
South Korean firms, borrowing intermediate or longer term from banks is the preferred
source, ahead of internal funds. This is the case even when there are high information
asymmetries between firms and their lenders. De Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992)
find that 49 % of Dutch companies with short-term bank debt never use excess-liquidity
for early repayment of short-term bank debt, notwithstanding their finding that on average
companies wanted to improve their solvency ratios.' Companies with bank debt are
2 Theoretical studies that reverse a different prediction of the pecking order model are e.g. Brennan and
Kraus (1987), Noe (1988) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989), where outside equity may be preferable to
debt when allowing firms a wider range of financing choices. Section 5.5 discusses an extension of my model in
which outside equity may be preferible to bank debt. I am not aware of papers where (bank) debt may be
preferable to internal finance, as in this chapter (see e.g. the survey article by Harris and Raviv (1991».
3 Answers 19 and 21 (p.145-6) in De Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992). This study, performed for the
Dutch central bank, presents the results of a survey among 1828 Dutch companies about their liquidity holdings
and financing behavior. 1810 companies had less than 100 employees. 729 companies held short-term bank debt
as of year-end 1990. The general message of the study, which is also revealed in De Haan et at. (1994), is that
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reluctant to repay early because of, among other things, (a) resulting changes in future
loan conditions (10.6% of companies mention future changes in interest rates, 11.3% of
companies mention future changes in other loan conditions) and (b) resulting dependence
on banks for new loans in the future (19.8% of companies). This suggests that firms
which have (possibly superfluous) bank loans now, may have relatively easy access to
relatively cheap bank loans in the future.
The result that a firm may choose to finance a project with bank debt instead of
internal funds has implications for the theory of money demand. It implies that firms may
hold larger cash balances than they need for their day-to-day transactions. Thus, firms'
cash balances may be higher than can be explained by inventory-theoretic models of the
transactions demand for money. 4 This is in accordance with empirical evidence by
Sprenkle (1969), who finds that only a small proportion of actual cash balances held by
corporations can be explained by a simple transactions model of the Baumol-Tobin type.
There has not been much progress on this issue. Goodhart (1989, p.74175) notes:
"Examination of the micro-economic determinants of the demand for money leaves us
with an awkward conclusion. That is that it is not easy to explain or to account at the
individual level for the amount of money balances held. Companies, and other
corporate bodies such as local authorities, appear to hold much larger balances than
inventory-theoretic transactions demand models show to be optimal. (..) There is,
perhaps, something of a puzzle to explain why such large balances are held. "
This chapter may provide an explanation.
The chapter is related to the literature that attributes a special role to banks with regard
to the provision of monitoring services (see e.g. Diamond (1984, 1991), James (1987».
As bank-borrower relationships evolve, the agency costs associated with bank debt may
decrease. The reason is that by its monitoring the bank gradually accumulates private
information about the borrower's quality (see e.g. Fama (1985), Diamond (1989), Sharpe
the majority of Dutch firms behave in line with the pecking order theory of financing; 54% of the firms list
internal finance as their first choice and 40% list debt as their second. However, 18% of firms list debt as their
first choice. My angle differs from De Haan et al. (1992, 1994) in that I am particularly interested in this
significant minority of firms. The part of their survey about bank: debt (answers 16-22 in Appendix ill of De
Haan et al. (1992», which is not discussed in De Haan et al. (1994), contains some very interesting clues about
these firms' behavior.
4 These models were developed by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), and expanded by Miller and Orr
(1966, 1968) to include uncertainties.
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(1990), Rajan (1992». Bank debt may th~involve decreasing agency costs in time.s/X ~
Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992) show that this may affect the finn's choice between
bank loans and publicly placed debt. In chapter 5 the prospect of decreasing agency costs
in time may induce the finn to borrow from a bank even when it could finance internally.
The chapter restricts itself to the rather narrow case of bank debt against internal
finance. The ideas, however, might be applied to other financing choices as well,
provided that different sources of funds induce different monitoring activities. For
instance, suppose that a firm wants to induce financial markets to monitor its activities, in
order to reduce the information asymmetry with potential shareholders. If outside equity
would induce more public monitoring than bank debt or internal funds, this finn might
under certain conditions prefer outside equity. This would reverse another prediction of
the pecking order model (see section 5.5).
Despite competition in the credit market, banks may earn positive expected profit in
equilibrium. This result holds even if the period 2 informational rent accrues completely
to the firm. The reason is that the period 1 interest rate has to be high enough to keep~.-- .-.
bad firms from applying for a loan. This differs from Sharpe (1990), where banks earn
negative period 1 profits in anticipation of positive informational rents in period 2.
The chapter suggests that bank finance may increase with growth opportunities. Finns
may take unnecessary bank debt now if they expect to need the bank in the future to
finance larger investments. This is different from Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen
(1986) and Stulz (1990). There, debt may solve agency problems in cash-rich firms that
lack growth opportunities. If firms have more cash than can be profitably invested in new
projects, managers may be tempted not to payout the excess cash to shareholders, but
instead to invest it in negative-NPV projects. Debt may reduce this agency problem, as it
reduces managers' discretion by forcing cash payouts at certain dates. Empirical evidence
on the relation between debt finance and growth opportunities is mixed. Evidence by De
Haan et al. (1992) and Kester (1986) supports my hypothesis." Kim and Sorensen (1986),
s Thus, this chapter is also related to a more general literature on reputation effects in dynamic games with
incomplete information. In finance, contributions include John and Nachman (1985), on the underinvestment
problem, and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), on investment bank reputation.
6 De Haan et al. (1992, p.147) find that investments/new projects are the most important factor in favor of
an increase of bank debt.
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Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) present evidence in favor
of the contrary prediction (see Harris and Raviv (1991».
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.1 presents the model. Section
5.2 studies the second period, in which firms realize the benefits of a good reputation.
Section 5.3 derives the main result: low-risk firms may invest in reputation acquisition by
taking an unnecessary bank loan instead of financing a project internally. Section 5.4
discusses robustness and extensions of the model. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.1. The model
Consider an economy with two periods. Each period will be referred to by its end date.
That is, period 1 starts at t = 0 and ends at t = 1; period 2 starts at t = 1 and ends at t
= 2. Firms have the opportunity to undertake investments of exogenously given size.
They are endowed with liquid funds. These funds are sufficient to undertake the period 1
investment, so firms are able to finance the period 1 project internally. The main question
is: Could bank debt still be useful in the first period? In the second period firms need
outside funds to finance a larger project. Banks may supply loans in both periods. All
economic agents are risk-neutral.
A. Firms
Firms are run and owned by entrepreneurs. That is, I do not consider agency problems
between firm managers and firm owners.
At the start of period 1 (t = 0) there are N[ firms, each endowed with a publicly
known amount L > 0 of liquid funds. At t = 0 these firms may invest in projects with
exogenously given size 1[. At t = 1, a new generation of Nz firms enters the market, also
endowed with L. Both generations of firms may at t = 1 invest in projects of size Iz, with
I[ < L < Iz. I[ and 12 are publicly known. The assumption I[ < L implies that the firm
is able to choose between internal finance and bank debt at t = o. Outsiders cannot
directly observe whether a firm invests funds in a project. Banks, however, can obtain
this information by investing a certain monitoring cost (see below). If undertaken at time t
(t = 0,1), projects at time t+ 1 yield return X~+[ in case of success and zero in case of
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failure. The finn privately observes the project return.
There are two types of firms: good and bad. Finns know their type, but outsiders do
not. A fraction 0 < q < 1 of each generation is of the low-risk or good type, with
success probability Ps- 0 < Pg ~ 1. Fraction 1-q is of the high-risk or bad type with
success probability Ps- 0 < Ps < Pg. The average success probability is given by Q ==
qpg+(1-q)Pb' The bad firm's project is unprofitable: PbX < 1. On average, projects are
profitable: QX > 1. The success probability of each firm is constant over time and return
realizations in both periods are independent. If successful, at t = 1 the entrepreneur
consumes all funds in excess of L that remain after debts, if any, have been repaid. At
date t = 2 the entrepreneur consumes all remaining assets.
B. Banks and monitoring
Banks possess liquid funds that they may lend to firms. The credit market is characterized
by Bertrand-competition among banks. Banks cannot observe the firms' types, and cannot
directly observe returns of the firms' investment projects. To cope with the latter
informational asymmetry, the bank and the firm sign a standard debt contract with a
liquidation clause, as in Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985). The bank commits
to liquidate the firm's assets if the firm does not repay its debt. This acts as a repayment
incentive for the firm.
The bank may invest some monitoring cost G < 1 per dollar of the loan I to observe
whether the firm actually invests the loan in the investment project.' A bank can be sure
whether the firm is active only by investing the monitoring cost 131.Once the money has
been invested in physical assets, the entrepreneur cannot divert it anymore, in line with
White's (1984) suggestion that monitoring diversion is costlier for liquid assets than for
physical assets. Thus, bank monitoring prevents the entrepreneur from taking the money
and running away. Note that this type of monitoring is not available in Gale and Hellwig
(1985), where the bank monitors only if the borrower reports default. This chapter
contains an extra incentive problem. If the bank would not invest the monitoring cost GI,
7 The assumption that the cost of monitoring is proportional to the loan size I reflects the intuitive idea that
large loans/projects are more difficult to oversee for the bank than are small loans/projects. Alternatively, one
could assume that the monitoring cost takes some fixed value C, independent of I. This would not alter the
qualitative results of this chapter. It would make the algebra more messy, however, as interest rates would then
depend on the loan size I.
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by assumption the entrepreneur would divert the funds, reducing the liquidation value of
the firm to zero. 8
The bank's monitoring effort is non-contractible, as in Besanko and Kanatas (1993),
Bester (1994) and chapter 3 of this thesis. As the bank cannot contractually commit to
monitoring, it will monitor only if it has an incentive to monitor. In the second period the
bank loan cannot be secured because 12 > L. Therefore the bank will always monitor if it
has granted a loan in period 2, to prevent the entrepreneur from running away with the
bank's money.
In period 1, the bank will not monitor if the firm finances the investment internally,
because then the bank does not have any money at stake. Neither will the bank monitor if
the firm takes a loan 11 and fully secures it with its liquid funds L (for instance by putting
the funds on a fixed-term deposit expiring not before debt repayment is due at t = 1).
Lending without bank monitoring does not provide the bank with better information about
the firm than it would have if the firm resorted to internal finance. Therefore I assume
that the firm prefers internal finance to a bank loan without monitoring. So in line with
the pecking order theory of financing, secured lending is dominated by internal finance.
If the low-risk flrm wants to be monitored in period 1 in order to profit from the bank-
firm relation in period 2, it must make sure that its funds L do not secure the bank loan
in period 1. If the bank loan is not fully secured, the bank's option to liquidate the firm's
assets in case of default is valuable only if the bank has monitored (otherwise the
entrepreneur would have absconded with the money, leaving no assets behind). Only
unsecured lending will induce bank monitoring in period 1. Therefore if a firm takes a
loan in period 1, it is an unsecured loan. Banks know this, so only offer unsecured loans
in period 1 (that is, loans with interest rates reflecting the monitoring cost 81).
The advantage of using unsecured debt in the first period is that it induces banks to
monitor. This enables firms to establish a reputation. The disadvantage is that debt is a
more expensive source of financing than is using internal funds, as it involves monitoring
cost. This cost is ultimately paid by the firm, because banks have to break even. Of
course, one could also introduce a bankruptcy penalty associated with debt, as in
Diamond (1984). As long as the extra expected cost involved with this penalty does not
8 The entrepreneur's myopic behavior would arise endogenously if the profit from stealing the bank's funds
I, (and exclusion from credit markets later) exceeds the profit from investing in period 1 and repaying the bank,
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outweigh the advantage of debt established in the chapter, the main results will survive.
Denote by rJIJ a borrower's period 1 bank repayment obligation, which includes the
net interest payment (rJ-1)11. For simplicity, assume that the borrower's period 1 debt r.I,
does not exceed the firm's funds L for all r, < X:
(1)
This implies that in period 1 a finn with bank debt is able to repay the debt even in case
of project failure." The firm's funds may fully secure the loan. If the entrepreneur does
not divert the funds, liquidation does not occur in period 1.
C. Deposits
If the firm wants to be monitored in period 1, it should not use its liquid funds L to
secure the loan. The firm could put its funds on a demand deposit with the bank. JO In
that case without bank monitoring the entrepreneur could receive a loan, not invest, take
the loan and the money on deposit before t = 1, so before debt repayment is due, and
run. To prevent this, the bank will monitor. Thus, a demand deposit in combination with
a bank loan gives the bank the incentive to monitor the finn. The maturity mismatch
induces monitoring. II
Putting the funds in a bank deposit account has an advantage relative to keeping the
money outside the bank. It allows the bank to observe the firm's deposit balance, which
may also contain valuable information (see Black (1975), Fama (1985) and Nakamura
(1993». Section 5.4 discusses an extension of the model in which checking accounts
information plays an explicit role. Here 1 assume that in period 1 the borrowing firm puts
its funds on a demand deposit. This is in line with the empirical evidence by Petersen and
Rajan (1994), who report that sixty-four percent of firms have checking or savings
9 It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case in which (I) does not hold. That case involves an
extra moral hazard problem. If an unsuccessful firm is unable to fully repay the bank in period I, the successful
firm may be tempted to falsely claim project failure. A bankruptcy penalty is then needed to prevent it from
doing so. For simplicity, I do not consider this case.
JO Any fixed-term deposit that expires before t = I, thus before debt repayment is due, has the same effect
on the bank's incentive to monitor. In the remainder of the paper, I define demand deposit to mean any period 1
deposit that is demandable before t = 1.
IJ Compare this to Calomiris and Kahn (1991), where the ability to make early withdrawals gives
depositors an incentive to monitor the bank.
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deposits with their current lenders. Moreover, company funds often have shorter maturity
than do company debts (see e.g. van 't Hoenderdal and Scheepens (1993».
D. Sequence of events
1. At t = 0 banks compete and offer unsecured loans of size II at gross interest rates r,
> 1 to the firms of the first generation.F Debt contracts stipulate that the bank
liquidates the borrower's remaining assets in case of default.
2. After banks have made their offers, firms may refuse all offers or accept one bank's
offer. If a firm refuses all offers, it may choose either to invest II from its own liquid
funds, or not to invest at all. If a firm accepts a bank's offer, it wants to be monitored
by the bank: (see the previous discussion).
3. If a firm accepts a bank's offer and borrows 11, the firm puts its funds L on a demand
deposit so that the funds do not secure the loan. To prevent the entrepreneur from
absconding with the loan, the bank invests the monitoring cost Bl1.13 This ensures that
the firm ties the borrowed funds up by investing them in the project.
4. If the firm has invested in a project at t = 0, the project expires at t = 1. Outsiders do
not observe the project return. If the project was debt-financed, the firm is able to
repay its bank debt rill in any case, by assumption (1); to prevent liquidation, it repays
the bank. In case of project success, the entrepreneur consumes all remaining funds in
excess of L. In case of project failure, the entrepreneur consumes nothing."
5. At t = 1, a firm can undertake a period 2 project 12 only if it receives a bank loan.
The firm that borrowed in period 1 bargains with its housebank about the second
period loan. For simplicity, assume that bargaining takes the form of a take-it-or-leave-
12 For simplicity I rule out the possibility that the investment I, is only partly debt-financed. If partial debt
finance were possible in period I, the firm's cost of borrowing would be lower and the case for debt finance
might be even stronger.
13 Note that at this point monitoring is optimal for the bank by 6 < I < rIo
14 The amount of funds that firms own at the beginning of period 2 is not very important for the main
result in Proposition 2. Alternatively, one could assume that firms do not own any funds at t = I (so all first-
generation firms consume everything at t = 1 and second-generation firms do not own any funds). But this
makes the period 2 equilibrium a bit less interesting. If no firms have internal funds at t = I, it does not become
clear that in period 2 firms behave in line with the pecking order theory of financing. Moreover, the result that
bad firms face loan size rationing in period 2 would disappear.
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it offer by the firm to the housebank, stating the interest rate it is willing to pay." N2
new firms enter the market. Banks compete a-la-Bertrand for firms without a debt
history.
6. If a firm receives a loan, the bank monitors that the investment takes place. Period 2
projects expire at t = 2. Banks do not observe project outcomes. The bank's
commitment to liquidate firms if default is reported ensures that all firms repay their
bank debts if they can; otherwise they are liquidated. Remaining assets of firms that
are not liquidated are consumed by the respective firm owners. The economy ends.
5.2. Equilibrium in period 2
In the sought-for equilibrium, all good firms of the first generation establish a reputation
with a bank in period 1, that is, banks find out their type. In the second period these
firms borrow from their housebank at a low interest rate, because they have bargaining
power. All other firms are pooled in period 2 at a higher interest rate. This section
derives the period 2 interest rates and firm payoffs, given that only good firms acquire a
debt history in period 1.
A. Interest rates
Define by rg the interest rate such that the bank earns zero expected profit on a loan (of
some size I) to a good borrower. If the loan is not fully secured, the bank invests
monitoring effort to prevent the entrepreneur from taking the money and running. Zero
bank profit then implies that the bank's expected return on the loan equals the monitoring
cost. Therefore rg satisfies (pgrg - 1)1 = BI, or equivalently
rg = (1 +B)/pg (2)
Suppose that at the start of period 2 all firms with a debt history are of the low-risk type.
15 Thus, the firm with a debt history acquires the entire informational surplus. This scheme gives all
bargaining power to the firm in period 2. I make this extreme assumption to stress the result of Proposition 2
that banks may earn positive profits even if the period 2 bank profit is zero. The qualitative results of the paper
would still hold, however, if the firm would assume a smaller (but strictly positive) part of the informational
rent. Other schemes that give ex-post bargaining power to the firm are duplicated monitoring, see Von Thadden
(1991), or a reputation model, see Sharpe (1990).
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These firms make a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer to their housebanks. Housebanks will accept
any offer that yields positive profits. In the bargaining equilibrium, the bank is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the firm's offer but it always accepts." Consequently,
the firm proposes to pay the zero-bank-profit interest rate rg as given by (2).
At t = 1, the pool of firms without a debt history consists of the (l-q)NI bad firms of
the first generation that did not invest in period 1 ("old bad firms"), as well as the N2
new firms that enter the market at t = 1. Banks cannot distinguish these firms from one
another. Assuming that bad firms want to be active in period 2, which will be guaranteed
by assumption (4) below, the zero-bank-profit interest rate r/ depends on the proportion f
of old bad firms in the pool of unknown firms." It satisfies f(Pbr/ - 1) + (1-f)<11r/- 1)
= 8, so that
r2' = (fp, + (1-f)Q)"I(1+8) (3)
A comparison of (2) and (3) shows that rg < r/ This implies that low-risk firms benefit
in period 2 from having acquired a debt history in period 1.
B. Firms with a debt history
Suppose that all firms with a debt history are of the low-risk type. In the second period
the low-risk firm behaves in line with the standard pecking order theory of financing. It
uses all of its own funds for the investment in period 2, and borrows only the excess
amount. The reason is that debt is relatively expensive as it involves monitoring cost.
This cost is ultimately paid by the firm, because banks have to break even.
Define by L, the amount of liquid funds owned by the firm at t = 1. If the period 1
project succeeded, L, = L; if it failed, L, = L - r.I, by (1). In the second period the
low-risk firm with a debt history pays interest rate rg as given by (2). In case of project
success it earns X-rg per unit of the debt-financed part 12-~ of the project, and X per unit
of the amount ~ financed internally. The low-risk firm's expected profit from the
investment made at t = 1 equals
Uirg;~) = pg{ (X-rg)(I2-~) + X~ } - L,
16 For a discussion of bargaining solutions, see e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).
17 If only low-risk firms take a bank loan in period I, f = (l-q)N,/[(l-q)N, +N2].
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C. Firms without a debt history
In period 2 the high-risk firm wants to invest as little as possible of its own funds because
its project is unprofitable. If "old" bad firms are inactive in period 1, these firms own an
amount L of liquid funds at t = 1, just like the new generation of firms. So at t = 1 all
firms without a housebank own liquid funds L.18 Of this group, only bad firms would
want to borrow more than 12 - L in period 2. Therefore the loan amount is determined by
the good borrowers' demand 12 - L. Bad firms face loan size rationing.
All firms without a debt history are pooled at interest rate r/ as given by (3). The
expected payoff of a good firm without a debt history is given by Uir/;L). Given loan
size rationing, the bad firm's expected period 2 payoff equals
V2(r2';L) = Pb{ (X-r2')(I2-L) + XL} - L
If bad firms would not want to be active in period 2, there would be no adverse selection
problem in that period. Good firms would then have no reason to build up a reputation in
period 1. This chapter is concerned with the case in which good borrowers may want to
establish a reputation with a bank in period 1. Therefore I will now introduce the
assumption that being active in period 2 is profitable for the bad firm, even when
borrowing at interest rate r/
(4)
Condition (4) will hold if the amount of debt obtained in period 2 is sufficiently large
relative to the amount of own liquid funds to be invested:
(5)
D. Period 2 equilibrium
The following Proposition summarizes the analysis.
Proposition 1: Assume that only low-risk firms have acquired a debt history in period 1
and that (1) holds. If I2-L ~ Q, the period 2 equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
a) Firms with a debt history receive a period 2 bank loan of size I2-L in case of period 1
18 This explains why in this model a bank's information from observing the firm's deposit balance does not
give the bank sufficient information to distinguish good firms from bad ones. There are many other ways to
model the notion that checking accounts information alone is insufficient to perfectly separate good firms from
bad ones. Examples are schemes where a firm's initial endowment of liquid funds L is not publicly observable,
or where a firm may receive money from other sources than the financed investment project (a wealthy firm
owner, other banks, other investments, outsiders). Section S.4 discusses the role of checking accounts.
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success, and of size I2-(L-r/1) in case of period 1 failure. They earn positive expected
profit and pay the zero-bank-profit interest rate rg.
b) Firms without a debt history receive a period 2 bank loan of size I2-L. They earn
nonnegative expected profit and pay the zero-bank-profit interest rate r/ > rg•
This Proposition describes the period 2 equilibrium that goes with the period 1 separating
equilibrium of the next section. It indicates that if low-risk firms acquire a debt history in
period 1, they may benefit from that reputation in the second period. Moreover, it shows
that bad firms face loan size rationing. Firms without a debt history are unable to borrow
more than the amount IrL, even though bad firms would like to obtain larger loans.
5.3. The period 1 financing decision
This section studies the (first-generation) firm's financing choice at t = O. It constructs a
separating equilibrium in which low-risk firms prefer a bank loan to internal finance in
period 1, and in which high-risk firms prefer to remain inactive. This equilibrium is
interesting because for low-risk firms it reverses the pecking order theory of financing.
Existence of the separating equilibrium requires that the bad firm is deterred from
imitating the good firm's behavior. Imitating the good firm's behavior implies that the
bad firm would take a bank loan in period 1, invest the money in the project and be
monitored by the bank. As the bad firm's project is unprofitable, however, this strategy is
costly. This firm will prefer to remain inactive if its expected loss from investing in
period 1 is greater than the cost advantage of obtaining a bank loan in period 2 under
favorable conditions.
A. The low-risk firm
This subsection derives conditions under which the low-risk firm prefers to take a bank
loan in period 1. In that case, the bank loan in period 1 must generate higher overall firm
profit than either financing the project internally or remaining inactive in the first period.
Internal finance in period 1: Suppose that a low-risk firm finances its project internally
at t = 0, and thus acquires no debt history. If the project has been successful in period 1,
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L, = L. If it has failed, L, = L-II. In the latter case the firm needs more than the offered
loan amount 12-L in the second period. As the bank offers only loans of size 12-L to
unknown borrowers in period 2, the firm is unable to finance the investment 12, After
failure of an internally financed project in the first period, the firm faces loan size
rationing in period 2. As the investment level is exogenously given, loan size rationing
forces the firm to remain inactive in the second period. In case of period 1 success, the
period 2 payoff equals U2(r2';~)' So the low-risk firm's overall expected profit in case of
internally financing the period 1 project is given by
UL(r/) = pg{ XII + Uir2';L) } - II
Inactivity in period 1: If the low-risk finn would remain inactive in period 1, it would
face the interest rate ri in period 2. The advantage of inactivity relative to internal
finance is that inactivity in period 1 prevents the risk of project failure in period 1;
project failure would lead to rationing in period 2. The disadvantage is that the firm must
forfeit the profitable period 1 investment opportunity. The firm's overall payoff in case of
period 1 inactivity is equal to the expected period 2 payoff U2(r/;L).
Debt finance in period 1: If the firm takes an unsecured bank loan in period 1, the
bank monitors the firm's activity. In case of project failure in period 1, L, = L - rIll' In
case of period 1 success, L, = L. Since in period 2 the firm pays the interest rate rg as
given by (2), its expected two-period profit in case of debt financing in period 1 equals
UD(rl>rg) = pg{ (X-rl)II + Uirg;L) } + (l-pg){ - r.I, + Uirg;L-rIII) }
Debt financing in period 1 has two advantages. First, it results in a lower period 2
interest rate. Note that the second-period interest rate rg depends not on success or failure
in period 1, but rather on whether the bank has monitored that the firm did actually invest
in period 1. Relative to internal financing, debt has the additional advantage that it
prevents the risk of being rationed in period 2 in case of period 1 project failure. So debt
may increase the future availability of a bank loan. These properties are in line with an
empirical observation by De Haan et al. (1992) discussed in the introductory section. The
cost of first-period debt fmancing consists of monitoring cost.
The low-risk firm prefers a bank loan in period 1 if the following two conditions hold:
UD(rl,rg) ;:: UL(r/)
UD(rl,rg) ;:: U2(r2';L)




rl ~ = APg[1 +(1-Pg)rg]II
The second condition is equivalent to
rt s X/[l +(1-pg)rg] == AI
(6)
(7)
B. The high-risk firm
In the separating equilibrium, the high-risk firm prefers to remain inactive in period 1. It
faces the same three options as the low-risk firm.
Internal finance in period 1: The high-risk firm would never fmance the unprofitable
period 1 project internally. In that case the bank would not monitor firm activity, so the
bad firm would have no strategic motive to undertake the unprofitable project.
Inactivity in period 1: If the high-risk firm is inactive in period 1 while good firms
acquire a debt history (that is, (6) and (7) hold), it faces period 2 interest rate r/ and
owns an amount of own funds L, = L at t = 1. In case of period 1 inactivity, the high-
risk firm's overall payoff is equal to the expected period 2 payoff Vir/;L).
Debt finance in period 1: At t = 0 the high-risk firm's alternative option is to be
active, take a bank loan and put L on a demand deposit. The bank monitors firm activity
in the first period. If the bank would take firm activity in period 1 as a signal of good
firm quality, the high-risk firm would be able to borrow at a favorable interest rate rg in
period 2. Its expected profit over two periods would then equal:
VD(rt,rg) = Pb{ (X-rt)It + V2(rg;L) } + (I-Pb){ - rtII + Virg;L-rllt) }
At t = 0, the high-risk firm will not deviate from the situation of period 1 inactivity if
VD(rt,rg) ::;; Vz{r/;L)
This is equivalent to
=B (8)
C. Reversing the pecking order: A separating equilibrium
Given that all first-generation firms have enough funds available at t = 0 to finance the
period 1 project internally, consider the separating equilibrium with the following
properties: (i) Good firms attract an unsecured bank loan at t = ° to induce the bank to
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monitor the firm; conditions (6) and (7) ensure that this is the case. (ii) Bad firms remain
inactive at t = 0, which is guaranteed by condition (8). (iii) All firms invest at t = 1; as
assumption (5) ensures nonnegative profit even for bad firms, it induces all firms to invest
at t = 1 (property iii).
In equilibrium bank competition drives down the period 1 equilibrium interest rate r,",
The period 1 rate satisfies two conditions. First, rl" must be such that banks earn
nonnegative profits. This implies rl" ~ rg as given by (2). Second, in equilibrium rl" must
also satisfy the incentive restriction (8), to keep bad firms from applying for a loan. So if
the separating equilibrium exists, the equilibrium interest rate rI" satisfies
rl" = max(rg,B)
Given assumption (5) and given r,' = max(rg,B), the separating equilibrium exists if and
only if conditions (6) and (7) hold. That is, the separating equilibrium exists if and only if
max(rg,B) :::;min(A,A') (9)
According to condition (9), a separating equilibrium exists if the period 1 interest rate is
high enough to generate nonnegative bank profit and to deter bad firms from taking a
bank loan, and if the rate is sufficiently low to keep borrowing attractive for good firms.
The monitoring cost of first-period debt financing increases with the size of the period
1 bank loan. The benefit of period 1 debt financing, a lower period 2 interest rate,
increases with the size of the second-period bank loan. So given the other parameters of
the model, the size of the period 2 bank loan relative to the size of the period 1 loan is
important for each firm's decision whether or not to take a bank loan in the first period. I
will therefore derive the equilibrium in terms of the ratio G == (lrL)/II, which is the ratio
of the period 2 loan size to the period 1 loan size.
The equilibrium conditions (5) and (9) can be restated in terms of G. Assumption (5) is
equivalent to G ~ Q/II' With regard to condition (9), straightforward calculations show
that there are unique critical values GI, G2 and G3 such that
rg s A iff G ~ GI
B :::;A iffG ~ G2
B :::;A' iff G :::;G3
So condition (9) holds if and only if rg ::;;A' and max(GI,GJ ::;;G :::;G3·
Next note that with regard to the first-period equilibrium interest rate rl" there exists a
unique parameter G" such that
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rg :::; B iff G :::; G'
If a separating equilibrium exists by (9), the equilibrium interest rate equals rl' = rg if G
:::; G'. In that case the bank: earns zero profit. Positive bank: profit occurs if G > G';
then rl' = B > rg. This proves the next Proposition:
Proposition 2. Assume rg :::;AI and G ~ QIIJ• If max(GJ, G.) :::; G :::; G3, a period 1
separating equilibrium exists with the following properties: High-risk firms remain
inactive in period 1. Low-risk firms prefer an unsecured period 1 bank loan of size IJ to
internal finance. The equilibrium of the period 2 subgame is given by Proposition 1. The
first-period equilibrium interest rate rJ' satisfies:
a) if G :::; G*, rJ' = rg• Banks earn zero expected profit.
b) if G > G*, r/ = B > rg. Banks earn strictly positive expected profit, even though the
period 2 informational rent is completely assumed by the low-risk firm.
The good finn signals its type by being active in period 1 and making sure that the bank:
monitors finn activity. The firm induces the bank: to monitor by taking an unsecured bank:
loan. The bad finn is deterred from taking a loan in the first period because its project is
unprofitable. If the bad finn's expected loss in period 1 is greater than the cost advantage
of obtaining a bank: loan in period 2 under favorable conditions, the bad finn prefers to
remain inactive in the first period.
Figure 1 depicts the expressions of inequality (9) in (G,rl)-space. If G < Q/II, the
period 2 bank: loan is so small relative to the amount of funds to be invested by the finn
that the bad firm prefers not to undertake the period 2 investment. In that case no adverse
selection problem exists in the second period since only good firms want to be active.
Good firms do not have to take a bank: loan to establish a reputation. If G :::; max(GI,G2)
the good finn's period 2 benefit from a first-period bank: loan is so low relative to the
cost of the bank: loan, that the finn prefers not to borrow in period 1. Therefore good
firms borrow in the first period only if G ~ max(GI,G2,Q/II)' If G becomes very large,
however (G > G3), the benefit of a good reputation is so large relative to the cost of
establishing a reputation that even the bad firm wants to establish a reputation. This
destroys the separating equilibrium. Therefore the separating equilibrium exists in the
region where max(Gt>G2,Q/II) :::; G :::; G3; see the marked part of the horizontal axis. In
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o max(G1,G2) 0/11 G* G3 4
G
this region, the equilibrium interest rate rl' is given by the (lower) line max(rg,B).
In this signaling equilibrium bank profit may be strictly positive (which is the case if
G* < G :::;G3), even though the bank's period 2 informational rent accrues totally to the
good firm. The reason is that the period 1 interest rate r, may have to be raised above the
zero-bank-profit interest rate rg, to keep bad firms from applying for a loan. This result
contrasts with Sharpe (1990). In Sharpe's model if banks acquire an informational rent in
period 2, competition in period 1 competes away this rent. Period 1 bank profit may thus
be negative and overall bank profit will always be zero. The crucial difference with this
chapter is that in Sharpe (1990) banks are unable to separate borrowers by type at the
beginning of period 1.
With regard to the theory of money demand, Proposition 2 gives a new explanation of
why firms hold cash balances. If a firm is in the process of building a reputation with a
bank, it may increase its liabilities by taking a bank loan, to induce the bank to monitor.
Its assets are increased as well, in the form of larger cash balances. The maturity
mismatch induces the bank to monitor. Thus, the model may explain why firms
sometimes hold larger cash balances than can be explained by existing micro-economic
theories of money demand, as discussed in the introductory section.
The prediction that reputational motives may explain the use of debt is related to
Hirschieifer and Thakor (1989). They consider a managerial labor market which can only
distinguish "success" versus "failure." The manager that wants to build a good reputation
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will choose to undertake the project with the highest success probability, even if a project
with somewhat lower success probability would yield higher expected payoff. Thus, the
manager acts in the interest of debtholders rather than equityholders. His firm may then
be expected to make relatively extensive use of debt.
From the general perspective of the chapter, the existence of the separating equilibrium
of Proposition 2 is important, as it supports the reversed pecking order. Of course,
existence of the separating equilibrium does not preclude the possibility that other
equilibria emerge. There are parameter constellations that yield the standard pecking
order result in which good firms prefer internal finance to debt finance. For instance, if
the monitoring cost involved with debt financing is sufficiently high -- so if condition (6)
is violated -- low-risk firms prefer internal finance to debt finance in period 1. Moreover,
if bad firms would not want to be active in period 2 -- so if condition (4) would be
violated because the amount of own funds to be brought in would be too high -- good
firms would have no reason to build up a reputation in period 1. Also in this case good
firms would prefer internal finance in period 1.
A separating equilibrium in which only the bad firm takes a bank loan in period 1 does
not exist. If the bank's beliefs would specify that taking a bank loan is a signal of bad
quality, the bad firm would prefer not to take the loan. If the bank's beliefs would specify
that taking a bank loan is a signal of good quality, the good firm would take a loan as
well, thus destroying any equilibrium. So within the class of separating equilibria, the
equilibrium derived in Proposition 2 is unique.
5.4. Robustness and generalizations of the model
A. The bank's monitoring technology
In this chapter the bank's monitoring technology allows the bank to monitor whether the
firm really invests. The bank does not directly observe (a signal of) the firm's type,
which accords with empirical evidence by Lummer and McConnell (1989). Several
authors have presented models with stronger assumptions, in which the lending bank's
private information about the borrower's type or the borrower's project return is better
than the information banks have in this chapter (see e.g. Hellwig (1990) for a discussion).
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If the bank would be able to directly observe a signal of the firm's type, the assumption
that the bad firm's project has negative net present value (Pt,X < 1) would no longer be
necessary to deter bad firms from trying to obtain a good reputation in the first period.
B. Information from observing checking accounts
A bank's access to checking accounts may be useful (see Black (1975), Fama (1985) and
Nakamura (1993)). If information about checking accounts in itself would be sufficient for
banks to distinguish successful firms from unsuccessful ones, bank monitoring would be
unnecessary and so would bank lending. In that case the good finn would simply invest
its own funds in the period 1 project and deposit the remaining funds with a bank. If the
bank could conclude from a rising balance that the project was successful in period 1, it
would pool all successful firms at a relatively low period 2 interest rate.
However, if banks would interpret a rising deposit balance as a good signal about a
firm's quality, high-risk firms could be induced to mislead banks by manipulating their
checking account balances. This would destroy any equilibrium without bank monitoring.
This chapter assumes that information about checking accounts alone is insufficient for the
bank. This accords with White (1993), who notes that if checking accounts would be the
banks' most important source of information, in practice one would observe both banks
making greater effort to obtain checking account exclusivity for their commercial and
consumer borrowers than they actually do, and non-bank lenders making special effort to
obtain this checking account information. But checking accounts information may still be
valuable in combination with monitoring, as the following extension of the model
illustrates.
Suppose that there exist good firms in two varieties. A fraction v of the good firms is
"very good," with success probability p., and a fraction l-v is "moderately good", with
success probability Pm < pvand Pg = vp, + (l-v)Pm. Moreover, assume that firms know
whether they are bad or good, but that good firms do not know whether they are very
good or moderately good. In the separating equilibrium in which all good firms take a
period 1 bank loan and bad firms do not, checking account information at the end of the
first period may be useful. The good fum that was successful in period 1 will own an
amount of liquid funds L, whereas the good fum that failed in the first period will own
only L - rill at the end of period 1. Both the firm and the bank will make a Bayesian
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update of their beliefs about the firm's type. The successful firm will be of the "very
good" type with conditional probability
Q = vpJ(vpv+(I-v)Pm) > v
The expected second period success probability of this firm will exceed the "average"
success probability Pg for good firms, The zero-bank-profit period 2 interest rate r, for
this firm will be lower than the average zero-bank-profit interest rate rg for good firms.
Similarly, the firm that was unsuccessful in period 1 pays a higher interest rate.
This simple example illustrates that checking account information may be useful in
conjunction with bank monitoring activity. Given that banks monitor borrowers'
investment projects, higher checking account balances may point to borrower success.
This may allow banks to make a Bayesian update of their beliefs about firms' types. The
example illustrates the casual observation that an important link: exists between checking
accounts and commercial loans. This informational explanation is complementary to
"operational" economies of scope that may exist in offering the two products jointly (see
Gendreau (1993) and Gilligan, Smirlock and Marshall (1984».
Sprenkle (1969) concludes that the main reason for large corporate cash balances is the
tradition in the US of holding compensating balances with banks to pay for banks'
services (see also Goodhart (1989». Chapter 5 argues that firms may take bank loans in
combination with demand deposits to induce banks to provide monitoring services."
C. Internal capital markets
This chapter considers only one source of outside funds: bank debt. Section 5.5 briefly
discusses how the central idea of this chapter might be applied to other sources of
financing as well. Here I discuss one type of external funds that might dominate bank
debt in a similar model, namely debt obtained from a firm that has related assets.
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) propose a model in which the only difference
between bank fmancing and related-firm fmancing is that in case of liquidation, the
related firm can redeploy the assets more effectively than the bank. Then bank financing
19 This may help to resolve the old dispute noted by Judd and Scadding (1982, p.lOlO) about the theoretical
role of compensating balances in influencing the level of deposits held by corporations. Hodgman (1961)
analyzed this issue under the assumption that banks are collusive and collectively force customers to hold greater
deposit balances in the aggregate than they otherwise would hold. Davis and Guttentag (1963) argue that such
collusion is improbable because rules for compensating balances would have to be well defined and publicized.
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is dominated by related-firm financing. In addition, if monitoring is easier when the
related firm owns the financed firm, their model may explain the advantages of an
"internal capital market." This internal capital market is different from the use of internal
funds in my model, because the internal capital market still involves an agency problem
between the internal financier and the project manager who uses the capital. My model
does not consider this agency problem."
5.5. Concluding remarks
Suppose that a low-risk firm wants to build up a good reputation with a bank, in order to
ensure favorable future loan conditions. Building up a reputation with a bank requires the
bank to monitor firm activity. This chapter argues that if bank monitoring effort is non-
contractible (as in Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Bester (1994) and this dissertation's
chapter 3), taking an unsecured bank loan may be an efficient way to induce the bank to
monitor firm activity. Firms that want to build up a good reputation may then take bank
loans even if they were able to finance projects internally. These firms' preference for
bank loans ahead of internal funds challenges a prediction of Myers and Majluf's (1984)
"pecking order theory" of financing. The model may explain empirical observations by
Ang and Jung (1993) and De Haan, Koedijk and De Vrijer (1992), but additional
empirical work is needed.
The focus of this chapter is rather narrow, as it only considers internal finance against
bank debt. An important topic for future research is to determine whether this chapter's
motivation wh high-quality firms may take bank debt instead of internal funds, namely,
to induce monitoring and thus establish a good reputation, applies to other sources of
finance as well. For instance, suppose that some high-quality firm would have a strategic
interest in gaining public recognition, that is, in reducing the information asymmetry with
potential future shareholders, as this would make future external financing cheaper. If
20 A disadvantage of an internal capital market relative to bank financing, however, is that it may be harder
to prevent collusion between the internal financier and the project manager than between an outside financier and
the project manager. Tirole (\992) discusses collusion in organizations; chapter 4 of this dissertation presents a
model of collusion in financial intermediation.
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outside equity would have an advantage with regard to inducing a broad public ("fInancial
markets ") to monitor the firm, this firm prefer might prefer outside equity to, say, bank
debt or internal finance. This would reverse another prediction of the pecking order
theory. Thakor (1993) notes that raising external financing when information is symmetric
dominates attempting to do so when information is asymmetric. If stockpiling cash by an
equity issue would induce fmancial markets to monitor, future external fmancing might be
obtained under symmetric (or less asymmetric) information. Then Thakor's (1993) result
that under asymmetric information stockpiling cash by an equity issue is a bad signal,
might be reversed. It would be very interesting to derive the exact conditions under which
this would be the case. The wish (or need) to be publicly monitored might explain why
equity fmancing seems so attractive in the real world, especially for high-growth firms."
The model also raises an interesting question with regard to the free-cash-flow
literature. Jensen (1986) notes that firm managers may have a tendency to waste cash
flows by investing funds in uneconomical projects, rather than to pursue increasing
dividends. He argues that debt reduces the agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the
cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. The reason is that debt
creation, without retention of the proceeds of the issue, forces managers to payout future
cash flows, whereas managers cannot credibly commit to dividend payments. Stulz (1990)
explicitly studies the trade-off between this positive effect of debt payments (reducing the
agency cost of managerial discretion) and the negative effect that debt payments may
inhibit profitable investment in other states of the world. In chapter 5, however, the firm
has liquid funds available at the beginning of period 1. Taking a bank loan leads to a
higher cash balance than would financing the investment internally. Debt creation in
period 1 does not satisfy Jensen's (1986) condition that the firm does not retain any cash
after the loan has been received. In contrast to Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), debt may
create an agency problem involved with too much cash, because the entrepreneur may be
tempted to run with the bank's money long before repayment is due. In this chapter bank
monitoring prevents this agency cost of debt. Still, the observation raises the question
how exactly debt creation solves the agency problem of too much cash. Does it help
21 The Economist, October 8th, 1994, refers to research at the Federal Reserve Board by Jean Helwege and
Nellie Liang, which indicates that for high-growth firms equity is much more attractive than can be explained by
current theory.
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mainly because debt forces cash payouts at certain dates, or does monitoring effort
deserve a more explicit role in the free-cash-flow literature?

Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift analyseert een aantal problemen op het vlak van bankieren en
bedrijfsfinanciering, met behulp van technieken afkomstig uit ~eSpeltheorie' el(cfe agency
theorie.
Hoofdstuk 1 leidt het proefschrift in. Het bespreekt kort de speltheorie en de agency
theorie, en maakt duidelijk waarom deze theoretische stromingen goed kunnen worden
~egepast bij het analyseren van het gedrag van banken en hun clienten. Vervolgens geeft
het hoofdstuk een overzicht van inzichten uit de modeme bancaire theorie, en van de
wijze waarop deze dissertatie enkele Iacunes in die theorie opvult.
Hoofdstuk 2, "Bankruptcy Litigation and Optimal Debt Contracts", analyseert een situatie
waarin de kredietnemer de opbrengst van een door de bank gefinancierd investerings-
project zonder problemen kan waamemen, terwiji de bank dit niet kan. De informatie-
voorsprong geeft de kredietnemer de kans om ongemerkt de opbrengst van het project ten
eigen bate aan te wenden, zonder de bankschuld af te lossen: "opzettelijke wanbetaling".
In de bancaire theorie wordt dit standaardprobleem doorgaans opgelost door aan te nemen
dat de bank in geval van wanbetaling de activa van de kredietnemer liquideert. Dit
vooruitzicht schrikt de kredietnemer zodanig af, dat hij er steeds voor kiest om terug te
beta len wanneer hij daartoe in staat is. In deze context dient liquidatie van ondememingen
dus alleen om opzettelijke wanbetaling te voorkomen.
Dit standaardmodel is niet geheel bevredigend om een aantal redenen. Ten eerste
gaan in de praktijk banken soms vrijwillig over tot herstructurering van de schuiden van
bedrijven in betalingsmoeilijkheden, en tot schuldkwijtschelding. Ten tweede kunnen
crediteuren niet zelf beslissen of de activa van een nalatige debiteur worden geliquideerd;
daar is een rechter voor nodig. In de derde plaats zijn er naast faillissement ook andere
factoren die een bedrijf weerhouden van opzettelijke wanbetaling, en die in het
standaardmodel niet voorkomen. Zo beperkt onderpand de neiging om niet volledig aan de
schuldverplichtingen te voidoen. Ais de bank bij wanbetaling het onderpand opeist, wordt
opzettelijke wanbetaling minder aantrekkelijk.
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Hoofdstuk 2 komt tegemoet aan deze kritiek en breidt het standaardmodel uit op
een aantal punten. De bank krijgt de mogelijkbeid om buiten de faillissementsprocedure
om over te gaan tot gedeeltelijke schuldkwijtschelding. Verder wordt, als de bank Diet tot
schuldverlichting besluit, een faillissementsaanvraag ingediend bij de faillissementsrechter.
De rechter kan beslissen tot reorganisatie over te gaan of tot liquidatie, afhankelijk van de
uitkomst van een imperfecte "test" (een gerechtelijk onderzoek).
Deze uitbreidingen van het model vergroten de kans dat een kredietnemer die Diet
terugbetaalt, ontkomt aan faillissement. De neiging tot opzettelijke wanbetaling zal dus
groter zijn dan in het standaardmodel. Het hoofdstuk gaat na op welke wijze het inbrengen
van onderpand deze neiging onderdrukt. Het optimale kredietcontract (rente en onderpand)
. --
hangt af van de opstelling an de bank ("hard", d~.z. Diet of nauwelijks schulden
kwijtscheldend, of " oepel'') , van de kwaliteit van de rechtbank, en van de positie van
crediteuren in geval van faillissement. Naarmate de bank soepeler is, de kwaliteit van de
rechtbank lager, en de positie van crediteuren in geval van faillissement slechter, zal het
kredietcontract strikter zijn om mogelijk ongewenste gedragseffecten te compenseren.
Tevens suggereert het model dat kredietnemers met een relatief lage kans op succes
een grotere neiging zullen hebben om, in geval zij toch succesvol zijn, alsnog tot
opzettelijke wanbetaling te besluiten. Om deze neiging te verminderen zullen zij meer
onderpand moeten inbrengen dan kredietnemers met een relatief hoge succeskans.
Hoofdstuk 3, "Financial Intermediation, Bank Failure and Official Assistance", beschouwt
een situatie waarin Diet kredietnemers (als in hoofdstuk 2) maar banken in financiele
moeilijkbeden kunnen komen. Het hoofdstuk bestudeert de rol van overheidsinterventie in
de banksector.
Een functie van overheidsinterventie in het bankwezen is vergelijkbaar met die van
faillissementsrechters in andere bedrijfstakken. Als een bank in grate problemen is
gekomen, kan dat leiden tot liquidatie van deze instelling. Deposanten delegeren de
uitvoering van de liquidatie aan overheden.
Overheden kunnen ook, als een alternatief voor liquidatie, besluiten probleem-
banken te hulp te schieten. Aldus kunnen zij het welvaartsverlies dat optreedt bij
grootschalige bankfaillissementen, voorkomen of beperken. Dit welvaartsverlies bestaat uit
verschillende componenten. Het monetaire effect van grootschalige bankfaillissementen,
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een sterke inkrimping van de geldhoeveelheid, heeft negatieve effecten op de reele
economie. Bovendien beeindigen bankfaillissementen de (soms langdurige) relaties tussen
banken en kredietnemers. Deze relaties zijn waardevol, onder meer omdat informatie-
problemen tussen beide partijen geleidelijk zijn afgenomen tijdens de duur van de relatie.
Bij bankfaillissementen gaat veel van deze informatie over kredietnemers verloren. Dit
vormt een niet-monetaire kost van bankfaillissementen, wanneer als gevolg van deze
faillissementen de kosten van bankkrediet voor bedrijven stijgen.
Overheidssteun kan het welvaartsverlies van grootschalige bankfaillissementen
voorkomen. Een probleem van assistentie door overheden is echter dat het vooruitzicht
-- -------van assistentie kan leiden tot een "moral hazard'bprobleem bij banken. Banken kunnen
geneigd zijn een riskantere strategie te volgen dan wanneer de overheid nooit te hulp zou
- -
schieten. De overheid moet dan ook een optimale tussenweg zoeken: Aan de ene kant
moet het welvaartsverIies van bankfaillissement worden beperkt door sommige
probleembanken overeind te houden. Aan de andere kant moet worden voorkomen dat dit
beleid riskanter bankgedrag uitlokt en daardoor de kans op bankfaillissement vergroot.
Hoofdstuk 3 analyseert deze afruil. Bet laat zien op welke wij~(h~ooruitzicht I
van) staatssteun aan probleembanken het kredietbeleid van alle banken kan doen
verslechteren. Het hoofdstuk leidt af dat de overheid banken onzeker moet houden over de
vraag of de overheid te hulp zal schieten in geval van problemen. Soms zullen banken
overeind worden gehouden, waardoor het welvaartsverlies van bankfaillissement wordt
beperkt. Tegelijkertijd kan door deze onzekerheid het negatieve effect dat verwachte
overheidssteun heeft op bankgedrag, worden vermeden.
Hoofdstuk 4, "Collusion and Hierarchy in Banking", bestudeert de organisatie van de
kredietverlening binnen banken. Het hoofdstuk gaat na hoe banken hun kredietbeleid
moeten vormgeven in het licht van interne agencyproblemen die bij de kredietverlening
een rol kunnen spelen. Het vormt op dit punt een uitbreiding van hoofdstuk 3. In dat
hoofdstuk wordt weliswaar aangenomen dat banken ervoor kunnen kiezen een zorgvuldig
kredietbeleid te voeren, maar daar wordt niet stilgestaan bij de vraag hoe zo'n beleid moet
worden ingericht.
Er wordt weI gezegd dat de "loan officer" die een krediet verstrekt soms een wat
gunstiger beeld heeft van de kredietwaardigheid van zijn client, de kredietnemer, dan
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iemand die er wat afstandelijker tegenaan kijkt. Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert dit probleem. De
loan officer heeft contact met een potentiele kredietnemer, en is in eerste instantie beter op
de hoogte van de kwaliteit van die kredietnemer dan de bankdirectie. Het persoonlijke
contact tussen loan officer en kredietnemer kan echter leiden tot een vertekening van het
oordeel van de loan officer, waardoor deze een te rooskleurig beeld schetst van de
kredietnemer. Als dit gebeurt, spreken we van ·'collrl" (de loan officer en de
kredietnemer spannen samen, misschien onbewust, tegen de bank).
De bankdirectie - die uiteindelijk verantwoordelijk is voor de winst behaald op het
krediet - wil collusie voorkomen, om ervoor te zorgen dat zo min mogelijk kredieten
worden verstrekt aan ondememers die onvoldoende kredietwaardig zijn. Het bestrijden
van collusie kan op twee manieren: door centralisatie of door delegeren. De bank zoekt de
optimale wijze om collusie te voorkomen.
In geval van centralisatie wordt de kredietcommissie ingeschakeld. Deze commissie
bestaat uit mensen die geen contact hebben met de client, en daardoor niet aan collusie
blootstaan. Als de kredietcommissie wordt ingeschakeld, neemt de loan officer niet zelf de
kredietbeslissing maar moet deze een kredietvoorstel opsturen naar de commissie. De
kredietcommissie kan een controle uitvoeren van dit rapport. Deze controle brengt collusie
aan het licht, en stelt vast of de door de loan officer aanbevolen kredietnemer wei of niet
kredietwaardig is. Als de loan officer een kredietnemer onterecht heeft aanbevolen, wordt
geen krediet verstrekt. Controles door de kredietcommissie beperken aldus de kans dat
collusie optreedt.
De tweede wijze waarop collusie kan worden beperkt is via delegeren. De
beloningsstructuur van de loan officer moet dan zodanig worden vormgegeven dat collusie
- leidend tot het onterecht aanbevelen van een niet-kredietwaardige kredietnemer -
ongunstiger is dan het vellen van een objectief oordeel. In dat geval moet de bank loan
officers niet aileen belonen voor het aanbrengen van nieuwe kredietrelaties, maar ook voor
het afwijzen van kredietnemers van onvoldoende kwaliteit - uiteraard zonder loan officers
te stimuleren tijd te verspillen aan het eerst opzoeken en vervolgens afwijzen van niet-
kredietwaardige clienten.
Het model geeft aan dat voor kleinere kredieten de kredietbevoegdheid bij de loan
officer moet worden gelegd (delegeren), terwijl voor grotere kredieten collusie beter
bestreden kan worden door de kredietcommissie in te schakelen (centraliseren). Dit geeft
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een verklaring voor het gegeven dat banken in de praktijk vaak kredietlimieten hanteren,
waarbij voor leningen die de limiet overschrijden de kredietbeslissing centraal wordt
genomen door de kredietcommissie.
Hoofdstuk 5 is getiteld "Internal Finance versus Bank Debt: Reversing the Pecking Order
Theory of Financing". Het geeft een verklaring (afgezien van fiscale motieven) voor de
situatie dat sommige bedrijven liever bankkrediet nemen dan gebruik te maken van interne
financie;ing, zelfs als bankkrediet informatiekosten (€n~ost} met zich meebrengt en
interne financiering niet. Oat gaat in tegen een bekend theoretisch resultaat van Myers en
Majluf (1984) dat bedrijven interne financiering prefereren wegens de afwezigheid van
informatiekosten. Evenals in hoofdstuk 3 spe\en in dit hoofdstuk de voordelen van
\angdurige relaties tussen banken en bedrijven een belangrijke rol.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschouwt een bedrijf dat in de toekomst, maar nu nog niet, behoefte
heeft aan externe financiering. Dit bedrijf heeft nu de keuze tussen intern financieren en
bankkrediet. Het voordeel van (eigenlijk overbodig) bankkrediet nu, is dat de bank in dat
g~eer informatie oQbouwt over het bedrijf (onder meer door kredietgesprekken en
kredietrevisies) dan wanneer het bedrijf aIleen een deposito zou aanhouden. Een goed
bedrijf is hierbij gebaat, opdat de bank in de toekomst, wanneer het bedrijf echt krediet
nodig heeft, een duidelijker beeld zal hebben van het bedrijf. Oat resulteert mogelijk in
gunstigere toekomstige kredietvoorwaarden. Als dat toekomstige voordeel groter is dan he~ I
nadeel van de extra kosten van bankkrediet nu, kiest dat bedrijf voor bankkrediet in plaats
.---
van interne financiering. Oat bedrijf zal dus, om bij de bank een reputatie op te bouwen,
al in een eerder stadium bankkrediet nemen in plaats van intern te financieren - ook al
heeft het bedrijf voldoende liquiditeiten.
Aldus biedt het hoofdstuk een theoretische verklaring voor een verschijnsel dat in .
enkele empirische studies aan het licht kwam: Sommige bedrijven fmancieren hun
investeringen liever met bankkrediet dan uit hun eigen liquide middelen.
---- --- -
In dat geval houdt het bedrijf grotere voorraden liquiditeiten aan (in combinatie met
bankleningen) dan verklaard kan worden door traditionele micro-economische theorieen
van de optimale geldvraag. Het hoofdstuk heeft dus ook implicaties voor de theorie van de
vraag naar geld door bedrijven. Bestaande theorieen blijken de werkelijke vraag naar
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